Opinion 25-156

November 6, 2025

Digest:  On these facts, a judge need not disqualify from a proceeding merely because counsel for a party makes many accusations against the judge, provided the judge concludes he/she can remain impartial.

Rules:   Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(E)(1); 100.3(E)(1)(a)-(f); Opinions 23-70; 94-46; People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403 (1987).

Opinion:

          The inquiring judge received a letter from counsel in a matter asking the judge to recuse for a long list of reasons.  Several reasons appear to involve primarily legal questions, such as the propriety of the judge’s closure of the courtroom, the correctness of the judge’s discovery orders, the judge’s willingness to excuse party appearances, and whether or not a pending federal case may be relevant to the matter.  Other reasons appear to involve incorrect factual assumptions.  For example, a purported “stranger” in the closed courtroom was in fact the judge’s law clerk, and the judge flatly denies counsel’s claims that the judge has prejudged certain issues in the case or has a disqualifying personal relationship with a witness or disqualifying extra-judicial knowledge of certain property.  Counsel also claims that the judge’s impartiality can be questioned because a party in the case is up for election against the judge’s spouse’s former campaign opponent. The judge believes he/she can remain fair and impartial, but asks if he/she must nonetheless disqualify under the circumstances.

          A judge must avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and must act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judge’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]).  A judge must disqualify where specifically mandated (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][a]-[f]; Judiciary Law § 14) and in other proceedings where the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]).  Where objective standards do not mandate disqualification, however, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal (see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]).

          We can only advise “whether the facts as presented by the judge require the judge to disqualify from the case going forward” (Opinion 23-70).  None of the specific objective disqualifying standards found in 22 NYCRR 100.3(E)(1)(a)-(f) appear to be implicated here on the facts presented.  We have advised that a judge need not recuse from a proceeding “merely because an attorney participating therein accuses the judge of misconduct in a letter addressed to the judge, the Administrative Judge, opposing counsel, and the Commission on Judicial Conduct,” provided the judge concludes he/she can be fair and impartial (Opinion 94-46).  Nor can we see any other grounds on which this judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1] [emphasis added]). 

          Where, as here, objective standards do not mandate disqualification, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal (see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; Opinion 23-70).  Accordingly, we conclude that the inquiring judge need not disqualify from the case, provided the judge concludes he/she can be fair and impartial.