Opinion 26-08
February 5, 2026
Digest: A family court judge who routinely directs the civil division of the sheriff’s office to serve orders of protection issued by the judge may meet with that office to discuss delays in service of the orders.
Opinion:
The inquiring family court judge “routinely issue[s] Orders of Protection under various articles of the Family Court Act.” The judge asks whether he/she may meet with the civil division of the sheriff’s office, which is responsible for serving ex parte orders of protection on the respondents, to discuss apparent delays between the issuance and service of the judge’s orders.
A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety and act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2[A]). A judge must not “convey nor permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge” (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[C]). A judge must “respect and comply with the law” (22 NYCRR 100.2[A]), “diligently discharge the judge’s administrative responsibilities” (22 NYCRR 100.3[C][1]), and “dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly” (22 NYCRR 100.3[B][7]). A judge also must not “initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers concerning a pending or impending proceeding,” unless an exception applies (22 NYCRR 100.3[B][6]). For example (22 NYCRR 100.3[B][6][a]):
Ex parte communications that are made for scheduling or administrative purposes and that do not affect a substantial right of any party are authorized, provided the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and the judge, insofar as practical and appropriate, makes provision for prompt notification of other parties or their lawyers of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond.
Risks of One-Sided Meetings
Private meetings with one “side” of a legal issue, even to discuss matters that are arguably “procedural” in nature, often risk creating an appearance that the judge’s impartiality has been compromised. We have cautioned that “working with representatives of only one side of an issue to develop policies, procedures or protocols to guide the court in dealing with the issues could erode the public’s confidence in the impartiality and independence of the judiciary” (Opinion 10-13 [judge who dismissed numerous parking tickets may not meet with police chief and commissioner of public works to discuss the dangers of illegal parking]; see also Opinion 17-101 [“[A] judge’s participation in this type of exclusive, private meeting may well cast doubt upon a judge’s impartiality, particularly where the attendees, who represent one set of interests before the judge, wish to discuss substantive and procedural legal issues in the other side’s absence.”] [citation omitted]).
This is particularly true where circumstances suggest a proposed meeting “is essentially an attempt to promote a particular agenda in connection with the judge’s judicial decision-making in certain matters that will come before the judge or otherwise to impermissibly influence” the judge’s judicial conduct (Opinion 13-124/13-125/13-128/13-129 [judges may not meet privately with the public defender concerning implementation of counsel-at-arraignment program unless the district attorney consents] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). We have therefore advised judges to decline invitations to meet privately with those who have an interest in a legal issue before the court (see e.g. Opinions 24-188 [judge may not meet privately with police and mayor to discuss “procedural issues the police have encountered in filing accusatory instruments or otherwise initiating proceedings in the town court”]; 17-101 [judge may not meet privately with defense attorneys to discuss a “defense perspective” on the court’s handling of cases, “even if the attendees do not plan to discuss specifically identifiable pending cases”]; 11-144 [judge may not meet privately with state police to discuss overtime expenses for troopers appearing in judge’s court]).
The Judiciary’s Interest in Improving the Administration of Justice
We have recognized the importance of judges’ involvement “in improving the administration of justice by, among other things, encouraging frank disclosure and discussion of administrative difficulties or successes, concerns and recommendations” (Opinion 14-100 [quotation marks and brackets omitted]). Although such meetings “should normally be balanced” with “all interests before the court,” we have recognized this may not always be practical (Opinion 07-188). We have advised, for instance, that a Surrogate’s administrative duties permit him/her to meet privately with the local public administrator, a court-appointed fiduciary who regularly appears in contested proceedings before the Surrogate, to “discharge his/her statutory oversight functions” (Opinion 14-100). Somewhat analogously, we have also said that a judge may send a letter to the new head of a children’s services agency, sharing the judge’s observations of the agency’s operations and procedures used when removing children from their homes (see Opinion 22-04).
Analysis: The Proposed “No-Sided” Meeting to Improve the Administration of Justice
On the facts presented, the civil division of the sheriff’s office is a municipal agency directed by the judge and obligated by statute to serve orders of protection on behalf of the family court. The Family Court Act provides that the court shall deliver an order of protection to one of several law enforcement agencies, which we understand to include the sheriff’s office (see FCA §§ 153-b[c]; 255). The statute directs that service “shall insofar as practicable be achieved promptly” (FCA § 153-b[c]). In effect, the sheriff’s service of the order of protection is directed by the judge and thereafter required by statute.
The meeting proposed by the inquirer, therefore, does not carry the same danger of an appearance that the judge’s impartiality has been compromised. The meetings addressed in our “one-sided meeting” precedents were requested by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, defense agencies, or even victim-aligned groups to address their interest in the cases appearing before the judge without the input or interference of the other “side.” Here, the civil division of the sheriff’s office has no apparent stake in the cases before the judge in family court. They are neither a party to the matters nor an initiating agency. Significantly, the inquiring judge would like to request the meeting to address the court’s interest in ensuring timely service of its orders (cf. Opinion 18-28 [distinguishing between impermissible requests by law enforcement for court to compile information and judge compiling information in furtherance of court’s interest in exposing perjury or corruption]).
Likewise, no “other side” maintains a cognizable interest in this meeting. The orders of protection that the sheriff’s office is directed to serve have already been adjudicated and issued by the court, and timely service of the orders is mandated by statute. The judge’s proposed meeting with the sheriff’s office to discuss delays in that service does not “provide one side with a procedural or tactical advantage” in the family court proceedings (Opinion 07-188). Nor would it be “practical” or “appropriate” to notify every family court litigant of this administrative meeting (22 NYCRR 100.3[B][6][a]), which is designed to address an issue impacting multiple cases.
In sum, the civil division of the sheriff’s office is a municipal agency directed by the judge and obligated by statute to serve orders of protection on behalf of the Family Court. We conclude the judge must be permitted to meet with that agency regarding that service to improve the administration of justice. Under the circumstances, we see no danger of an appearance of partiality or an attempt to influence the judge and therefore do not require the judge to attempt to discern, let alone include, other “sides” or “stakeholders” in the meeting. Accordingly, the proposed meeting is permissible.
We caution that the judge should not discuss the substantive details of any pending or impending matters (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[B][8]) or engage in ex parte conversations beyond administrative matters (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[B][6][a]).