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Home Certified Questions (500.27)

Below is a listing of Rule 500.27 certified questions pending before the Court, stating the issue(s) certified and their status. Please call the Clerk's Office if you have any questions.

For those certified questions that proceed to briefing in the normal course, the briefing schedule generally will be: appellant's brief to be filed 60 days after the Court accepts the certification; respondent's brief to be filed 45 days after the date set for the filing of appellant's brief; and a reply brief, if any, to be filed 15 days after the date set for the filing of respondent's brief.

The Court welcomes motions for amicus curiae participation from those qualified and interested in the subject matter of these certified questions. Please refer to Rule 500.23 and direct any questions to the Clerk's Office.


Plymouth Venture Partners v GTR Source; Plymouth Venture Partners v Capital Merchant Services

By order dated February 23, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified the following questions to this Court:

(1) whether a judgment debtor suffers cognizable damages in tort when its property is seized pursuant to a levy by service of execution that does not comply with the procedural requirements of CPLR 5232(a), even though the seized property is applied to a valid money judgment; and, if so

(2) whether the judgment debtor can, under these circumstances, bring a tort claim against either the judgment creditor or the marshal without first seeking relief under CPLR 5240.

On March 25, 2021, the Court accepted the certified questions and set a briefing schedule.

 


Donohue v Cuomo

By order dated November 6, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified the following questions to this Court:

"Question 1:

Under New York state law, and in light of Kolbe v. Tibbetts, 22 N.Y.3d 344, 980 N.Y.S.2d 903, 3 N.E.3d 1151 (2013), M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 135 S.Ct. 926, 190 L.Ed.2d 809 (2015), and CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 761, 200 L.Ed.2d 1 (2018), do §§ 9.13 (setting forth contribution rates of 90% and 75%), 9.23(a) (concerning contribution rates for surviving dependents of deceased retirees), 9.24(a) (specifying that retirees may retain NYSHIP coverage in retirement), 9.24(b) (permitting retirees to use sick-leave credit to defray premium costs), and 9.25 (allowing for the indefinite delay or suspension of coverage or sick-leave credits) of the 2007-2011 collective bargaining agreement between the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. and the Executive Branch of the State of New York (“the CBA”), singly or in combination, (1) create a vested right in retired employees to have the State’s rates of contribution to health-insurance premiums remain unchanged during their lifetimes, notwithstanding the duration of the CBA, or (2) if they do not, create sufficient ambiguity on that issue to permit the consideration of extrinsic evidence as to whether they create such a vested right?

Question 2:

If the CBA, on its face, or as interpreted at trial upon consideration of extrinsic evidence, creates a vested right in retired employees to have the State’s rates of contribution to health-insurance premiums remain unchanged during their lives, notwithstanding the duration of the CBA, does New York’s statutory and regulatory reduction of its contribution rates for retirees’ premiums negate such a vested right so as to preclude a remedy under state law for breach of contract?”

On December 15, 2020, the Court accepted the certified questions and set a briefing schedule.



Jesus Ferreira v City of Binghamton, et al.

By order dated September 23, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified the following question to this Court:

“Does the ‘special duty’ requirement—that, to sustain liability in negligence against a municipality, the plaintiff must show that the duty breached is greater than that owed to the public generally—apply to claims of injury inflicted through municipal negligence, or does it apply only when the municipality’s negligence lies in its failure to protect the plaintiff from an injury inflicted other than by a municipal employee?”

On October 20, 2020, the Court accepted the certified question and set a briefing schedule.