

# State of New York Court of Appeals

Summaries are prepared based on the parties' briefs and are for background purposes only.

To be argued Wednesday, March 11, 2026

**Second Child v Edge Auto** (236 AD3d 499 [AD1])  
Court PASS Docket No. APL-2025-00112

New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) § 370 requires rental car companies to file proof of insurance that "shall inure to the benefit of any person legally operating the motor vehicle." In *ELRAC v Ward* (96 NY2d 58 [2001]), the Court of Appeals interpreted this language to mean that rental car companies must provide primary insurance for renters up to the statutory minimum liability limits.

Several years later, in 2005, Congress enacted the Graves Amendment, a federal law providing that rental car companies are not liable for injuries caused solely because a renter was driving their vehicle. The Amendment also included a savings clause, specifying that it did not supersede state laws imposing financial responsibility or insurance requirements on vehicle owners or state laws imposing liability for failure to meet those requirements.

In 2019, Second Child rented a truck from Edge Auto. Second Child's employee, while driving the rented truck, struck another vehicle and injured the driver. The injured driver sued Second Child.

Relying on VTL § 370, Second Child argued that Edge Auto's insurance policy was required to provide coverage. Edge Auto argued that the Graves Amendment preempted section 370 and therefore relieved it of responsibility for injuries caused by Second Child's operation of the vehicle.

Supreme Court, Bronx County, and the Appellate Division, First Department, agreed with Edge Auto, holding that the Graves Amendment preempted VTL § 370 to the extent the state law required rental car companies to provide primary insurance to renters.

The Attorney General argues, as amicus curiae, that VTL § 370 is a financial responsibility law, and the Graves Amendment expressly preserves such laws from preemption.

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**People v Travis Woods** (226 AD3d 597 [AD1])  
Court PASS Docket No. APL-2025-00033

In 2008, Travis Woods was arrested for his participation in a drug-trafficking organization, the nonfatal shooting of one drug dealer, and the fatal shooting of another. He was indicted and tried before a jury. The jury convicted him of the drug-related charges and acquitted him of the charges relating to the nonfatal shooting. As to the fatal shooting, the jury deadlocked on the murder and criminal possession of a weapon charges. Mr. Woods was sentenced to nine years' incarceration on the drug charges.

Mr. Woods was retried on the murder and weapon charges three more times. In 2009 and 2010, his second and third trials again ended in mistrials when the juries could not reach a verdict.

In 2013, nearly three years after the third trial, Mr. Woods moved to dismiss the case based on an alleged violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The People declared readiness for trial that day and explained that the delay resulted from their efforts to reassess and reinvestigate the case and from discussions with Mr. Woods about a possible disposition. The court denied the motion.

The fourth trial concluded with the jury convicting Mr. Woods of second-degree murder and second- and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The court sentenced him to 25 years to life. Mr. Woods moved to vacate the conviction under CPL 440, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel; after a hearing at which trial counsel testified, the court denied the motion.

Mr. Woods appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division. His request for leave to appeal the denial of his CPL 440 motion was denied, and the Appellate Division therefore did not review the claims raised in that motion.

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments convicting Mr. Woods of the drug, murder and weapon charges. As to the speedy-trial claim, the court held that although the nearly three-year delay was "significant," it was justified by the People's good-faith reassessment and reinvestigation of the case and by their discussions with defense counsel, and that Mr. Woods had not shown prejudice. As to Mr. Woods's record-based ineffective-assistance claim, the court held that, to the extent the record permitted review, the claims were without merit.

The court also rejected Mr. Woods' challenge to the trial court's submission of exhibits to the jury during deliberations without additional notice to the defense, holding that the court was not required to provide further notice because the jury's exhibit requests were ministerial rather than substantive.

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**People v Naim Roper** (231 AD3d 491 [AD1])  
Court PASS Docket No. APL-2025-00024

For misdemeanor charges, the People are required to be ready for trial within 90 days (CPL 30.30). CPL 170.30(2) requires that a misdemeanor motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds “should” be made before trial commences. CPL 210.45(1) requires that any motion to dismiss be made “in writing and upon reasonable notice” to the People.

In January 2011, Naim Roper was accused of kneeing a corrections officer in the groin. He was arraigned on misdemeanor charges including assault, menacing, and harassment.

Over the next year, Mr. Roper’s case was adjourned numerous times. On July 23, 2012, the People answered ready for trial. The case was calendared for trial the next day.

When the case was called for trial on July 24, Mr. Roper moved to dismiss based on an alleged violation of CPL 30.30. The trial judge denied the motion, finding that it was untimely and not made upon reasonable notice to the People.

Mr. Roper was tried and convicted of attempted third-degree assault, menacing, and harassment.

On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed, holding that the trial court properly rejected the motion as untimely and not on reasonable notice.