Opinion 26-100

 

May 7, 2026

 

Digest:  With respect to a proposed Judicial Institute program for judges on press access and the rights of the press in court proceedings, it is ethically impermissible to bring in outside journalists to (1) instruct the judiciary on a “media perspective” concerning transparency, access, and the practical impact of judicial decisions on press coverage and (2) observe judicial training on press access.

 

Rules:   22 NYCRR 100.0(U)-(V); 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.2(C); 100.3(B)(1); 100.3(B)(8); Opinions 26-08; 24-188; 24-34; 23-03; 20-38; 17-101; 16-176; 14-26; 14-20; 14-09; 13-124/13-125/13-128/13-129; 10-13.

 

Opinion:

 

          The inquiring judge is interested in working with the Judicial Institute to develop an educational program for judges on press access and the rights of the press in court proceedings.  As currently envisioned, approximately 75-80% of the program would focus on black-letter law and hypotheticals “in a traditional format, with presenters consisting of judges, attorneys, and other UCS personnel.”  This would be followed by a shorter second segment, in which a moderated panel of journalists would provide “a media perspective on transparency, access, and the practical impact of judicial decisions on press coverage.”  The judge asks if it is ethically permissible to “bring in outside journalists” for this program to (1) address the judges as described above and (2) observe the presentation of black-letter law and hypotheticals.  The judge also asks if it makes a difference whether some of the journalists may be parties or witnesses in pending or impending press access litigation.

 

          A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and act to promote public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]).  In performing their adjudicative duties, judges must faithfully apply the law, without being “swayed” by “public clamor or fear of criticism” (22 NYCRR 100.3[B][1]).  A judge must “maintain professional competence” in the law (id.), but must not “convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge” (22 NYCRR 100.2[C]). In addition, a judge must not make “any public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court within the United States or its territories” (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[B][8]).  Under the rules, “[a] ‘pending proceeding’ is one that has begun but has not yet reached final disposition” (22 NYCRR 100.0[U]), and “[a]n ‘impending proceeding’ is one that is reasonably foreseeable but has not yet been commenced” (22 NYCRR 100.0[V]).

 

1.  Moderated Press Panel at the Judicial Institute for a Media Perspective on Transparency, Access, and the Practical Impact of Judicial Decisions on Press Coverage

 

          Judges may organize and attend judicial education programs on a wide variety of topics, including press access and the rights of the press in court proceedings.  As a general rule, they may attend programs presented by judges, court system personnel, and attorneys, even where the programs relate to legal issues that may come before them (see Opinion 14-26), unless unusual circumstances create an appearance of impropriety (see e.g. Opinion 14-09).

 

          When court administrators or supervising judges bring in outside speakers to present programs to judges, however, they must bear in mind the overarching need to maintain public confidence in the judiciary’s impartiality and independence.  For example, we have advised that “[a] supervising judge may further judicial education by . . . hosting a ‘lunch and learn’ program for judges and court personnel which presents outside speakers, provided the overall program is balanced and impartial” (Opinion 24-34).  By contrast, in Opinion 14-20, we advised that:

 

A supervising judge should not permit a local medical professional, who is an expert in child abuse and who regularly consults with and testifies as an expert on behalf of the District Attorney and/or the Department of Social Services, to present a judicial training on child abuse to Family Court judges who preside in the supervising judge’s district.

 

After observing that “judicial participation in one-sided training or educational programs should be avoided” as it could “impermissibly compromise the appearance of judicial impartiality,” we further advised (id. [citations omitted]):

 

In addition, that the expert presenting the training regularly testifies before the judges attending the training also could impair the public’s confidence in the attendees’ impartiality.  The Committee has cautioned against the appearance of impropriety that may result from too close contact between judges and expert witnesses.  The expert here is not a national figure who might rarely, if ever, testify locally, but rather one who consults with and testifies on behalf of local prosecutorial agencies on a regular basis.  A judge’s ability to impartially assess an expert witness’ credibility might reasonably be viewed as compromised where that witness, regularly employed by one side, previously has been the sole presenter of training provided to the judge on an issue about which the witness will be testifying.  Questions about the judge’s impartiality will likely occur to a defendant if a prosecuting agency’s regular expert witness trains judges for the court system, lending an impression that the expert already has the court’s imprimatur.

 

          Even greater caution should be exercised before bringing in those with a direct personal stake in the outcome of certain cases to address judges at internal court system educational programs about those very cases.  Journalists have a clear professional and economic interest in maximizing their access to courtrooms and proceedings.  They must, like other litigants and interested parties, make their legal arguments to judges through appropriate legal channels.  Bringing in this class of special interests—and no other—to be guest speakers or panelists at a Judicial Institute program on press access would create an impression that journalists are in a “special position to influence” the judiciary (22 NYCRR 100.2[C]).  Relatedly, we note that it would be difficult to achieve any meaningful balance on the topic of press access, absent a readily identifiable group of litigants who have a similarly strong and persistent interest in closing courtrooms or sealing some or all of the record.

 

          This conclusion is further bolstered by considering our line of opinions prohibiting one-sided meetings (see e.g. Opinions 24-188; 13-124/13-125/13-128/13-129; 10-13; see also generally Opinion 26-08 [reviewing and distinguishing prior opinions]).  Significantly, in Opinion 17-101, we said a judge may not meet with attorneys who represent criminal defendants concerning a “defense perspective” on the court’s handling of “discovery, diversion and disposition of cases.”  We advised “that a judge’s participation in this type of exclusive, private meeting may well cast doubt upon a judge’s impartiality, particularly where the attendees, who represent one set of interests before the judge, wish to discuss substantive and procedural legal issues in the other side’s absence.  This is so even if the attendees do not plan to discuss specifically identifiable pending cases” (id. [citation omitted; emphasis added]).

 

          Accordingly, we conclude the proposed press panel, which would provide a media perspective on transparency, access, and the practical impact of judicial decisions on press coverage, is ethically impermissible for a Judicial Institute program, especially where some of the journalists may be parties or witnesses in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation on that very issue.

 

2.  Press Observation of Internal Court System Training for Judges

 

          On the second question, it is again necessary to take a step back and consider the specific type of event proposed here.  The question involves an internal training program for judges, organized by the court system’s own Judicial Institute, rather than (for example) a continuing legal education program sponsored or co-sponsored by a bar association or even a court-organized program specifically open to attorneys or the public.

 

          We find some guidance in our prior opinions about issues to consider when a magistrates association wishes to invite outsiders to participate in its activities.  For example, in Opinion 20-38, we advised that a judge “may discuss pending or impending matters with other judges and court clerks at a magistrate’s association meeting, assuming this is a confidential setting with no others present.”  By contrast, “[w]here a judicial association’s email contact list includes individuals who are not judges or court personnel, a judge cannot assume the emailed discussions are confidential or private and therefore must take particular care to observe generally applicable limitations on judicial speech” (id.).  Significantly, we advised (id.):

 

We see particular risks when judges wish to share their personal opinions on controversial legal topics freely and informally in a public forum.  Thus, a judge should not use a general judicial association email contact list that includes non-judges as a discussion platform on any topic that might suggest an appearance of impropriety, serve to erode the public’s confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality and/or suggest that an individual judge might be inserting him/herself unnecessarily into the center of substantial local controversy.

 

          In Opinion 23-03, we concluded that “[a] magistrates association may invite prosecutors, defense counsel, probation and various law enforcement and county agencies to attend and speak at [its monthly] meetings where no pending or impending matters are discussed.”  However, we cautioned that “to avoid any improper appearance, any portion of the meeting where necessary magistrates association business is discussed or transacted should be private, outside the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel, probation officers, law enforcement or correctional officers, and others who are not judges or court personnel” (id.).  We further emphasized that “it would be improper to invite any one outside agency—but not others—to the portion of the magistrates association meeting that focuses solely on association business, as it could potentially convey an appearance of ‘a special relationship’ with that agency” (id.).

 

          In our view, the proposal to permit journalists to observe the court system’s internal training for judges on press access issues would create an ethically perilous situation for any judges in attendance.  The point of internal judicial training programs, as we understand it, is to enable judges to ask questions, make comments, share their experiences and challenges with their colleagues, and discuss thorny matters of interpretation of statutes and case law.  In sum, they must be able to discuss pending and impending cases, and perhaps share potentially unpopular and/or tentative views that can be discussed and clarified by their judicial colleagues.  At a program attended by journalists, anything they say will constitute a public comment, and thus they will lose the necessary safe harbor to engage in frank discussions.

 

          Moreover, because the journalists in attendance will have a direct professional interest in the subject matter of the training, their presence will create, at the very least, an appearance of impropriety and could create an impression that journalists are in a “special position to influence” the judiciary (22 NYCRR 100.2[C]).  Strikingly similar concerns are reflected in our previous advice that a judge “may not accept a collectable music album from a press photographer who regularly covers cases in the inquiring judge’s courtroom” (Opinion 16-176).  There, we noted that a press photographer “has a professional interest in covering cases in the judge’s courtroom, and this interest regularly comes before the inquiring judge” (id.).  We observed that because press photographers “require the judge’s permission to photograph the proceedings,” acceptance of even an inexpensive gift may “create an appearance of impropriety, as there is a danger the public will infer this photographer is seeking to curry favor and/or influence the judge” (id.).

 

          Accordingly, we conclude that the inquiring judge may not allow journalists to observe the proposed judicial training on press access.