Opinion 25-131
September 10, 2025
Digest: A judge need not disqualify from a case involving child endangerment charges merely because (a) the judge’s child knows the subject child, (b) the judge’s close friend is engaged to a witness in the case, and (c) the judge recently disqualified him/herself in a different case on other grounds.
Rules: Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A)-(B); 100.3(E)(1); 100.3(E)(1)(d)(iii); 100.3(E)(1)(e); Opinions 25-94; 22-132; 21-06; 19-161; 19-39; 15-185; 11-125; People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403 (1987).
Opinion:
The inquiring part-time judge was assigned two unrelated criminal cases against the same defendant. The judge disqualified from one case, involving alleged Vehicle and Traffic Law charges, because the charging officer was a recent client of the judge’s law practice. In the second case, the defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child. The judge’s child is “friendly with” the defendant’s child,[1] and the judge’s close friend is engaged to a witness who signed a supporting deposition in the case. However, the judge has determined the child and witness are no more than “acquaintances” under Opinion 11-125, and the judge’s recent client has no involvement whatsoever in the case. The judge nonetheless asks whether the “totality of the circumstances” might create an appearance of impropriety requiring disqualification in the second case.
A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety and act to promote public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2[A]). A judge must not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence the judge’s conduct or judgment (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[B]). A judge must disqualify when “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including where required by rule or law (see Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]). For example, a judge must disqualify where his/her child “is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][e]) or “has an interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][d][iii]). Where disqualification is not required under objective standards, however, the judge remains “the sole arbiter of recusal” (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]).
In general, a judge’s obligations in a specific case depend on the judge’s connections with the particular parties, counsel, witnesses, and subject matter involved in that case rather than on a judge’s prior recusal decisions. For example, after the dissolution of a fifth-degree relative’s marriage, we advised that the judge’s “prior recusals, made during the relative’s marriage, do not require recusal in all subsequent matters involving the same litigants” (Opinion 22-132). Likewise, in Opinion 19-39, plaintiff’s counsel urged the inquiring judge to recuse because he/she had recently disqualified in another action where plaintiff’s counsel was the attorney of record. But the judge did not have a conflict with plaintiff’s counsel; the prior disqualification resulted solely from a conflict with another law firm representing a party in the other action. Accordingly, we concluded that the judge “need not disqualify him/herself merely because ... the judge once disqualified him/herself in another case involving the same attorney, due to an undisclosed conflict with another law firm” (Opinion 19-39).
Here, similarly, the inquiring judge’s prior disqualification in the traffic case involving this defendant, due to the presence of a recent former client in that particular case, does not require disqualification in other cases involving that defendant.
With respect to social connections, we have advised that a judge’s disqualification obligations depend upon the judge’s own relationship with the attorney, party, or witness at issue (see Opinion 11-125). A judge’s obligation to disqualify based upon a social relationship with one individual does not automatically extend to that individual’s relatives (see Opinions 21-06; 15-185). Nor are a judge’s relative’s social connections automatically imputed to the judge (see e.g. Opinions 25-94; 19-161).
Thus, we conclude here that the judge need not disqualify from a child endangerment case merely because the subject child is “friendly with” the judge’s child (see Opinion 25-94) or because another witness in the case is engaged to a close friend of the judge (see Opinion 15-185). As it appears that the inquiring judge has determined that his/her own relationship with such individuals is merely that of “acquaintances” under Opinion 11-125, neither disclosure nor disqualification is required on this basis.
We further conclude that all the described circumstances, whether taken singly or in combination, do not raise any reasonable questions about the judge’s impartiality in the child endangerment case (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]). Disqualification is therefore not ethically mandated, and the judge may preside in the matter, provided the judge believes he/she can be fair and impartial.
[1] The inquiring judge is uncertain whether the defendant’s child is a witness to or the subject of the alleged crime. For ease of drafting, we will assume the latter; the judge’s obligations will not increase if the child is “only” a witness.