Opinion 25-111

September 10, 2025

Digest:  On these facts, a judge may not facilitate an introduction between a non-profit organization of which the judge’s spouse is an officer and a local agency that coordinates and oversees court-mandated community service for the purpose of discussing whether the agency will place defendants with the judge’s spouse’s organization.

Rules:   22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.2(C); 100.3(E)(1)(e); Opinions 24-141; 23-140; 22-19; 21-73; 21-31; 10-124; 10-112; 09-174; 05-152.

Opinion:

          The inquiring administrative judge, as well as other judges subject to his/her supervision, may impose sentences that require a convicted defendant to perform community service as an alternative to incarceration.  One service provider (“Agency A”) coordinates and oversees court-mandated community service for the court, and arranges for defendants to participate in various beautification projects.  The judge’s spouse is an unpaid officer of a local not-for-profit organization (“Organization B”) that operates such projects.  The judge asks if he/she may introduce Organization B’s manager to Agency A’s director “so they can independently discuss” whether Agency A will engage Organization B to employ defendants sentenced to community service.  The judge would not sentence defendants directly to service at Organization B, and would not participate in Agency A’s decision whether to engage Organization B.  Neither the judge’s spouse nor Organization B would be compensated for any court referrals.

          A judge must avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and must always act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]).  A judge may not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance any private interest (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[C]).

          Although the rule against lending judicial prestige to advance private interests may be especially strong when those interests are commercial in nature (see e.g. Opinions 23-140; 21-73; 09-174), it also applies more broadly.  For example, a judge who volunteers in a not-for-profit organization’s mentoring program may not provide a testimonial for use in the organization’s marketing materials (see Opinion 22-19).  Nor may a judge provide a testimonial to be posted on the website of a charitable foundation (Opinion 24-141).  As we explained, providing a testimonial “to burnish the foundation’s image and enhance its financial position constitutes an impermissible use of the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the organization, however worthy its purposes may be” (id.).  Similarly, “[a] judge may not provide a biographical video for use in a not-for-profit organization’s social media campaign, where the required release and the overall context create an impression that the judge’s video will be used to promote the organization and its gala fund-raising event” (Opinion 21-31).

          Given that the inquiring administrative judge’s spouse is an officer of Organization B, we conclude the judge should not introduce the director of Agency A to a manager at Organization B, to encourage Agency A to include Organization B in its service program.  We conclude this would impermissibly lend the prestige of judicial office to advance private interests, and thus create an appearance of impropriety, even without a direct pecuniary benefit to the judge, the judge’s spouse, or Organization B.

          This opinion addresses and prohibits the use of the inquiring judge’s influence or prestige to promote Organization B’s participation in Agency A’s programs.  In reaching this conclusion, we do not proscribe the participation of Organization B in Agency A’s programs, or the sentencing of a defendant to community service that will be supervised or coordinated by Agency A even if the judge is aware that the community service could be performed for Organization B.  Of course, the judge should remain alert for instances where his/her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, such as when the judge’s spouse is likely to be a material witness (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][e]; Opinions 10-124; 10-112; 05-152).