Opinion 25-172
December 18, 2025
Digest: A judge who is an officer of a bar association may not personally participate in the association’s advocacy letters urging rejection of a bar applicant or prosecution of certain crimes. Should the association decide, without the judge’s involvement, to send such letters, the judge must take appropriate action to dissociate him/herself from the letters. Provided that the judge’s non-participation is made clear, the judge need not resign as an officer of the association.
Rules: 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A), (C); 100.3(B)(8); 100.4(A)(1)-(3); 100.4(C)(3); Opinions 25-120; 23-152; 22-91; 22-15(B); 18-168; 15-229; 14-33; 00-15; 89-116/89-121; 88-100.
Opinion:
The inquiring judge is the head of a bar association. The judge understands that they “may not under any circumstances participate in” or “lend[] their name to” advocacy activities such as “a letter to the character and fitness committee advocating that a candidate who has expressed bigoted views or threatened violence against others should be denied admission to the bar” or “petitioning a local district attorney to seek hate crime charges against racially/ethically/gender/religious motivated crimes.” Accordingly, the judge asks if it is permissible to continue to serve as an officer of the bar association after it has decided to undertake such activities without the judge’s participation.
A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety, and must always act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2[A]). A judge must neither lend the prestige of judicial office to advance private interests (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[C]) nor make any public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court within the United States or its territories (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[B][8]). A judge’s extra-judicial activities must be compatible with judicial office and must not cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s impartiality, detract from the dignity of judicial office, or interfere with proper performance of judicial duties (see 22 NYCRR 100.4[A][1]-[3]).
We concur that the inquiring judge must not personally participate in the bar association’s proposed letters urging rejection of a bar applicant and prosecution of certain crimes. As we have noted, “caution is needed to avoid creating an appearance that the judge is voluntarily testifying as a character witness or improperly lending the prestige of judicial office to advance private interests before a government agency” (Opinion 14-33). While a judge with relevant personal knowledge of an individual applicant may provide an affirmation of good moral character supporting that individual’s application for admission to the bar (see e.g. Opinion 23-152), no such personal connection is involved here. Likewise, both the public comment rule and the need to maintain both actual and apparent impartiality preclude a judge from joining a bar association’s letter urging a district attorney to bring hate crime charges for a particular incident (see generally 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]; 100.2[C]; 100.3[B][8]; see also Opinion 22-91 [explaining why a judge or quasi-judicial official may not participate in a bar association’s amicus brief]).
Judges are encouraged to participate in bar association activities and may serve as officers or in other leadership positions, subject to generally applicable limitations on judicial speech and conduct (see e.g. Opinions 25-120; 22-15[B]; 15-229; 22 NYCRR 100.4[C][3]). The sole remaining question before us, then, is whether the judge must resign from a leadership position in a bar association that decides to send the above-referenced advocacy letters.
We have previously addressed questions concerning a judge’s continued participation in a bar association that chooses to evaluate and rate candidates for public office, a political activity in which judges may not participate (see e.g. Opinions 18-168; 15-229; 00-15; 89-116/89-121). In one of our earliest opinions, we concluded that a judge may remain a member or officer of a bar association that ranks candidates for judicial office, but “may not participate in the rating process, and should make such nonparticipation clear so as to avoid any appearance of impropriety” (Opinion 88-100). We advised that the “bar association should make it clear by affirmatively stating in all matter[s] dealing with the subject of judicial candidate evaluations that judicial members of the organization do not participate in the rating process in any way” (id.). The following year, where a bar association “issued press releases and placed advertisements stating that it has rated a candidate running for judicial office as not qualified,” we said the judge must “request the bar association to state on all future press releases and advertisements that judicial members of the organization had no involvement with the rating of judicial candidates” (Opinion 89-116/89-121). A decade later, citing those opinions, we said that a judge who is an officer of a bar association has “an obligation to publicly disassociate the judge from the bar association’s rating of candidates for judicial office” (Opinion 00-15). While the exact approach and wording undoubtedly vary, we understand that some bar associations include a standard disclaimer with their ratings announcements.[1]
Here, too, we conclude this judge must take appropriate action to dissociate him/herself from the proposed advocacy letters, should the bar association’s other officers or directors decide to send such letters in the bar association’s name. We note that the judge’s status as a high-ranking officer of the bar association puts him/her in a special position to insist that his/her non-participation be made clear, through whatever means makes sense under the circumstances. This could, for example, take the form of a disclaimer or recusal note on the letter itself. Provided that the judge’s non-participation is made clear, the judge need not resign as an officer of the association.
Finally, Opinion 88-100 states that “in the event that a judicial member’s name appears on the association’s letterhead, his name should be deleted from any written matters concerning candidate rating.” On further consideration, we think this advice is unnecessary; it certainly has not reappeared in our opinions over the past 37 years. We see no impropriety in use of a bar association’s regular letterhead for candidate ratings, provided it is otherwise clear that any judges listed on the letterhead had no involvement in the rating process. Opinion 88-100 is amended to the extent inconsistent with this view.
[1]. In bar associations where judges regularly assume leadership positions, for example, it may be sufficient to mention the association’s established policy or protocol which precludes judicial members from participating in any aspect of the evaluation, review, or ratings process.