Opinion 25-149
November 6, 2025
Digest: On these facts, a judge may mentor an individual who appeared before the judge nine years ago on a guilty plea to traffic infractions and a violation, where the individual has fully satisfied all terms and conditions of the sentence and has no matters pending.
Rules: 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A), (B); 100.4(A)(1)-(3); Opinions 23-92; 23-33; 22-55; 20-55; 16-124; 16-34; 14-181; 05-140.
Opinion:
A judge asks if he/she may accept an unexpected request from a former criminal defendant “to serve as [his/her] mentor” with a focus on educational and career advice. The defendant appeared before the judge on a single occasion nine years ago. The case had been before another judge for trial, but the parties negotiated a plea “reducing the charges to [a violation] and various traffic infractions” and the matter was transferred to the inquirer for allocution. The sentence imposed by the inquiring judge “included a conditional discharge, fines, surcharges, and community service, all of which have been fully satisfied.” The judge understands that the defendant has had no encounters with the criminal justice system in the past nine years, and no aspects of the prior conviction remain open. The request for mentorship was made independently on the defendant’s own initiative, and not through any agency.
A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and must always act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]). A judge must not allow family, political, or other relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[B]). A judge may nonetheless participate in extra-judicial activities that are compatible with judicial office and do not (1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge; (2) detract from the dignity of judicial office; or (3) interfere with proper performance of judicial duties (see 22 NYCRR 100.4[A][1]-[3]).
We have “recognized that
the community benefits from having judges take an active part in community
affairs whenever possible” (Opinion 23-92 [citations omitted]). A judge may
therefore serve as a mentor in circumstances where the mentorship is “not
likely to create an appearance of impropriety or involve the judge in
impermissible activities” (Opinion 23-33). For example, a judge may mentor
applicants seeking to obtain a nomination to one of the nation’s military
service academies (see id.); may mentor foster youth through a city
agency (see Opinion 22-55); “may mentor high school students
through a program organized by a not-for-profit chamber of commerce” (Opinion
20-55); “may mentor a high school student through a not-for-profit mentorship
program” (Opinion 16-124); and may participate as a panelist and mentor in a
philanthropic, non-commercial luncheon for young members of a minority group (see Opinion
16-34). Of particular note, we have said a judge may participate as a “mentor/life
coach” in a ministry for formerly incarcerated individuals returning to
society, where the participants “have been released and are no longer subject
to supervision by any probation or parole authority” (Opinion 05-140). We
emphasized that the judge may not interact with “law enforcement agencies or
other courts on the participant’s behalf” nor “provid[e] employment
recommendations” (id.). We also “cautioned” the judge “not to
participate with anyone who has previously appeared before him/her and not to
advise anyone who may appear before his/her court” (id.).
Conversely, we have advised that a judge may not serve as a mentor to “a teenager who recently appeared before the judge as a respondent in a Persons in Need of Supervision truancy proceeding” (Opinion 14-181). Notwithstanding the judge’s willingness to “immediately forward the case for reassignment” and a clearly well-intentioned desire to provide “personal guidance and social support” to a vulnerable teenager, we found that the proposed mentoring relationship would create an appearance of impropriety (id.). After reviewing other opinions where we found impropriety in a judge’s “proposed personal interaction with a litigant concerning the subject matter of the case that was (or had been) before the judge,” we then explained (id. [citations and footnote omitted]):
It would directly interfere with the proper performance of the judge’s judicial duties, in that it would require the judge to disqualify him/herself from a specific pending matter which is properly before the judge. It could also potentially cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality in the present truancy proceeding, or raise questions about the judge’s ability to be impartial in PINS cases generally, as other alleged truants might reasonably fear the judge was, in effect, biased against them because he/she did not offer to mentor them.
We find Opinion 14-181 readily distinguishable. Here, the defendant appeared before the judge on a single occasion nine years ago, and has long since satisfied all terms and conditions of the non-carceral sentence then imposed. The defendant has had no further connection whatsoever with the judge, the judicial system, or the judge’s court. Also unlike Opinion 14-181, this defendant’s prior case did not involve truancy or delinquency proceedings, or any other subject matter that could directly suggest a need for mentorship. That is, the proposed mentoring relationship will focus on educational and career advice completely unrelated to the subject matter of the prior criminal case.
Accordingly, on the facts presented, we conclude the judge may mentor the former defendant on education and career matters, subject to generally applicable limitations on judicial speech and conduct.