

**AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE  
(Reckless Driving; Vehicular Manslaughter;  
Prior VTL 1192 Within Ten Years)  
Penal Law § 125.14 (3)  
(Committed on or after Nov. 1, 2007)**

**Note:** *Subdivision three of Penal Law § 125.14 requires commission of Reckless Driving, Vehicular Manslaughter in the Second Degree and the element that the defendant has been previously convicted of violating any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law (or a conviction in any other state or jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law) within the preceding ten years. That latter element is subject to the procedure set forth in CPL 200.60.*

*That procedure requires that the element related to the defendant's prior conviction be alleged in a special information.*

*If, upon arraignment on the special information, the defendant admits the prior conviction, the court must not make any reference to the conviction in the definition of the crime or in the listing of elements.*

*But, if the defendant denies the prior conviction or remains mute, the court must add the prior conviction element to the definition of the crime and the list of elements. See People v Cooper, 78 NY2d 476, 479 (1991)(In a Vehicular Manslaughter case, CPL 200.60 required the special information to plead both defendant's prior conviction and that he knew that the conviction resulted in revocation of his license); People v. Burgess, 89 AD3d 1100 (2d Dept, 2011)(The defendant's admission to a special information that he was previously convicted of driving while intoxicated, that his license was accordingly revoked, and that his license remained revoked as of the date of the alleged crimes relieved the People of their burden of proving those elements, and granted the defendant the protection afforded by CPL 200.60.); People v Alshoaibi, 273 AD2d 871, 872 (4<sup>th</sup> Dept 2000)("CPL 200.60 applies both to convictions and conviction-related facts."); People v Orlen, 170 Misc 2d 737 (Nassau County Court 1996)(CPL 200.60 applies to a suspension or revocation based upon a refusal to submit to a chemical test), cited by People v Alshoaibi, 273 AD2d at 872, supra, in support of its decision.*

*This charge assumes the defendant has admitted the element recited in the CPL 200.60 special information. If not, the Court must read the element in the definition of this charge, and add the element to the list of elements to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.*

The (specify) count is Aggravated Vehicular Homicide.

Under our law, a person is guilty of Aggravated Vehicular Homicide when he or she engages in Reckless Driving<sup>1</sup> and commits the crime of Vehicular Manslaughter in the Second Degree.<sup>2</sup>

The following terms used in that definition have a special meaning:

A person ENGAGES IN RECKLESS DRIVING when that person drives or uses any motor vehicle,<sup>3</sup> in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of a public highway, road, street, or avenue, or unreasonably endangers users of a public highway, road, street, or avenue.<sup>4</sup>

Intoxication, absent more, does not establish reckless

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<sup>1</sup> At this point, the statute continues: “as defined by section twelve hundred twelve of the vehicle and traffic law.” That definition is utilized in this charge in the definition of “reckless driving.”

<sup>2</sup> At this point, the statute continues: “as defined in section 125.12 of this article.”

<sup>3</sup> At this point, the statute continues: “motorcycle or any other vehicle propelled by any power other than a muscular power or any appliance or accessory thereof.” (*Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1212*). Such language has been omitted here due to the all encompassing term “motor vehicle.” The additional statutory language should, however, be inserted if that type of vehicle is at issue

<sup>4</sup> The term “public highway,” used twice in the definition of “reckless driving,” is separately defined to include “[a]ny highway, road, street, avenue, alley, public place, public driveway or any other public way.” *Vehicle and Traffic Law § 134*. Instead of separately defining that term, the most common types of “public highway” (road, street, or avenue) have been incorporated directly into the definition of “reckless driving.” Of course, if one of the omitted types of “public highway” is in issue, that type of “public highway” should be added.

driving. One can engage in reckless driving without being intoxicated and, conversely, one can drive while intoxicated without engaging in reckless driving. Evidence of an individual's intoxication and how that condition may have affected his or her ability to perceive and react to risks commonly encountered while operating a motor vehicle on a public highway may be considered in determining whether a person was engaged in reckless driving when that evidence is coupled with evidence of the manner in which the motor vehicle was being operated.<sup>5</sup>

Under our law a person commits the crime of VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE when he or she<sup>6</sup> operates a motor vehicle<sup>7</sup>

Select appropriate alternative(s):

while he or she has .08 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in his or her blood as shown by chemical analysis of his or her blood, breath, urine or saliva.<sup>8</sup>

while he or she is in an intoxicated condition.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> *People v Goldblatt*, 98 AD3d 817 (3d Dept 2012).

<sup>6</sup> At this point the statute states "causes the death of another...." That portion is omitted here because that language is repeated at the end of the statute where it makes more sense. Thus, to avoid redundancy and for clarity, this charge utilizes the reference to serious physical injury at the end of the statute.

<sup>7</sup> At this point, the statute states: "in violation of subdivision two, three, four or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law or operates a vessel or public vessel in violation of paragraph (b), (c), (d) or (e) of subdivision two of section forty-nine-a of the navigation law." In lieu of that language, this charge inserts the applicable provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

<sup>8</sup> Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192 (2).

<sup>9</sup> Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192 (3).

while his or her ability to operate such a vehicle is impaired by the use of a drug.<sup>10</sup>

while his or her ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs.<sup>11</sup>

and as a result of such intoxication [or impairment by the use of a drug, or impairment by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs], operates such motor vehicle in a manner that causes the death of another person.

[The term DRUG includes (*specify*<sup>12</sup>).]

*[Note: if a separate instruction to the jury was given for the applicable VTL 1192 offense incorporate it here by reference; otherwise select applicable portions and insert here.]*

Under our law, if the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol [or impaired by the use of a drug, or impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs], and while doing so caused the death of another person, then you may, but are not required to, infer that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment, such person operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused the death of another person.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192 (4).

<sup>11</sup> Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192 (4-a).

<sup>12</sup> Vehicle & Traffic Law §114-a and Public Health Law § 3306.

<sup>13</sup> The Legislative Memorandum in support of this statute states that “the addition of the rebuttable presumption provision would create a causal link between a driver who causes serious physical injury or death and a

In order for you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, the People are required to prove, from all the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the following three elements:

1. That on or about (date), in the county of (County), the defendant, (defendant's name), engaged in reckless driving of a motor vehicle; and

2. That the defendant did so:

Select appropriate alternative(s):

while the defendant had .08 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in his/her blood as shown by chemical analysis of his/her blood, breath, urine or saliva.

while the defendant was in an intoxicated condition.

while the defendant's ability to operate such vehicle was impaired by the use of a drug.

while his or her ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs; and

3. That as a result of such intoxication [or impairment by the use of a drug, or impairment by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs], the defendant operated such motor vehicle in a manner that causes the death of (specify); [and<sup>14</sup>]

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presumption that it was his or her intoxication or impairment that was the cause of such serious physical injury or death." See *People v Mojica*, 62 AD3d 100 (2d Dept 2009), lv denied 12 NY3d 856 (2009).

<sup>14</sup> If the defendant did not admit the additional elements set forth in the special information, those elements need to be added to this list of elements.

If you find the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of those elements, you must find the defendant guilty of this crime.

If you find the People have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of those elements, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.