Opinion 25-160

November 6, 2025

Digest:  A judge’s knowledge of an attorney’s or law firm’s contributions to the judge’s prior campaign for election to non-judicial office does not necessarily require disclosure or disqualification in all instances involving that attorney or law firm, but the judge should consider all relevant factors in reaching a conclusion about potential recusal. 

Rules:   22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.2(B); 100.3(E)(1); 100.5(A)(1)(h); 100.5(A)(2); 100.5(A)(5); Opinions 23-41; 10-135; 08-40; 04-106; 02-06.

Opinion: 

          A new judge, who had previously campaigned for election to a non-judicial public office within the past year, asks about his/her ethical obligations regarding attorneys that appear in front of him/her who either donated, or whose law firms donated, to the judge’s prior non-judicial campaign.  Since the prior campaign was for a non-judicial position, the judge, as a candidate, knew who contributed to the campaign and often personally solicited contributions from donors.

          A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and must always act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]).  In particular, a judge must not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge’s judicial decision-making or judgment (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[B]).  Further, a judge is disqualified in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]).

          We have recognized, in other contexts, that a “candidate for non-judicial office is not subject to the same exacting standards” as a judicial candidate (Opinion 08-40).  For example, a judicial candidate may contribute to their own campaign as permitted under the Election Law (see 22 NYCRR 100.5[A][2]), but must not otherwise personally solicit or accept campaign contributions from any source (see 22 NYCRR 100.5[A][1][h]; 100.5[A][2]).  Instead, a judge who wishes to accept campaign contributions from others must form a committee of responsible persons to “solicit and accept reasonable campaign contributions and support” on the candidate’s behalf (22 NYCRR 100.5[A][5]).  Additionally, we have advised that the judicial candidate should be shielded from knowing the identities of contributors and the amounts contributed (see Opinions 10-135; 02-06). 

          Nonetheless, we have advised that in situations where a judge inadvertently learns of an attorney’s contribution to his/her judicial campaign, that fact, standing alone, does not mandate the judge’s disqualification.  “In and of itself, the judge’s knowledge of a contribution, does not automatically give rise to an inference of partiality” (Opinion 04-106; see also Opinions 23-41; 10-135). 

          We see no reason to impose a different standard for judges who are aware of contributions by attorneys or law firms to their prior campaign(s) for election to non-judicial office.  However, while mere knowledge of a contribution “does not automatically give rise to an inference of partiality,” we nonetheless advised in Opinion 04-106 (and reiterated in Opinion 23-41) that a judge who has acquired such knowledge should

consider various factors that may be of significance in reaching a conclusion about recusal. For example, what is the size of the contribution in relation to other contributions by attorneys? Was the case in which the attorney appears pending before the judge at the time the contribution was made? Is the appearance being made during the course of the campaign? Is the attorney’s adversary also listed as a contributor? Did the judge have prior knowledge that the attorney was a supporter (e.g. having been listed as such or having been in attendance at a fund-raiser) and therefore might likely have been thought to be a contributor in any event?

After considering these or other appropriate factors, “if the judge is confident he/she can be fair and impartial, no disqualification is required.  If, on the other hand, in his/her discretion, and having considered all relevant factors, the judge concludes that the specific circumstances might give rise to a publicly perceived appearance of partiality,” the judge should “disclose and recuse, subject to remittal” (Opinion 04-106).

          In sum, we conclude here that a judge’s knowledge of an attorney’s or law firm’s contributions to the judge’s prior campaign for election to non-judicial office does not necessarily require disclosure or disqualification in all instances involving that attorney or law firm, but the judge should consider all relevant factors in reaching a conclusion about potential recusal.