Opinion 25-194
February 5, 2026
Digest: On these facts, a judge may not participate in a community advisory committee to support dissertation research on the topic of stigma experienced by survivors of sexual assault.
Rules: 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(A); 100.3(B)(6), (8), (11); 100.4(A)(1)-(3); Opinions 15-26/15-44; 11-138; 10-131; 10-115; 04-91; 97-56.
Opinion:
A full-time judge who presides in a human trafficking intervention court has been invited to serve on a community advisory committee (“CAC”) to support dissertation research on the topic of stigma experienced by survivors of sexual assault. As explained in the inquiry, the research is intended to “address a gap in understanding the multilevel and contextual manifestations of stigma that rape survivors endure which can lead to adverse health outcomes.” The CAC’s six or seven members will include “survivors and representatives from a range of fields working with rape survivors,” and the study synopsis characterizes them as “trusted providers for the community and members of the community.” The CAC “will be convened to inform recruitment, recommendations, and resources for participants” and is expected to “provide invaluable advice for both recruitment of participants and interview guide questions, and overall study approach.” It will meet at least five times over the course of the study:
initially at study commencement, during recruitment and data collection (including CAC member-checking of the [Co-Principal Investigator]’s analyses) and upon study completion to disseminate results and debrief. Data analysis, CAC meetings, and participant interviews will continue concurrently. CAC input has been elicited for standby and follow-up referrals and other resources provided to participants.
The study synopsis further states that using CAC members “for peer review and checking of interpretations will add to the validity and rigor of results.” With respect to the CAC’s anticipated “guidance regarding recruitment [and] study design (interview guide questions and on-call support for survivors),” the synopsis nonetheless cautions that “it is imperative in feminist epistemology to keep the participants as the experts of their experiences.” The study will focus on “up to 20 participants” who live in the region and were raped as adults at least six months earlier. The study synopsis also includes the following statement: “Because this study is exploring how stigma impacts rape survivors’ health, healthcare access and quality of care received, judicial inclination towards either prosecution or defense is not considered.”[1]
A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and must always act to promote public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]). A judge’s judicial duties “take precedence” over all the judge’s other activities (22 NYCRR 100.3[A]). Accordingly, a judge’s extra-judicial activities must be compatible with judicial office and must not (1) “cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge,” (2) “detract from the dignity of judicial office,” nor (3) “interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties” (22 NYCRR 100.4[A][1]-[3]). Among other restrictions, a judge must not make any public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court within the United States or its territories (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[B][8]) nor disclose nor use, for any purpose unrelated to judicial duties, nonpublic information acquired in a judicial capacity (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[B][11]). A judge also must not “initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers concerning a pending or impending proceeding” (22 NYCRR 100.3[B][6]).
Where consistent with the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, a judge may participate in academic research. For example, we said a judge may “participate in an interview with a graduate student in connection with the student’s dissertation research on a particular legal issue . . . provided the judge does not comment on a pending or impending proceeding, does not disclose any non-public information acquired in a judicial capacity and does not express any predisposition to decide matters in a certain way” (Opinion 11-138). Similarly, we advised that a judge may “answer questions to a survey and participate in a follow-up interview on the topic of ‘Justices’ Perspectives on the Changes in Their Courts,’” where the survey questions “are essentially administrative in nature” (Opinion 10-131). In Opinion 97-56, we advised that a full-time judge may “participate in a two-day meeting as part of a non-profit foundation's research program on adolescent development and juvenile justice,” where the group has “no involvement . . . with the courts” and is “particularly interested in the judge’s work in the area of juvenile justice and its implication for research, practice and policy.” Finally, we have advised a judge may “serve as a consultant to a professor who will conduct a scholarly research project concerning jurors’ memories during jury deliberations and the implications of jurors’ memories for a judge’s jury instructions,” subject to certain limitations, particularly that it “will not cause his/her impartiality to reasonably be questioned” (Opinion 10-115).
The inquiring judge’s proposed role is perhaps closer to that of the ongoing “consultant” in Opinion 10-115, as opposed to the more discrete involvement in meetings or interviews contemplated in Opinions 11-138, 10-131, and 97-56. Unlike Opinion 10-115, however, the judge would not be an individual consultant, assisting with issues that call for a uniquely judicial perspective, but instead would be part of an ongoing advisory group. We must therefore consider the composition and role of the CAC in assessing the propriety of the judge’s proposed involvement.
Here, the CAC will include “representatives from a range of fields working with rape survivors” and “trusted providers for the community.” They are being asked to provide “peer review and checking of interpretations” as well as “standby and follow-up referrals and other resources provided to” the rape survivor participants. Given the study’s focus on how “stigma impacts rape survivors’ health, healthcare access and quality of care received,” it appears that the CAC will not reflect specifically defense-oriented or prosecution-oriented perspectives. This does not mean that the CAC is balanced; to the contrary, there is at least the appearance that the CAC is strongly aligned with victims and victim advocates, especially in light of the study’s “imperative . . . to keep the [study] participants as the experts of their experiences.”
We thus turn for guidance to our prior opinions addressing a judge’s involvement with efforts to combat domestic violence (see generally Opinion 15-26/15-44 [identifying four broad categories]; 11-85). We determined in Opinion 04-91 (citations and quotations omitted):
[T]he inquiring judge’s court . . . is involved with victims of crime, including victims of domestic abuse and sexual abuse, and with victims of juvenile delinquency. The Committee has approved participation of judges in extra-judicial programs relating to crime victims, if the programs are not so one-sided as to give rise to an appearance of partiality. Thus, judges may take part in domestic violence task forces that are devoted to the improvement of the legal system and in which not only law enforcement agencies but also public defenders are involved, and which focus on the manner in which cases are handled rather than being geared towards prosecution of such cases or advocacy on behalf of victims of domestic violence that are involved in court matters.
Under some circumstances, however, a judge’s public association with a heavily one-sided program on behalf of crime victims may create an appearance of partiality.
After weighing all the circumstances presented here, we conclude the judge’s participation in the CAC, as described, “would create an appearance of particular sympathy toward one side in court and therefore an appearance of partiality” (id.).
In addition, we note that the study participants may have pending or impending cases in the Unified Court System. The participants will be recruited from the region in which the judge presides, and there is no proposal to exclude participants whose cases have come or may come before the judge. Thus, as the CAC has a role in “data collection (including CAC member-checking of the [Co-Principal Investigator]’s analyses)” and “[d]ata analysis, CAC meetings, and participant interviews will continue concurrently,” the judge’s proposed participation could also potentially expose the judge to impermissible ex parte communications and/or implicate the public comment rule (see generally 22 NYCRR 100.3[B][6]; 100.3[B][8]).
Accordingly, on the facts presented, the inquiring judge may not participate in a community advisory committee to support dissertation research on the topic of stigma experienced by survivors of sexual assault.
[1] We understand from the inquiry that this is meant as “a statement addressing pro-prosecutorial vs. pro-defense leaning (or lack thereof).”