Opinion 25-118
September 10, 2025
Digest: A judge may write a letter on behalf of their child for inclusion in a mitigation packet to be reviewed by another judge, a probation department, and a district attorney in connection with the child’s pending criminal cases, where the letter (a) will reflect only a parent’s views of the child’s history, rehabilitation, and family support, and (b) will contain no reference whatsoever to the judge’s judicial title or status.
Rules: 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A), (C); Opinions 23-82; 22-76; 18-74; 17-106; 16-33; 12-169; 10-175; 07-178.
Opinion:
The inquiring judge’s adult child[1] was previously “a mentally ill, homeless addict” for many years. During that period, the child “was arrested numerous times” and absconded from probation, resulting in two outstanding warrants. A few years ago, however, the child “decided to get sober . . . and proceeded to change [his/her] life.” The child has remained sober since then and achieved significant employment and relationship milestones. As explained by the judge, “[t]he last step in [the child’s] transformation is clearing up [the outstanding] warrants.” Accordingly, the child’s defense counsel is preparing a “mitigation packet” for presentation to the probation department, the court, and the prosecutor. The judge asks if they may write a letter, in their capacity as a parent, to be included in the mitigation packet.
A judge must always avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2), and must always act to promote public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]). A judge must not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance private interests or voluntarily testify as a character witness (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[C]).
In Opinion 23-82, we advised that, after a judge’s adult child has been convicted and sentenced, a judge may attend and participate in the child’s subsequent parole hearing, provided they do so in the obvious role of a parent and without reference to their judicial status or otherwise invoking the prestige of judicial office.
In that opinion, we expressly recognized that speaking or writing on behalf of a potential releasee or parolee “would ordinarily be prohibited, absent either a subpoena or a request directly from the parole board or other appropriate governmental agency” (id. [emphasis omitted]), even when the potential releasee or parolee is a family member (id.; see also Opinions 16-33; 10-175). We explained the “core concern” is that such intervention “could readily be perceived as using the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of another, and is akin to voluntarily testifying as a character witness” (Opinion 23-82 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]).
However, we have long recognized that the parent-child relationship is “unique” and “special” (Opinions 17-106; 12-169) and have repeatedly advised that “a person elected or appointed to judicial office does not forfeit his/her rights or responsibilities as a parent” (Opinion 07-178). While a judge is not free to disregard the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct merely because they are acting in their parental or filial capacity (see e.g. Opinions 22-76; 18-74), “the special nature of the parent-child bond must be accounted for when addressing judicial ethics” (Opinion 12-169). Thus, in Opinion 23-82 we explained:
Here, too, we think it is appropriate to carve out a narrow exception. Our understanding is that the presence or absence of family support for the potential releasee or parolee is a significant component of a release decision. To forbid a judge who is a parent from voluntarily participating in a parole hearing for their own child seems unnecessarily and unfairly punitive to that child. Accordingly, we conclude that a judge may attend and participate in their child’s parole hearing, provided they do so in the obvious role of a parent and without reference to their judicial status or otherwise invoking the prestige of judicial office. Subject to those restrictions, the judge may voluntarily speak or write on behalf of their child at the parole hearing, without first being subpoenaed or requested to do so by the parole board or other tribunal.
In our view, the same reasoning applies to the proposed mitigation packet here; just as a judge may attend and participate in their child’s parole hearing as a parent, so too may a judge as parent write a personal letter describing the child’s history, rehabilitation, and family support, provided the judge acts solely in the parental role, with no reference to his/her judicial status.
Accordingly, we conclude a judge may write a letter on behalf of their child for inclusion in a mitigation packet to be reviewed by another judge, probation department and district attorney in connection with the child’s pending criminal cases, where the letter (a) will reflect only a parent’s views of the child’s history, rehabilitation, and family support, and (b) will contain no reference whatsoever to the judge’s judicial title or status. As the letter is authorized strictly in the judge’s personal capacity as a parent, we remind the judge not to use judicial stationery or court resources in preparing or sending the letter.
[1] The analysis herein would also apply to a judge’s step-child, whether or not formally adopted (see Opinion 23-82).