Opinion 26-68
May 7, 2026
Digest: (1) Where a judge learns that
his/her court attorney, after researching multiple churches, has selected a
particular Catholic church to hold an upcoming family wedding and baptism, the
judge: (a) must insulate the court attorney from all cases involving that
particular church and make appropriate disclosures in writing or on the record,
and may thereafter preside as long as the judge concludes he/she can be fair
and impartial; but (b) need not disclose or insulate his/her court attorney on
this basis from cases involving any other church, diocese, or archdiocese.
(2) Provided the judge believes he/she can be fair and impartial, the judge
need not disclose or disqualify from all cases involving Catholic institutions
or dioceses, solely because the judge and the court attorney identify as
Catholics and have parents, children, and/or siblings who are practicing Catholics.
Rules: Judiciary Law §§ 212(2)(l); 14; 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(C)(2); 100.3(E)(1); 100.3(E)(1)(a)-(f); 100.3(E)(1)(d)(ii)-(iii); Opinions 24-158; 23-151; 23-52; 22-15(C); 21-169; 15-14; 08-124; People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403 (1987).
Opinion:
The inquiring judge asks about the propriety of presiding in cases involving Catholic schools, churches, and/or dioceses, in light of certain connections maintained by the judge’s court attorney and family members. The judge notes that the “Archdiocese of New York, among other specific churches, and schools within their jurisdiction, is a named co-defendant in many actions” involving sexual abuse claims.[1]
A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and must always act to promote public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]). Therefore, a judge must disqualify him/herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]) and where specifically required by rule or law (see e.g. Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][a]-[f]). For example, a judge must disqualify in a proceeding when the judge knows that he/she, or a relative within the sixth degree of relationship by blood or marriage, “is an officer, director or trustee of a party” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][d][ii]) or “has an interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][d][iii]). Where objective standards do not mandate disqualification, however, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal (see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]).
1. Court Attorney’s Negotiations for Wedding and Baptism
The judge’s court attorney recently selected a Catholic church where he/she wishes to hold an upcoming family wedding and baptism, after “doing research” on multiple Catholic churches. The court attorney and the church have commenced negotiations to hold these events, although the plans have not yet been finalized. The judge has at least one pending case in which this particular church is a party, and asks if he/she may continue to preside in the matter.
We note initially that the court attorney’s current involvement with this church is different from routine membership, attendance, and financial support. To the contrary, after “doing research” on multiple churches, the court attorney is actively engaged in negotiations and/or planning with the selected church to hold two highly significant personal life events there -- a wedding and a baptism -- for his/her family. Accordingly, while the negotiations and planning are ongoing, we conclude the court attorney has a conflict in matters involving that specific church (cf. Opinion 15-14 [finding stage of “discussing or negotiating a position” with prospective employer to be ethically significant point in law clerk’s job search]).
Where a member of the judge’s staff has a conflict, “it is ordinarily sufficient to insulate the staff member and disclose the situation” (Opinion 23-151). Here, too, we conclude that the judge’s impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned in matters involving a particular church simply because his/her court attorney plans to hold a wedding and baptism there, even while the court attorney is actively engaged in negotiations and planning.
Thus, the judge must insulate the court attorney and make full disclosure of the reason for the insulation to the parties in writing or on the record in matters where the selected church is a party (cf. Opinion 15-14 [requiring insulation of law clerk from “all cases involving a prospective employer once the judge learns the prospective employer offered employment to the law clerk or that the law clerk and prospective employer are actually discussing or negotiating a position,” although insulation may be discontinued if the job offer falls through]). After disclosure, the judge has discretion to preside, even if a party objects, provided the judge believes he/she can be fair and impartial.
We note that the court attorney’s decision to hold a wedding and baptism at one particular Catholic church does not, without more, raise any reasonable questions about the judge’s impartiality in matters involving any other church, diocese, or archdiocese. Accordingly, the judge need not disclose or insulate the court attorney on this basis in such matters, assuming the judge is satisfied the court attorney will observe appropriate “standards of fidelity and diligence” and “refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice” in the performance of the court attorney’s official duties (22 NYCRR 100.3[C][2]).
2. Familial Religious Affiliations
In the course of discussing the court attorney’s negotiations and planning for the upcoming wedding and baptism, the judge and his/her court attorney also “realized that, as Catholics, we have a number of familial links to the Catholic Church.” Their parents and/or siblings are active members of a Catholic church who attend services and/or volunteer weekly. Their children sometimes accompany these more devout relatives to church, and the judge’s children also attend a Catholic school.[2] The judge notes that, although he/she is not a practicing Catholic, he/she sometimes accompanies relatives to church “on special occasions.” The judge asks if such affiliations affect his/her ability to preside in matters involving various Catholic institutions.
We find no reasonable basis to question the judge’s impartiality in all cases involving Catholic churches or dioceses, based on the described connections. Notably, in Opinion 08-124, we considered an inquiry from a full-time judge who “is a certified emergency medical technician” with multiple active connections to a local health care facility and a local hospital – although we carefully noted that the judge “owns no stock in and is not on the board of either entity” (id.). On those facts, we concluded (id. [citations omitted]):
[T]he inquiring judge’s contacts with the health care facility and the hospital as an emergency medical technician, as a patient and as a social friend with certain doctors and nurses employed by such institutions do not per se create an appearance of impropriety should either institution be involved in a case before the judge. Therefore, in the absence of any basis for mandatory disqualification, and, assuming the judge can be impartial, he/she need not disqualify him/herself in a case where either institution is involved as a party, nor disclose his/her contacts with either institution in such cases. However, the judge must consider any additional factor in a particular case that would warrant a different result (e.g., if the judge is currently undergoing, or has recently received treatment at the time a proceeding is pending wherein the health care facility or hospital appears as a party).
Here, the judge’s and the court attorney’s personal connections are further removed. Beyond the specific church discussed above, the connections described by the inquiring judge are indirect and general. Even if the judge were a practicing Catholic, this would not, in and of itself, raise any reasonable questions about the judge’s impartiality or other appearance of impropriety that would require disqualification from all matters involving Catholic institutions or dioceses.[3] Accordingly, under the circumstances presented, neither disqualification nor disclosure is required on this basis, as long as the judge believes he/she can be fair and impartial. Likewise, the judge also need not insulate the court attorney from all matters involving Catholic institutions or dioceses on this basis.
3. Hypothetical Question
Finally, the judge asks about his/her obligations if it turns out that his/her court attorney “cannot make arrangements” at the specific church he/she already selected and then selects a different location for the wedding and baptism. As this presents a purely hypothetical question, we must decline to respond (see Judiciary Law § 212[2][l]; Opinions 24-158; 21-169). The judge may request additional guidance once he/she has more information and the situation is no longer purely hypothetical.
[1] As relevant here, a “diocese” is a specified geographical area overseen by a Catholic bishop, which encompasses various churches/parishes; an “archdiocese” is overseen by an archbishop and may include multiple dioceses. The Archdiocese apparently governs some schools/churches directly, but the judge “cannot identify with certainty” which ones without further research.
[2] In addressing this question, we note that the judge is not asking about matters involving the specific Catholic school his/her children attend. There is nothing in the inquiry to suggest that the school is a party to any litigation before the judge.
[3] Different principles could apply where the judge holds a leadership role (see e.g. Opinions 23-52; 22-15[C]; 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][d][ii]-[iii]).