Opinion 26-20(B)

February 5, 2026

Digest: A full-time city court judge who previously served as associate corporation counsel for the city may preside in matters where the city is a party and matters where the corporation counsel’s office appears, provided he/she did not have any involvement with the particular case before him/her as an attorney. 

Rules:   Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(E)(1); 100.3(E)(1)(b)(i); 100.3(F); Opinions 25-21; 24-94; 21-07; 18-04(A); 17-150; 87-26; People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403 (1987).

Opinion:

          The inquiring full-time city court judge was previously employed by the city as an associate corporation counsel.  In that capacity, the judge had prosecuted alleged code violations and engaged in motion practice and discovery in traffic matters.  Many code violation cases that the judge handled are still pending in the city court, but none of the traffic matters remain.  The judge asks if he/she may preside in the court part that hears code prosecutions; over the court’s traffic calendar; and in small claims or civil matters involving the city as a party.

          A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety and act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2[A]).  Thus a judge must disqualify in any proceeding where his/her impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]), including where required by rule or law (see e.g. Judiciary Law § 14).  Disqualification may be subject to remittal in many situations, but not, for instance, when the judge knows that he/she has “served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][b][i]; 100.3[F]).  Where objective standards do not mandate the judge’s disqualification, he/she remains the sole arbiter of recusal (cf. People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]).

          We have distinguished between judges who previously worked in the public sector and those who worked in the private sector.  For example, we concluded that “employment in a government law office … is unlikely to create any appearance of a financial or business relationship with [the judge’s] public sector colleagues” (Opinion 17-150).  We also have not required a waiting period before a former municipal attorney may preside in matters where that municipality is a party, where the judge had no prior involvement in the particular matter at issue (see e.g. Opinions 24-94; 87-26). 

          A judge who previously served as a prosecutor without supervisory responsibilities is permanently disqualified without the possibility of remittal in any case where he/she had some personal involvement as a lawyer, no matter how minor (see Opinions 25-21; 21-07; 18-04[A]).  But the judge may otherwise preside over cases prosecuted by his/her former public sector colleagues, provided the judge can be fair and impartial (see id.).  The judge may also preside over new, unrelated cases involving defendants the judge had previously prosecuted, even if the new cases involve the same or similar type of crime (id.). 

          Here, we likewise conclude the inquiring judge is permanently disqualified from all matters in which he/she was involved as an attorney, and remittal is not available.  The judge may otherwise preside in matters where the city is a party and matters where the corporation counsel’s office appears, including code violations, traffic matters, and small claims and civil matters, provided the judge did not participate in or have any involvement whatsoever as an attorney with the particular matter now before him/her as a judge.