Opinion 25-114

September 10, 2025

Facts/Issue:    A full-time judge asks if he/she may be a member of a not-for-profit sororal organization of Catholic American-Irish women.  The entity seeks to (a) “promote friendship, unity, and Christian charity”; (b) “foster and sustain loyalty to” their religion and our nation; (c) “aid and advance by all legitimate means the aspiration and endeavors of the Irish people for complete and absolute independence”; and (d) promote Irish culture, history, and traditions.  The entity does not endorse candidates but is “involved in the legislative process” and supports legislation “related to peace in Ireland, freedom for all Irish people, and [their] beliefs as Catholics.”

Discussion:     A judge must not hold membership in “an organization that practices invidious discrimination based on age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, religion, national origin, disability or marital status,” although he/she may hold membership in an organization “dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic, cultural or other values of legitimate common interest to its members” (22 NYCRR 100.2[D]).  

                      Here, we conclude the inquiring judge is in the best position to assess the relevant factors and decide whether this not-for-profit religious organization for women of a particular national origin excludes or limits persons from membership on the basis of sex or any of the other listed classes, and then “whether the exclusion is invidious” or subject to an exception under the Rules:

§ If the exclusionary practice is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose (i.e., the “preservation of religious, ethnic, cultural or other values of legitimate common interest to its members”), then membership is permitted.  

§ Conversely, if the discriminatory practice is one in which the policy of exclusion is arbitrary, and excludes persons or categories of persons solely on the basis of that characteristic, and by reason of such exclusion stigmatizes such persons as inferior, then the discrimination is invidious and membership is prohibited.

                      As a reminder, where an organization takes public positions in matters of substantial controversy, the judge should not in any event be an officer, director, or leader of the organization.

Conclusion:     It is the obligation of the judge who wishes to be a member of a not-for-profit religious organization for women of a particular culture or national origin to determine if it invidiously discriminates. 

Authorities:    Opinions 20-128; 96-82.