1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	OAKES,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 51
7	PATEL, et al.,
8	Appellants.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	February 14, 2013
12	Before:
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
16	Appearances:
17	
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Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We're going to do
2	number 51, Oakes v. Patel.
3	Counselor, would you like any rebuttal
4	time?
5	MS. FLAHERTY: One minute, please, Your
6	Honor.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One minute. Go
8	ahead. You're on.
9	MS. FLAHERTY: Amy Flaherty on behalf of
10	the appellant Kaleida Health. It is my intention
11	this morning this afternoon, to address two
12	issues before the court, to primarily focus on the
13	release issue and the additur issue.
14	With respect to the release issue, the
15	court below erred in finding that the releases were
16	null and void which were signed by the plaintiff
17	-
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: How long how
19	long after the release did this all come up to the
20	court?
21	MS. FLAHERTY: Your Honor, the release
22	issue came up following the first trial. Kaleida
23	Health obtained copies of the releases following the
24	first trial, and very shortly thereafter made the
25	motion to amend their answer to assert the

motion to amend their answer to assert the

1	affirmative defenses of release and of general
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: You don't
3	MS. FLAHERTY: obligation law.
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: you don't disagree
5	that it's a discretionary call by the court?
6	MS. FLAHERTY: In general, I would agree
7	that motions for leave to amend are discretionary
8	decisions. In this particular case, the Fourth
9	Department erred when it found, essentially, that the
10	releases were null and void, so that
11	JUDGE SMITH: Well, even even if they
12	weren't null and void, wasn't there wasn't
13	there a reason not to allow the amend I mean,
14	you could have found those releases sooner.
15	MS. FLAHERTY: Your Honor, what is
16	demonstrated in this record is that as soon as the
17	releases came to the attention of counsel and copies
18	provided to them by the
19	JUDGE SMITH: Well, could they
20	MS. FLAHERTY: liquidator, they were
21	
22	JUDGE SMITH: who couldn't
23	- were they unavailable to counsel before that? I
24	mean
25	MS. FLAHERTY: Your Honor

1 JUDGE SMITH: - - - you had, in fact, signed a rather similar document - - -2 3 MS. FLAHERTY: But not until 2007, Your Honor. What this record shows is the information 4 5 that was being provided to both the attorney for Kaleida Health as well as to the client itself, 6 7 Kaleida Health, was that Kaleida Health had no 8 insurance coverage because it, in fact, had not filed 9 a proof of claim, back - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: But isn't that - - -11 MS. FLAHERTY: - - - in 2003. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - isn't that collateral 13 in so many ways? I mean, we've had liquidations in 14 insurance companies before, and usually that's the 15 problem of the defense. And if the defense wants a 16 stay of a proceeding because they don't have any 17 insurance or something like that, it happens. It just struck me that there's an awful lot 18 19 of issues that are attached to the entire liquidation 20 procedure there that, apparently, the court didn't 21 want to handle that late in the game. 22 MS. FLAHERTY: Your Honor, what the court 23 found, basically - - - the trial court found - - -2.4 was that there was no procedural vehicle to allow the

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amendment - - -

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor
2	MS. FLAHERTY: which
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: counselor, but
4	didn't by not raising it earlier, didn't you
5	greatly affect the trial, the tactics?
6	MS. FLAHERTY: No, Your Honor.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No?
8	MS. FLAHERTY: We did not. No. And let me
9	explain why, if I could?
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure.
11	MS. FLAHERTY: With respect to this
12	particular case where Kaleida Health had a self-
13	insured retention of two million dollars and was
14	controlling the defense; where there were several
15	other physicians involved and liability was contested
16	remember, we're talking about having an excess
17	policy with PHICO there was always going to
18	need to be a liability trial.
19	JUDGE SMITH: Yes, but
20	MS. FLAHERTY: That was always going to
21	happen.
22	JUDGE SMITH: doesn't the what
23	about the wouldn't the strategy of the
24	liability trial change if the plaintiff had known
25	that Kaleida had well, maybe it's sort of half

1 a release, that is, it's a release as to its own acts 2 but not Dent's? Wouldn't the plaintiff have been - -3 - have been screaming about Dent the whole trial? 4 MS. FLAHERTY: Your Honor, with respect to 5 this, you have to go back and look at our record and the motions that were made before the trial court. 6 7 And when you look at those, plaintiff has certainly 8 claimed prejudice in terms of the timing of the 9 assertion of the release. But in fact - - - and 10 those papers have not shown prejudice. If you look 11 at each of the arguments that were made - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well, what about - - -12 13 MS. FLAHERTY: - - - by the plaintiff, they don't bear - - -14 15 JUDGE SMITH: - - - well, what about - - -16 MS. FLAHERTY: - - - out. 17 JUDGE SMITH: - - - what's the answer to 18 this particular argument? I don't know whether they 19 make it or not, but couldn't they make the argument, we were actually trying - - - although they tried 20 21 unsuccessfully to get Dent out of the verdict sheet. 22 If we had known that Dent was the only - - - that 23 Dent's liability was the only way to get to your 2.4 insurance policy, we would not have tried to make

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Dent a bit player.

1 MS. FLAHERTY: Your Honor, with respect to that, first of all, in terms of the appeal itself, 2 3 they still could have appealed, from the final 4 judgment, the decision by the trial court to let Dent 5 out of the case - - -6 JUDGE SMITH: No, my question - - -7 MS. FLAHERTY: - - - not to pursue. 8 JUDGE SMITH: - - - my question is, I mean, 9 they - - - as I read - - - as I read - - - what I've 10 read of the record, it looks like the plaintiff's 11 strategy was to minimize Dent's responsibility, 12 indeed, to cast doubt on the testimony that 13 implicated Dent. Wouldn't they have done otherwise if they'd realized that there was a release defense 14 15 that was inapplicable to Dent? 16 MS. FLAHERTY: No, Your Honor. I think 17 what would happen in those circumstances, if there was, in fact, a disclaimer with respect to Dent, but 18 19 there was not in this case - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You don't think this 21 affected the apportionment and what went on here? 22 mean - - -23 MS. FLAHERTY: No, Your Honor. Again - - -2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - how could it 25 not? How could it not?

1 MS. FLAHERTY: Because there always was 2 going to be a liability trial. And in fact, 3 plaintiff would not have changed their strategy, 4 because, basically, the most insurance coverage, the 5 most - - - the deepest pocket was always going to be Kaleida Health. 6 7 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Explain - - -8 JUDGE READ: Could you talk about the 9 additur a little bit before you - - -10 MS. FLAHERTY: Yes, Your Honor. I would -11 JUDGE READ: - - - run out of time? 12 13 MS. FLAHERTY: - - - very much like to. 14 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Just before you go into the 15 additur, I just have one more question on this. What are you saying our standard of review is, then? 16 17 Aren't we still limited to whether there was an abuse of discretion by the trial court determination? 18 19 MS. FLAHERTY: Your Honor, I would refer 2.0 this court to their decision in Edenwald. And in 21 that particular case, this court looked at the 22 prejudice argument which was asserted by the 23 plaintiff, and found as a matter of law that there 2.4 was no prejudice and that the amendment could have

been - - - should have been permitted.

1	So under the circumstances of this case,
2	this court can do the same. It can also look at the
3	prejudice argument
4	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You want us to say the
5	plaintiff wasn't prejudiced
6	MS. FLAHERTY: As a matter of law, Your
7	Honor.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: by this proposed
9	amendment?
LO	MS. FLAHERTY: Yes.
L1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: As a matter of law.
L2	MS. FLAHERTY: As a matter of law
L3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Okay.
L4	MS. FLAHERTY: given the arguments
L5	that were
L6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, go to
L7	additur.
L8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Go to additur.
L9	MS. FLAHERTY: With respect to the additur
20	the Fourth Department, of course, held in this
21	particular case that the appellant well, that
22	the defendants had failed to preserve the additur
23	argument.
24	I want to direct, first and foremost,
25	hecause I think it's very important this court back

1	in time, to when the initial motion was made by the
2	plaintiff. Because the Fourth Department found that
3	there was not preservation at the level of the trial
4	court. So if we put ourselves back, that means that
5	the plaintiff has a verdict in his favor.
6	The plaintiff then moves to
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But aren't you kind
8	of taking it
9	MS. FLAHERTY: set aside
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't your strategy -
11	were you sort of taking an all-or-nothing
12	approach?
13	MS. FLAHERTY: No, Your Honor.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: One is good, one's
15	not good
16	MS. FLAHERTY: No.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: period; that's
18	the end of the story?
19	MS. FLAHERTY: No, Your Honor, and if I
20	could
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why
22	MS. FLAHERTY: if I could elaborate
23	in terms of this preservation issue, because I think
24	it's important
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.

MS. FLAHERTY: - - - and then address your 1 2 issue as well. 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes. 4 MS. FLAHERTY: With respect to that, going 5 back in time to when the motion was initially made, 6 this Fourth Department decision requires defendants -7 - - us, in this particular case - - - in order to 8 preserve the issue, to have opposed the motion to set 9 aside as well as to offer an alternative argument 10 that should this court direct additur, it should be 11 to a particular sum. 12 Again, back in time when the court has not 13 yet heard that motion, has not yet decided the motion 14 to set aside the verdict, essentially we have to - -15 16 JUDGE SMITH: Assume you're - - -17 MS. FLAHERTY: - - - anticipate - - -18 JUDGE SMITH: - - - assume you're right - -19 2.0 MS. FLAHERTY: Um-hum. 21 JUDGE SMITH: - - - assume you're right 22 about that. Isn't there still something troublesome? 23 Assume you're right on the preservation point, or 2.4 Justice Peradotto is right on the preservation point, 25 isn't there something troublesome about your coming

1	up after the second trial, when you know how the
2	second trial comes out, and say, okay, now give me
3	the choice I should have had after the first trial?
4	MS. FLAHERTY: No, Your Honor. The
5	standard for preservation is
6	JUDGE SMITH: I'm not asking a preservation
7	question.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Why didn't you
9	MS. FLAHERTY: In terms of I believe
10	it answers your question.
11	JUDGE GRAFFEO: why didn't you appeal
12	initially, after the first trial?
13	MS. FLAHERTY: We did appeal, Your Honor.
14	We appealed; we filed a notice of appeal. This trial
15	judge
16	JUDGE SMITH: You did not
17	MS. FLAHERTY: then scheduled trial -
18	
19	JUDGE SMITH: you did not get a stay.
20	MS. FLAHERTY: in March. We did not
21	get a stay. There was not sufficient time to perfect
22	that appeal.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: Why the same thing had
24	struck me. You can get a stay. I mean, if the trial
25	judge doesn't give one, you can go get one at the

1	Appellate Division.
2	MS. FLAHERTY: We did try, as well
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: Because it's bonded.
4	MS. FLAHERTY: to move for a stay.
5	And to be forthright, it was on the grounds so we
6	could pursue the appeal from the amendment. But it
7	was vigorously opposed, both at the trial court
8	JUDGE SMITH: Did you
9	MS. FLAHERTY: and at the Fourth
10	Department by that. There was not time to have this
11	particular appeal heard and decided.
12	JUDGE SMITH: Did the Appellate Division
13	deny a stay?
14	MS. FLAHERTY: As well. Yes. But with
15	respect to
16	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay
17	MS. FLAHERTY: that's going back to
18	what the relevant issue was in front of the Fourth
19	Department. The Fourth Department, in looking at
20	this appeal, always had to decide what the minimum
21	amount that the plaintiff was entitled to
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
23	MS. FLAHERTY: receive.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, okay.
25	You'll have your

1	MS. FLAHERTY: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: rebuttal.
3	Thank you.
4	Counselor, would you like any of your four
5	minutes for rebuttal?
6	MR. MILLER: No, thank you, Your Honor.
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Good, go.
8	MR. MILLER: Your Honor, Gregory Miller on
9	behalf of the defendant-appellant, Satish Mongia. I
10	would like to use my four minutes to discuss an issue
11	that is derivative, I think, of the additur issue and
12	essentially flows downhill, and that is the
13	preclusion of certain evidence at the second damages-
14	only trial.
15	JUDGE SMITH: This is your the expert
16	that you had disclosed?
17	MR. MILLER: That's correct.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What do you hope to
19	show with the expert?
20	MR. MILLER: What did I hope to show
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
22	MR. MILLER: with the expert?
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
24	MR. MILLER: What we hoped to show, not
25	only with the expert, but through any proof at

1	during the course of the trial, was that there was a
2	certain amount of damages that would have been
3	sustained by the plaintiff anyway, even without
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You want to mitigate
5	
6	MR. MILLER: the defendant's
7	agencies.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: yes, you want -
9	
10	MR. MILLER: Correct.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: to mitigate
12	your damages.
13	MR. MILLER: That's correct, Your Honor.
14	JUDGE SMITH: Did the expert disclosure say
15	that?
16	MR. MILLER: The expert disclosure
17	specifically stated that the testimony would be given
18	only to the extent that those conditions could have
19	been that his injuries could have been avoided
20	or ameliorated with an earlier diagnosis.
21	JUDGE SMITH: I guess I didn't really see
22	that in the expert disclosure. I think the expert
23	disclosure sounded like it was a general you
24	know, it covered everything, including the standard
25	of care. I just didn't see you I mean, I

understand your point that causation is a damages issue if you say only part of the injury was caused by causation - - by this negligence. I just didn't see it in the disclosure.

2.4

MR. MILLER: The import of the disclosure was simply to elucidate for this jury and actually - - - and to be fair, the preclusion of the expert is only one piece of the puzzle of the preclusion at the trial.

JUDGE SMITH: Okay. So you say there was a broader preclusion of what should have been proper damages proof?

MR. MILLER: That's correct, Judge.

JUDGE SMITH: What other rulings do you complain of other than that one based on the motion to preclude that expert?

MR. MILLER: Other than the motion in limine, I would direct Your Honors' attention to pages 13,371 of the record with respect to the testimony of the physiatrist, Dr. Janet Kent. And actually, I apologize. The record is 13,368 to 13,384. During the course of Dr. Kent's testimony on direct, Mr. Letro had asked a number of questions regarding an aneurism that developed in the plaintiff's groin as a result of a catheterization

1	attempt that was made to discover and actually
2	diagnose the aneurism.
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: Was this addressed at the
4	appellate level?
5	MR. MILLER: It was briefed at the
6	appellate level, but not discussed by the court.
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: Are you asking us to
8	overrule an evidentiary ruling by the Supreme Court?
9	MR. MILLER: No, Your Honor. What I'm
10	asking you to do I'm simply saying that this is
11	another aspect of not only is it an aspect of -
12	
13	JUDGE SMITH: What do you mean "no"? You
14	are
15	MR. MILLER: Excuse me?
16	JUDGE SMITH: aren't you? You say
17	the Supreme Court erred and you want us to reverse.
18	The Supreme Court erred, the Appellate Division erred
19	in affirming, and you want us to reverse. I thought
20	that's what an appeal was?
21	MR. MILLER: That's correct. Maybe I
22	misunderstood Judge Pigott's
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: Oh, I think you understood
24	it. I guess Judge Smith is asking it in a different
25	way.

1 JUDGE SMITH: Maybe I didn't. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: You're saying he made a 3 ruling that you think was wrong? MR. MILLER: In preclusion of the evidence, 4 5 not only the expert proof on the motion in limine, but also - - -6 7 JUDGE PIGOTT: With respect to the - - -MR. MILLER: - - - the proof - - - with 8 9 respect to the proof that was allowed to be brought 10 out on cross-examination during the course of the 11 trial. JUDGE PIGOTT: Yes. I'm wondering how we 12 13 get there. I mean, generally, we don't deal with 14 evidentiary rulings by the trial court. 15 MR. MILLER: Understood. But that is just - - - I only bring it up - - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: Fuel for the fire. 17 MR. MILLER: Fuel to the fire, exactly. 18 19 I believe that the overall preclusion of 20 the proof related to the amount of damages that would 21 have been sustained had it not been for the 22 defendant's alleged negligence or proven negligence. 23 JUDGE PIGOTT: Are you tying that to the 2.4 preclusion on the expert? In other words, are you 25

saying you didn't get your expert and then this

1 testimony came in, and but for that, your expert would have - - - would have been more germane? 2 3 MR. MILLER: Correct. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 5 Thanks. 6 MR. MILLER: Thank you. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor? 8 MS. CAMPBELL: May it please the court, Ann 9 Campbell on behalf of Rajnikant Patel, M.D. With 10 respect to the issue of the - - - I believe some of 11 the questioning as to the preclusion - - -12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes. 13 MS. CAMPBELL: - - - addressed the offer of 14 proof. And I would submit that the colloquy that 15 occurred among counsel and the court established that 16 the court was well aware of what the purpose of the 17 expert proof - - -JUDGE SMITH: And I see that. But still, 18 if it's not in the disclosure - - - I mean, it may be 19 20 that in the discussion that counsel was having with 21 the court, that counsel was right and the court was 22 wrong. But still, if it's not - - - if the 23 disclosure that he precluded doesn't really say this, 2.4 can we reverse him?

MS. CAMPBELL: Well, Your Honor, I - - -

because the judge - - - the trial judge did distill 1 2 it and he understood it perfectly when he said, "The 3 issue is you want to show that regardless of a timely intervention, the plaintiff still would have had 4 deficits, " that's exactly - - -5 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: Where are you in - - -7 MS. CAMPBELL: That is 12,277 of the record 8 and 12,281 of the record. So that the trial judge 9 understood perfectly what the purpose was for the 10 expert disclosures for the experts - - -11 JUDGE SMITH: You're saying failings in the 12 disclosure were really remedied in the colloquy? 13 MS. CAMPBELL: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. 14 And getting back to the additur issue, we 15 ask the court to look at the case - - - this court's 16 case of Geraci v. Probst. That's a 2010 case. 17 there the standard for preservation was, was the Appellate Division alerted to the relevant question 18 19 and given an opportunity to correct the error? 20 And we submit that yes, that was the case. 21 When the Appellate Division looked - - - the 22 Appellate Division looked at that first - - -23 JUDGE READ: Well, let's assume it's - - -2.4 MS. CAMPBELL: - - - verdict - - -25 JUDGE READ: - - - preserved; what should

they have done?

2.4

MS. CAMPBELL: They should have - - - they should have then evaluated what was the minimum - - - they all agreed that 5.1 million dollars was not adequate. So there was some discussion, obviously, among the court about that was not an appropriate number. What we understand ordinarily happens when an Appellate Division looks at the - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: After the second case is finished, this is what ordinarily happens?

MS. CAMPBELL: Well, Your Honor, we were - as Ms. Flaherty alluded to, we - - -

JUDGE READ: You had no choice.

MS. CAMPBELL: - - - there was just simply not enough time.

JUDGE READ: There was no choice.

JUDGE PIGOTT: You're - - - I know your time is up, but can you explain to me you didn't have any choice? Because I just find - - - I would think that you'd be running around trying to find every judge you could to say we cannot try this case again. There's too many issues, there's too many things that we've got to take up to Rochester. And, you know, we'll post a bond; we'll do - - - you know, I mean -

25 | -

Τ	MS. CAMPBELL: Well, there was an effort to
2	put in to
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: I guess you went to both.
4	MS. CAMPBELL: enter an interlocutory
5	order judgment, rather. And that was denied.
6	And then there was an attempt to we did sit
7	with one of the Appellate Division judges and
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did
9	MS. CAMPBELL: attempted to get a
10	stay.
11	JUDGE SMITH: So you went only to one
12	judge? You didn't get a ruling from the full court?
13	MS. CAMPBELL: That's correct.
14	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did you make a motion
15	MS. CAMPBELL: If I recall.
16	JUDGE GRAFFEO: did you make a motion
17	to set aside the verdict, claiming at the trial
18	court level, claiming that the
19	MS. CAMPBELL: We
20	JUDGE GRAFFEO: proposed additur was
21	beyond the minimum that the jury could have found
22	reasonable?
23	MS. CAMPBELL: At the trial court level,
24	Your Honor?
25	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Yes.

1	MS. CAMPBELL: I guess the question I would
2	have is what was the what would be the
3	mechanism for doing that?
4	JUDGE SMITH: You
5	MS. CAMPBELL: We appealed.
6	JUDGE SMITH: so did you did
7	you object to the I guess the point is, did you
8	after the trial court you obviously
9	you've moved to set aside the verdict, because you
10	did set it aside.
11	MS. CAMPBELL: We did not move to set aside
12	the verdict.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: You wanted it?
14	MS. CAMPBELL: We we were we
15	were okay with
16	JUDGE SMITH: I'm sorry, the plaintiffs
17	- the plaintiffs moved to set aside the verdict. You
18	said the verdict's fine.
19	MS. CAMPBELL: Yes.
20	JUDGE SMITH: On damages?
21	MS. CAMPBELL: On damage well, and
22	apportionment.
23	JUDGE SMITH: Yes. And the judge said no,
24	it's not fine, it's got to be X dollars higher. And
25	you never said no, it should be X minus Y dollars

1	higher?
2	MS. CAMPBELL: Well, Your Honor, because
3	what was the mechanism for us to do that?
4	JUDGE SMITH: You say there's no
5	MS. CAMPBELL: We appealed.
6	JUDGE SMITH: point in doing that.
7	MS. CAMPBELL: We filed a notice of appeal.
8	I
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry. But there's no -
10	there's no I mean, let's assume for a
11	minute that the five-million-dollar judgment had been
12	entered. You still could have appealed that, right?
13	I mean, it wasn't like you were so satisfied with it
14	that you were going to write a check at the
15	courthouse steps?
16	MS. CAMPBELL: The dreaded hypothetical.
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: It's all right. I think I
18	understand.
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Good.
20	MS. CAMPBELL: I want to make sure I answer
21	your question
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, counsel.
23	MS. CAMPBELL: Your Honor. I guess
24	I'm just not quite understanding what you're asking
25	of me.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, what we were talking 1 2 is if you were satisfied with the five-point - - -3 five-million-dollar verdict. And what I'm suggesting 4 is maybe, maybe not. I mean, it's over, and then 5 there's a judgment filed. And I would think within thirty days there might be another paper filed rather 6 7 than a check being written. But I guess we'll never 8 know. 9 JUDGE SMITH: Well, but you - - - but you 10 weren't - - - assuming you were stuck on liability, 11 you weren't complaining about what the first jury did 12 on damages? 13 MS. CAMPBELL: Dr. Patel did not. We urged the court to affirm the jury's verdict. 14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 16 Thanks. 17 MS. CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor? 18 19 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. If it pleases the 20 court, I'm Ronald Wright. I'm here with Francis M. 21 Letro on behalf of the respondents, Oakes. 22 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Go ahead, counselor. 23 MR. WRIGHT: Responding to the question of 2.4 the additur, I just want to bring out the questions

regarding the stay and the issue of the stay. When

1	they sought the stay between the first and the second
2	trial, they were only seeking a stay to appeal the
3	issues with respect to the release issue. They did
4	not at all mention anything to do with settings. In
5	fact, they said we are not going to deal with any
6	issues with respect to the apportionment
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What was their
8	strategy that they were saying that?
9	MR. WRIGHT: Well, they said they could do
10	that quickly and
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: Was that in the record
12	MR. WRIGHT: it would be a limited
13	issue.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean
15	MR. WRIGHT: Yes. The motions for stay are
16	in the record.
17	JUDGE PIGOTT: That's all right, I can find
18	it.
19	MR. WRIGHT: I probably but, yes
20	-
21	JUDGE SMITH: Can you give
22	MR. WRIGHT: I think they're part of
23	the supplemental record, as a matter of
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
25	JUDGE SMITH: Don't do it now, but give

- can you give it to us in some form, because it's kind of a big record.

MR. WRIGHT: Just a little bit. Just a little bit. Absolutely. Yes. I do believe that we

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little bit. Absolutely. Yes, I do believe that was part of the supplemental record, however. So I think that does address some of the issues that even when they had the opportunity, they never once said hey, listen, we want to appeal this large additur, we think it's too high, give us a chance. Because, as we, you know, argue on our papers, once you hit the second trial, that radically changes the nature of the relief form.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But Judge Peradotto thought it was preserved.

MR. WRIGHT: Well, she did. She argued that was preserved. Of course, the majority did not. And I would argue they took the position all along that the first verdict was correct. There should be no additur whatsoever.

JUDGE SMITH: So did they have to suggest in the alternative a number that they thought would - - was - - - would have been adequate?

MR. WRIGHT: At the very least, they had to indicate a willingness to take an additur anything - - of any amount - - -

1	JUDGE SMITH: They would have taken a
2	dollar. You knew that.
3	MR. WRIGHT: Well, at least based on the
4	representations throughout the proceedings, they said
5	they would. Now, obviously, you know, no, a dollar -
6	
7	JUDGE SMITH: No, I mean, at some point
8	- at some point it's ridiculous. Obviously, an
9	additur of a dollar or a hundred dollars is a
10	it's a joke. Of course they'd take it.
11	MR. WRIGHT: Right. I acknowledge that.
12	Sure, of course.
13	JUDGE SMITH: I mean, they what did
14	they have to do? Did they have to come up with some
15	number that was not a joke that they would take?
16	MR. WRIGHT: Well, I would suggest, again,
17	I mean, whether they needed to come back with a
18	number, that would have been, I think, an intelligent
19	thing to do.
20	JUDGE SMITH: Isn't that a settlement
21	discussion rather than a motion?
22	MR. WRIGHT: Well, that's why I think that
23	the proper the relief, of course, is that they
24	refused the additur. That's

JUDGE READ: Well, isn't it - - - isn't it

kind of inherent in objecting and saying that the five million - - - I mean, aren't they kind of saying that's minimally adequate, if they're saying that's adequate?

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MR. WRIGHT: That's what their position

was. And I'd say - - - I mean, it's just there's a

logical - - just a natural logical inconsistency in

saying we refuse any additur - - -

JUDGE READ: Because we think - - -

MR. WRIGHT: - - - while at the same time saying we'll accept some additur. It's one or the other. Or at least argue in the alternative. They certainly have that availability. They never made that representation.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I still get stuck on, I guess, just the concept. If this had been a remittitur - - let's assume that you hit for five and the judge said I think that's too high; if you don't take three, you're going to trial next week. I would think that because your experts are all scattered and everything else, you'd say I can't do it next week and would ask for and, I would think, obtain a stay. But you didn't. I mean, it didn't happen here. I'm not blaming anyone. Then there's another trial. Why would we go back?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, that's - - - that's one of my - - - I mean, the whole point - - - I mean, you know, I cite the O'Connor case - - - additur, this issue doesn't come up to the - - -

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JUDGE SMITH: So even - - - you mean you have the alternative argument, I guess is what Judge Pigott and I are both suggesting - - - even if it was preserved, you have the alternative argument that it essentially fell out of the case once the second jury came in and - - -

MR. WRIGHT: Oh - - -

JUDGE SMITH: - - - that their remedy was to try to get it decided before then, which they didn't do.

MR. WRIGHT: I think that's absolutely the case. I must - - - they also had the opportunity to brief it to the Appellate Division, which they - - - what they didn't do. And then - - - but once you had - - - the whole purpose of an additur or a remittitur, it applies equally, is to save, you know, judicial economy and efficiency of saving the need to go through the second trial.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yes. And you can see the colorable argument that when the judge says five million for here - - I mean, it wasn't like he was

sitting there with a green eyeshade saying, I think that the - - - you know, the cost of future custodial care is a little bit high or low. I mean, he hit on the nonpecuniary, right, and with what some people would consider boxcar numbers - - - which doesn't sound like a deliberative body making a determination based on a verdict.

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MR. WRIGHT: Well, I would point out that the court's - - - the amount that actually the court came up with its additur, was eerily similar to the exact numbers that came out at the second trial. So to say that it's unreasonable or was pulled out of the hat or something like that, I just don't think stands up.

JUDGE SMITH: What was it - - -

MR. WRIGHT: He offered a very detailed account - - -

JUDGE SMITH: - - - what was it supposed to be? What's an additur supposed to be? Is it supposed to be the lowest number that would not deviate from reasonable compensation, or can it be any number within the range of reasonable compensation?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, I certainly think it can
- - there's no set formula. And in fact, in the

O'Connor case, which the court - - - was a Court of Appeals case, they actually, in that case, said it should be set at the highest level, otherwise you're depriving the nonmoving - - - the moving party, the party that doesn't have the chance to accept or reject the additur, you're depriving them of their right to a trial. Because after all, this was - - -JUDGE SMITH: Well, they already got a trial, and a jury gave them less than they - - - less than they thought was right.

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MR. WRIGHT: Exactly. And then the court found that was an improper measure of damages, and so set it aside. It became a nullity, at that point.

And both sides were entitled to a fresh trial on the nature of the damages; a fresh start with that respect and to offer proof. At that point, where - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Hasn't - - - hasn't kind of the general rule, I guess, to make it as simple as possible, been if it's an additur, it's the minimum amount that was reasonable for the jury to find, and if it's a remittal, it's the maximum amount?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, there's certainly case law, I mean, that's cited, that says that. But as I point out, there's also some findings to the contrary

on that. So I don't know that that is a hard and fast rule. And as I argued - - -

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JUDGE SMITH: It is true, isn't it, that the Appellate Division - - - I don't know whether it's a question of law or a question of fact or discretion or whatever - - - the Appellate Division would have - - assuming the issue was adequately preserved, and assuming the second trial hasn't happened, the Appellate Division could review the amount of the additur?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, certainly before the second trial, that happens on a regular basis. As we point out in the papers, we haven't been able to find a single instance where after a second trial, any court, anywhere - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Logically, why - - why do you think that is?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, I think the logical reason, once again, goes back to the - - - I think it's twofold. One is the purpose of additurs and remittiturs, to conserve judicial economy. Once you've gone through the process and expense of the second trial, it's no longer serve its purpose to go back and - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Would the - - -

1 MR. WRIGHT: - - - revisit it. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - I should have asked 3 Ms. Flaherty this. But the - - - if the issue is the 4 amount of the additur, that's a different question 5 than if there should be an additur at all. I mean it 6 7 MR. WRIGHT: Oh - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - if it - - -9 MR. WRIGHT: - - - that's correct. 10 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - if the amount of the 11 additur is even as - - - a dollar, so they say we're 12 not paying you another dollar, and you go to trial 13 and you get seventeen, you're going to get your 14 seventeen, I would assume, even though they said the 15 additur's going to be - - - you know, if they said 16 you've either got to take seven million or a new 17 trial, and they say we're not paying the seven, and 18 you have a new trial and you're hit for seventeen, 19 you still get seventeen, you don't get seven. 20 MR. WRIGHT: Right. Because the second 21 verdict supersedes the - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 23 MR. WRIGHT: - - - I mean, it no longer 2.4 exists. Once they've rejected it - - - and that was

the second point - - - once they've rejected it,

which is their remedy, they have accepted the consequences of the second trial. You have a first trial. Is it set aside or is not properly set aside? You make that decision. Again, this is discretionary with the court, anyway. He could have simply have ordered the second trial without going through the additur process at all. Well, why does the granting of - - -

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JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is there any - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, I was wondering about that. Is that clearly established that when there's a - - - when the damages are either insufficient or inadequate does the court have the discretion to just set aside the verdict without offering additur or remittitur?

 $$\operatorname{MR}$. WRIGHT: I think that's certainly true. There are multiple cases and we cite several - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, there are interests of justice in terms of - - - I've seen it in liability;

I'm not sure I've seen it in - - -

MR. WRIGHT: Well, we cite several cases, and in fact, most - - - when the dissent cited cases for the proposition that we have to be able to review the additur, she cited three cases. One of them was Sherry v. North Colonie School District. And in that

1 case, there was no additur whatsoever and the court 2 didn't look askance at it whatsoever when it was 3 reviewed. They simply said was it properly set aside? Yes or no? 4 5 JUDGE SMITH: It works - - - presumably it 6 should work both ways. So you would say that if the 7 - - - if the damages had been excessive and the judge 8 had said these damages are excessive, new trial on 9 damages, he doesn't have to say new trial on damages 10 or take this number? 11 MR. WRIGHT: That's correct. It's discretionary with the trial court. 12 13 JUDGE SMITH: Do they ever do that? I believe they do. And in - -14 MR. WRIGHT: 15 - once again, the case of O'Connor - - - which I know 16 is an older case, but it is probably the most lengthy 17 treatment by the Court of Appeals on this issue - - quite clearly said that this is a discretionary 18 19 remedy. You can do it or you don't have to do it. 20 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did you change your proof 21 of damages at the second trial? 22 MR. WRIGHT: We did not change the proof of It was the same level; we claimed the same damages. 23 2.4 injuries. We did bring in different experts to

discuss various elements of those damages.

1 didn't, in any way, claim damages at the second trial 2 that were not claimed and proven at the first trial. 3 JUDGE SMITH: Doesn't - - - don't, I guess, 4 Mr. Miller and Ms. Campbell have a point that they -5 - - that causation can be a damages defense as well 6 as a liability defense? MR. WRIGHT: You know, it's our position 7 8 that causation and damages are separate issues. Now, 9 of course, causation affects - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: Well, suppose - - - suppose 11 you say half my damages were caused by the negligence 12 and half weren't? That goes to damages, doesn't it? 13 MR. WRIGHT: Causation necessarily can have 14 some effect on damages. However, in this case, we 15 had a trial the first time where - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: Yes, and that first - - -17 MR. WRIGHT: - - - it was proven all - - -JUDGE SMITH: - - - that first trial heard 18 19 - - - the first jury heard experts who were not - - -20 where you weren't worrying about whether the expert 21 was talking about liability or damages, because it 22 was a nonbifurcated trial. And that jury came up 23 with a low number. Maybe the second jury should have 2.4 heard the same experts?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, the trial court, you

1 know, wrote a decision. It was supervising the 2 trial, heard the nature of the proof. And we - - -3 as we cite in - - - to the record, the only proof on 4 causation and the attribution of the damages came via 5 Dr. Jacobs, the plaintiff's expert. And he was quite 6 clear that the damages that resulted in all his 7 catastrophic injuries were because of the second rebleed. 8 9 JUDGE SMITH: Yes, well, that's - - -10 you're talking about the plaintiff's proof. 11 MR. WRIGHT: They offered no proof on this 12 issue. They disclosed Dr. Grand on this issue and 13 not - - - and that's what we said, he offered almost 14 the exact same disclosure at the second trial. For 15 whatever reason, this discretion, obviously, and prerogative of the defense - - -16 17 JUDGE SMITH: So but you - - - well - - -MR. WRIGHT: - - - they didn't offer that 18 19 proof. 20 JUDGE SMITH: - - - it does - - - it does 21 look to me - - - I mean, we agree that it in general, 22 at a damages trial with no liability at stake, the 23 defense is allowed to say, hey, only half the damages 2.4 were caused by the negligence. That's just common

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sense, right?

1 MR. WRIGHT: Where it hasn't been tried before. 2 3 JUDGE SMITH: Yes. 4 MR. WRIGHT: Correct. 5 JUDGE SMITH: What do you mean hadn't been tried before? Whether it's been tried before or not, 6 7 you're trying only damages. And if you want to say 8 only half the damages were caused by the negligence, 9 you've got a right to show that to the jury. 10 MR. WRIGHT: Yes. I'm agreeing with that. 11 JUDGE SMITH: And it did seem to me that in 12 the colloquy that they keep talking about, the judge 13 was missing that point. MR. WRIGHT: Well, I - - - I guess I differ 14 15 on that point, obviously, because in this case, all 16 those - - - those issues had been fully tried and 17 vetted during the first trial. He was making a I did not set that finding aside. 18 ruling. 19 JUDGE SMITH: Maybe they were and maybe - -20 - but we don't know what the jury did with them. 21 Maybe they on - - - maybe that's why the verdict was 22 so low. Maybe they only did give you half the 23 damages. 2.4 The defendants made that MR. WRIGHT:

argument both to the trial court and to the Appellate

1	Division, and that was rejected. On the
2	JUDGE SMITH: Well, that's why we're here.
3	MR. WRIGHT: I appreciate that. And
4	but the reason is because you have to look at what
5	the proof was. Again, the proof on causation came
6	only through Dr. Jacobs, who, as the plaintiff's
7	expert, did not say any of it was apportioned to the
8	underlying condition of the
9	JUDGE SMITH: Well, but isn't the question
LO	whether defense proof on causation was kept out at
L1	the second trial?
L2	MR. WRIGHT: I don't think you can view the
L3	second trial in isolation from the first trial. The
L4	whole point
L5	JUDGE SMITH: As to damages, it was.
L6	MR. WRIGHT: But this again is this
L7	an issue of damages
L8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: It's separate from the
L9	jury's
20	MR. WRIGHT: or causation?
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: viewpoint, isn't it?
22	It's separate from the jury's viewpoint, from the
23	first trial.
24	MR. WRIGHT: But the nature of the proof
25	that came in via the first trial was that causation

1 was entirely decided at that point. It did not need 2 to be revisited. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, you said yourself, you brought in different testimony, different proof on 4 5 the second trial. Why couldn't they? MR. WRIGHT: Well, they did, actually. I 6 7 mean, it wasn't on causation, because that was a 8 settled issue. But with respect to damages, they 9 brought in their own physiatrist. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Aren't the two issues 11 intertwined, though? 12 MR. WRIGHT: They're not intertwined, 13 because again - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? 14 15 MR. WRIGHT: They're not intertwined. 16 this - - - and it has to look at the specific facts 17 of this case, because again, this trial - - - this 18 issue was fully tried and vetted during the first 19 proceeding. Dr. Jacobs, our expert, gave the only 20 testimony on - - -21 JUDGE SMITH: You keep saying that of course it was. But the - - - but the first 22 23 proceeding was set aside as to damages. To the 2.4 extent it was relevant to damages, didn't the issue

have to be fully tried and vetted again?

1	MR. WRIGHT: No. Not no, no.
2	Because causation still well, in the cases tha
3	the defense cites where they talk about damages
4	causation impacting damages, it's still a separate
5	issue. Causation is a distinct issue from damages,
6	which is
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, then you're
8	disagreeing with Judge Smith's first question.
9	Because he says, can't causation be an issue in
10	damages? And you disagree?
11	MR. WRIGHT: It can be. But in this
12	particular case there was already a trial where it
13	was found that it wasn't. And the judge based
14	on the proof again, there was no proof
15	whatsoever offered at the first trial that
16	JUDGE SMITH: You
17	MR. WRIGHT: any of this was
18	JUDGE SMITH: you're saying that the
19	law of the case by the time you got to the second
20	trial was that this was all or nothing?
21	MR. WRIGHT: That's right. Just as
22	liability should
23	JUDGE SMITH: That if it caused one dollar
24	of damages, it caused them all?
25	MR. WRIGHT: That is that is what

1	we're
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that fair? Does
3	that strike you as
4	MR. WRIGHT: No, not at all. I mean, just
5	as liability
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Not fair, or that it
7	is fair?
8	MR. WRIGHT: It is fair to happen, just as
9	liability can affect damages, or if you want to
10	apportion proof say that had the Oakes are
11	contributorily at fault, that will obviously affect
12	the measure of damages, too.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes, but you should
14	be able to put in evidence that limits damages to
15	your negligence, no?
16	MR. WRIGHT: And they had that opportunity
17	at the first trial.
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And after that,
19	foreclosed?
20	MR. WRIGHT: Absolutely, because that
21	wasn't set aside. It wasn't set aside.
22	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Before your red light goes
23	on, do you want to tell us what the relevance of the
24	releases what you view as the purpose of the

releases?

1 MR. WRIGHT: Well, again, our position on the releases is that they just waited too long after 2 3 the trial. All the discussion about the trial 4 strategy, I think, was absolutely spot on during the 5 first argument. Obviously, if we knew about the 6 releases and knew that they were going to be 7 asserted, we would have an interest in talking about Dent more, because we would have an avenue of 8 9 recovery for all that percentage that was related to 10 Dent. And we tried very hard - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So from a tactical 12 perspective, it was very telling? 13 MR. WRIGHT: And that's just one element of 14 it. I mean, we also released defendants post-trial 15 before this motion was made. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Is there any way that the 17 court could have addressed that concern? MR. WRIGHT: I don't see how it could have 18 19 happened after the fact. I mean, you would have to 20 go back and retry everything over again. And that's 21 the hallmark of prejudice, after all the time, 22 effort, and expense. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. 2.4 Thanks.

Rebuttal, counselor?

1	MS. FLAHERTY: Just briefly. With respect
2	to the the preclusion issue, I think it's just
3	important to remember that the defendant excuse
4	me, the plaintiff, at the first trial, had the burden
5	to establish which damages stemmed from the
6	negligence that was proven. That continued with
7	respect to the second trial. And the preclusion of
8	the defendant's expert then precluded the defendant's
9	ability
10	JUDGE SMITH: Is there I'm still
11	-
12	MS. FLAHERTY: to challenge that.
13	JUDGE SMITH: I'm still a little
14	confused about whether this issue extends to more
15	than the preclusion of the one expert.
16	MS. FLAHERTY: Yes, Your Honor.
17	JUDGE SMITH: There are other are
18	there other rulings or offers of proof or anything
19	that you can point to that you say was error,
20	independent of that preclusion order?
21	MS. FLAHERTY: In terms of the second
22	trial?
23	JUDGE SMITH: Yes.
24	MS. FLAHERTY: Well, to an one thing
25	that does come to mind is with respect to the judge's

1 ruling, he also precluded any of the defendants from 2 cross-examining any of the witnesses at the trial 3 with respect to any additional - - -4 JUDGE SMITH: Any causation issue - - -5 MS. FLAHERTY: - - - any causation - - -6 JUDGE SMITH: - - - and those are - - -7 MS. FLAHERTY: - - - any - - -8 JUDGE SMITH: - - - and Mr. Miller gave me 9 some pages. And I'd be happy if after the argument 10 anybody wants to give me more where that occurred. I 11 would - - - I'd like to know that. 12 MS. FLAHERTY: Just briefly with respect to 13 the additur argument. What is important to 14 appreciate is because the Kaleida Health and the 15 other defendants did not have an opportunity - - -16 did not, simply, have enough time to perfect that 17 order from the denial of the motion, you're creating 18 a situation where there are disparate appellate 19 rights. 2.0 JUDGE SMITH: Your adversary says that you 21 never really tried to get review of the additur 22 before trial. That the review you were looking for 23 was review of the release. Is that correct? 2.4 MS. FLAHERTY: We also did, though, seek an

interlocutory judgment. We also - - - remember, we

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have ongoing proceedings in front of this trial judge
 1
 2
          where it was very clear that this trial judge was
 3
          going to set the next trial; did, in fact, set the
          next trial - - -
 4
 5
                    JUDGE SMITH: Okay. But I guess - - -
                    MS. FLAHERTY: - - - for a short period - -
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 7
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                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - I guess what I'm saying
 9
          is - - -
10
                    MS. FLAHERTY: - - - of time - - -
11
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - I quess what I'm
12
          suggesting is - - -
13
                    MS. FLAHERTY: - - - when it could be
14
          perfected - - -
15
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - wasn't your remedy to -
16
          - - so we wouldn't be in the position where we're
17
          talking about a first trial additur after the second
18
          trial, wasn't your remedy to try to get the issue
19
          resolved in the Appellate Division before the second
20
          trial took place? And maybe you tried to get a stay
21
          and failed, or maybe you couldn't, maybe you never
22
          tried. But either way, why shouldn't you be out of
23
          luck? Now we've had the second trial. He says the
          point is judicial economy. What are you economizing?
2.4
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                    MS. FLAHERTY: A couple of things. You
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know, in terms of judicial economy, it is the reason why it's so important to have this appellate court review the issue that, in fact, was before them: the relevant question in terms of the minimum amount of damages that this gentleman was entitled to.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: In the global aspect of this, though, if the second jury had come back at six million, do all the arguments go away? I mean, you won't - - you won't say, well, wait a minute, we want to set that aside too, because we still want to talk about - -

MS. FLAHERTY: Your Honor, then at that point in time, the final judgment would have been entered, and there would have been a determination whether or not to perfect an appeal - - - take an appeal and perfect an appeal from a final judgment.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Which - - -

MS. FLAHERTY: Whether or not that would have been done or not, I think, depends upon a lot of things, including what - - - you know, what happened at the second trial.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, true. But what I'm saying is that if you'd gotten a four-million-dollar verdict then, I mean, you wouldn't be appealing?

MS. FLAHERTY: In terms of following the

	second trial?
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
3	JUDGE SMITH: You wouldn't be appealing on
4	damages.
5	MS. FLAHERTY: I don't think there would
6	have been a need to appeal the additur issue at that
7	point in time, to perfect the appeal and include
8	-
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. So you wouldn't be
10	going back
11	MS. FLAHERTY: those arguments we had
12	in our brief.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: saying our rights were
14	impaired when we were forced on to trial without
15	being able to argue the additur, because of course,
16	it was satisfied, because the jury came back with a
17	verdict that we can live with.
18	MS. FLAHERTY: I think there was definitely
19	a compilation of errors which led
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: Yes.
21	MS. FLAHERTY: I think, as we
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
23	MS. FLAHERTY: discussed, to the
24	second verdict.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.

1	Thanks counselor. Thank you all.	
2	MS. FLAHERTY: Thank you	•
3	(Court is adjourned)	
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CERTIFICATION

I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Oakes v. Patel, et al., No. 51 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Penina waich.

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