Opinion 26-50
March 26, 2026
Digest: A judge who has credible first-hand knowledge that another judge has, as a litigant, used his/her access to the court system’s case management system to gain advantage and harass his/her opponent in a personal legal proceeding must report the litigant-judge to the Commission on Judicial Conduct. Reporting may await the conclusion of the proceedings.
Rules: 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(D)(1); Opinions 26-14; 24-178; 17-48; 15-124; 13-146; 10-14.
Opinion:
The inquiring judge is presiding in a matter where one of the litigants is also a part-time attorney judge. During testimony, the litigant-judge admitted that he/she used the court system’s universal case management system to “look up the criminal history” of someone close to his/her party opponent.[1] The litigant-judge “acknowledged there was no case pending before [him/her] involving” that person, and “further acknowledged [he/she] had no other legitimate reason to access the information.” In light of the litigant-judge’s overall demeanor and certain frivolous claims despite his/her experience as an attorney representing clients in similar matters, the inquiring judge is also concerned that the litigant-judge “is using the court process to harass the other party.”
A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety and act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2[A]). A judge who receives information indicating a “substantial likelihood” that another judge has committed a “substantial violation” of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct must take “appropriate action” (22 NYCRR 100.3[D][1]).
We have previously summarized a judge’s responsibilities when he/she becomes aware of information indicating another judge may have committed an ethical violation (Opinions 13-146 [citations omitted]):
A judge is not required to conduct an investigation of alleged misconduct and, therefore, may discharge his/her disciplinary responsibilities based on facts already known to the judge without further inquiry. In general, the Committee has advised that the judge who has first-hand knowledge of all the facts and persons involved in a particular situation is in the best position to determine whether there is a “substantial likelihood” that another judge has committed a “substantial violation” of the Rules. If the judge concludes that either of these two elements is missing, the judge need not take any action. If a judge concludes that there is a substantial likelihood that another judge has engaged in a “substantial violation” of the Rules, the action the judge must take will depend on the nature of the misconduct. For example, if the misconduct is so serious that it calls into question a judge’s fitness to continue in office, the judge must report the conduct to the appropriate disciplinary authority. By contrast, if the misconduct, although substantial, does not reach that level of seriousness, the judge has the discretion to take some other, less severe action than reporting the conduct to a disciplinary authority.
Ordinarily these determinations are left to the inquiring judge’s discretion (see Opinion 17-48). We have recognized, however, that (id. [citations omitted]):
There have nonetheless been instances where the facts described in an inquiry make clear the inquiring judge has sufficient information to meet the initial “substantial likelihood” threshold and the conduct described, if true, clearly calls into question another judge’s fitness to continue in office. In such instances, the Committee has generally advised that “appropriate action” necessarily involves reporting the conduct to the Commission on Judicial Conduct for inquiry and investigation.
In the present inquiry, the litigant-judge’s own testimony supplies sufficiently reliable, first-hand knowledge to satisfy the “substantial likelihood” requirement. The litigant-judge admitted that he/she used the court’s case management system in an unauthorized way to obtain otherwise confidential information. Moreover, the inquiring judge has apparently concluded based on the testimony and overall circumstances that the litigant-judge did so to harass the opposing party and obtain personal advantage in the proceedings. The inquiring judge’s personal observations and inferences suggest that the litigant-judge may have committed a “substantial violation” of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.
Thus, the two-prong test is met and the sole remaining question is what constitutes “appropriate action” under the circumstances. In our view, the alleged misconduct as described in the inquiry suggests that the litigant-judge has misused his/her special access to the universal case management system to advance his/her own interests in a personal litigation and to harass his/her litigation opponent. As such allegations, if proved, go to the core of the litigant-judge’s fitness to continue in office, the conduct must be reported to the Commission on Judicial Conduct (see e.g. Opinions 15-124; 10-14).
To avoid disruption, we note the inquiring judge may wait until the conclusion of the proceeding to make the report (see e.g. Opinion 24-178).
[1] As explained by the inquiring judge, the litigant only has access to the case management system “because of [his/her] employment as a part-time judge.” We have noted that “propriety of access to this database is an administrative decision that rests with the appropriate court administrators” (Opinion 26-14).