Opinion 25-177
December 18, 2025
Digest: (1) It is a judge’s obligation to determine whether exclusion of women from a not-for-profit cultural or civic organization constitutes invidious discrimination. If so, the judge may not be an officer or member of the organization. If the organization does not invidiously discriminate, the judge may be a member and/or serve as an officer, subject to generally applicable limitations including the prohibition on personal involvement in fund-raising and membership solicitation.
(2) A judge must not serve on committee whose sole function is to lend its members’ names to a not-for-profit foundation’s fund-raising efforts.
(3) A judge may serve on a parish committee that provides non-legal advice to the pastor on how to manage income and expenses, where the committee has no fund-raising functions.
Rules: 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.2(D); 100.4(C)(3)(a)(i)-(ii); 100.4(C)(3)(b)(i), (iv); Opinions 25-114; 25-66; 20-128; 20-46; 19-18; 12-14; 10-33; 97-64; 96-82; 94-147.
Opinion:
A full-time judge asks whether he/she may participate in various extra-judicial activities, including serving as an officer of the local branch of the Friendly Sons of Saint Patrick, serving on a not-for-profit foundation’s “Lawyers’ Committee,” and serving on a local church parish’s finance committee.
A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety and act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2[A]). A judge may not “hold membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination” based upon protected characteristics such as sex and gender, but may be a member of “an organization that is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic, cultural or other values of legitimate common interest to its members” (22 NYCRR 100.2[D]). A judge may “serve as an officer … or non-legal advisor” of a not-for-profit charitable, religious, civic, or cultural organization, provided it is not likely to “be engaged in proceedings that ordinarily would come before the judge” or, in the case of a full-time judge, to “be engaged regularly in adversary proceedings in any court” (22 NYCRR 100.4[C][3][a][i]-[ii]). A judge must neither use nor permit the use of the prestige of judicial office for fund-raising or membership solicitation (see 22 NYCRR 100.4[C][3][b][iv]) and must not “personally participate in soliciting funds or other fund-raising activities,” although he/she may “assist … in planning fund-raising” and may “participate in the management and investment of the organization’s funds” (see 22 NYCRR 100.4[C][3][b][i]).
1. Friendly Sons of Saint Patrick
The judge first asks whether it is permissible to serve as an officer, including president, of the local branch of the Friendly Sons of Saint Patrick, a not-for-profit cultural or civic organization. The judge advises that membership is limited to men, although women are invited to attend all events. The organization has an annual gala fund-raiser to raise money for charitable causes, and also has occasional golf outings.
The threshold issue here, since the organization’s membership is limited to men, is whether the organization “practices invidious discrimination based on … sex, … gender identity, [or] gender expression” (22 NYCRR 100.2[D]). We have previously advised that “it is the judge who is in the better position to assess the relevant factors and reach a conclusion as to whether the organization practices invidious discrimination” (Opinion 96-82). Thus, if an organization “excludes or limits persons from membership on the basis of sex or any of the other listed classes … then the judge must further determine whether the exclusion is invidious or subject to an exception under the Rules” (Opinion 20-128 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). As we explained in Opinion 25-114:
§ If the exclusionary practice is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose (i.e., the “preservation of religious, ethnic, cultural or other values of legitimate common interest to its members”), then membership is permitted.
§ Conversely, if the discriminatory practice is one in which the policy of exclusion is arbitrary, and excludes persons or categories of persons solely on the basis of that characteristic, and by reason of such exclusion stigmatizes such persons as inferior, then the discrimination is invidious and membership is prohibited.
Assuming the judge concludes that membership is permitted under Section 100.2(D), we see no other reason the judge could not serve as an officer of the organization. We have advised that a judge may serve as president of a local United Way organization (see Opinion 97-64), on the Board of Trustees of a not-for-profit college foundation that encourages the development of the college by soliciting, encouraging, accepting, investing, and managing private and institutional gifts to the college (see Opinion 10-33), and as president of a not-for-profit organization which promotes athletic involvement by raising funds for athletic programs at local schools (see Opinion 12-14). Thus, the fact that one of the organization’s recurring events is an annual charitable fund-raiser is not an obstacle, provided the judge abides by all applicable limitations on personal involvement in fund-raising. As a reminder, the judge must not personally solicit funds, must not permit the use of the prestige of judicial office for fund-raising, and must not “permit his/her name to appear as the author on any fund-raising letter or as spokesperson in other solicitations” (Opinion 12-14). For similar reasons, we note the judge should not be listed as a member of a Journal Committee, as the judge may not permit the use of his/her name in solicitation of journal advertisements (see e.g. Opinions 25-66; 94-147).
2. Lawyers’ Committee for the Inner City Scholarship Foundation
The judge next asks if he/she may serve on the “Lawyers’ Committee” for the Inner City Scholarship Foundation. The Foundation seeks to provide “families with demonstrable financial needs the opportunity to give their children a quality, values-based” parochial school education. As a Lawyers’ Committee member, the judge would be listed on the “invitation to an annual luncheon at which funds are raised for scholarships and on an invitation to a non-fund raising summer event with legal speakers.” On the facts presented, we understand that members of the Lawyers’ Committee do not help select scholarship recipients or perform any other function; they merely lend their names to the fund-raising invitation.
We have previously advised that a judge may not serve on the board of a not-for-profit entity “whose sole purpose is to raise funds for a foreign educational institution” (Opinion 20-46). Indeed, as explained in Opinion 19-18 (citations omitted), “a judge must not chair an entity with no real function other than fund-raising, where circumstances will inevitably suggest the judge is personally involved in the entity’s fund-raising efforts. The core example is ‘an ad hoc committee existing solely for the purpose of raising funds at a specific event.’”
As it appears that Lawyers’ Committee members have absolutely no role or function beyond lending their names to the foundation’s fund-raising invitation, the judge may not serve on the Lawyers’ Committee.
3. Parish Finance Committee
Finally, the judge asks if he/she may serve on his/her local parish’s finance committee, providing advice to the pastor on how to manage income and expenses. The judge indicates that the finance committee has absolutely no fund-raising functions.
A judge may serve as a “non-legal advisor” to a not-for-profit religious organization and “may participate in the management and investment of the organization’s funds” (22 NYCRR 100.4[C][3][b][i]; see also Opinion 10-33).
We see no reason for a different result here, and thus the judge may serve in this capacity.