Opinion 26-27

March 26, 2026

Digest:  A judge may permit a not-for-profit civic or charitable organization to use the judge’s real property in another county to provide temporary housing for victims of labor human trafficking, but must disqualify in any matters involving current residents of the property.  If the arrangement results in frequent disqualification, the judge must either terminate the arrangement or divest him/herself of any interest in the property.

Rules:   22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(A); 100.3(E)(1); 100.3(F); 100.4(A)(1)-(3); 100.4(D)(2); 100.4(D)(4); Opinions 21-22(B); 21-22(A); 20-138; 19-24; 09-48.

Opinion:

          The inquiring full-time judge owns a parcel of real estate in another county.  A not-for-profit civic or charitable organization that supports farmworkers would like to “use the house on the property as temporary housing for victims of labor human trafficking.”  Under the arrangement, the judge would continue to pay utilities for the property and would not receive rent or any other form of compensation.  The organization would manage the house, including determining who resides there and for how long.  In the unlikely event that a current resident of the house is involved in a matter that comes before judge, he/she would recuse.  The judge asks if the proposed arrangement is ethically permissible.

          A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety and act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2[A]).  A judge must disqualify him/herself in any proceeding where the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]).  A judge’s judicial duties “take precedence” over all his/her other activities (22 NYCRR 100.3[A]), but the judge may engage in extra-judicial activities that are compatible with judicial office and do not cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s impartiality, detract from the dignity of judicial office, or interfere with proper performance of judicial duties (see 22 NYCRR 100.4[A][1]-[3]).  A full-time judge may “hold and manage investments of the judge and members of the judge’s family, including real estate” (22 NYCRR 100.4[D][2]), but must “manage the judge’s investments and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases in which the judge is disqualified” (22 NYCRR 100.4[D][4] [requiring divestment of interests “that might require frequent disqualification”]). 

          In general, judges “may contribute to any permissible charity or not-for-profit organization” (Opinion 09-48).  We have advised that a judge may donate office space in a building owned by the judge to a not-for-profit charitable entity that provides support to immigrants “regardless of their immigration status” (Opinion 19-24).  We analyzed the “proposed in-kind gift of office space” as a charitable donation, and noted that it was “not rendered ethically impermissible merely because the entity gives general ‘know-your-rights’ legal information and connects immigrants to pro bono legal services” (id.).

          We have also advised that a judge who owns real property must disqualify in any proceeding where the judge’s current tenants appear (see e.g. Opinion 21-22[B]).  Of particular note, in Opinion 20-138, a judge was renting residential property to “a not-for-profit organization that provided free transitional housing to homeless individuals.”  Although the not-for-profit organization was “fully responsible for paying the rent and maintaining the security deposit, as well as screening, selecting and managing the homeless individuals who will live rent-free in the unit and providing them with certain essential residential supplies,” we advised that the judge “is disqualified, subject to remittal, in matters involving a litigant who is currently residing” on the judge’s property (id.).  We further cautioned that, should the organization’s placements of homeless individuals in the judge’s building result in frequent disqualification, “the judge must terminate this landlord/tenant relationship or divest him/herself of the investment” (id.).

          Accordingly, we conclude the inquiring judge may permit the organization here to use the judge’s real property to provide temporary housing for victims of labor human trafficking.  The judge must disqualify from any proceedings involving an individual who is currently residing on the property, although disqualification on this basis may be subject to remittal under Section 100.3(F).  As set forth in our opinions, remittal is a multi-step process that requires full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification and the voluntary affirmative consent of the parties and their counsel (see Opinion 21-22[A]; 22 NYCRR 100.3[F]).

          If the arrangement results in frequent disqualification, the judge must either terminate the arrangement or divest him/herself of any interest in the property.