Opinion 26-92(A)

May 7, 2026

Digest: A judge who has an ongoing business/financial relationship with a neighbor is disqualified, subject to remittal, in all cases involving the neighbor until the business/financial relationship is completely terminated.

Rules:    Judiciary Law §14; 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(E)(1); 100.3(E)(1)(a)-(f); 100.3(F); Opinions 26-27; 21-22(A); 18-103; 17-160; 96-55.

Opinion:

           A judge owns land that is primarily used for agricultural purposes.  The judge’s neighbor farms the judge’s land and prepares an annual agricultural assessment form that the judge utilizes to seek an agricultural tax assessment for a portion of the judge’s property.  This assessment provides a real property tax exemption based on agricultural use.  The judge asks if he/she may preside in a civil matter in which this neighbor appears.

          A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]).  A judge must disqualify him/herself when required by rule or law (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][a]-[f]; Judiciary Law § 14) and in any other case where the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]).  For example, the judge must disqualify when the judge knows he/she has “an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][c]).

          Where a judge resides on a street owned by a golf course and shares maintenance costs for the street with other neighbors on the street, we have said the judge is disqualified in all cases involving the golf course and the neighbors on the street due to their ongoing business/financial relationship (see Opinion 18-103).  Similarly, a part-time judge who owns a local insurance and real estate agency is disqualified in cases involving holders of insurance policies obtained through the judge’s agency “until their mutual business/financial relationship completely ends” (Opinion 17-160).  Disqualification may be required even where the judge receives no money from the arrangement.  For example, where a judge permits a not-for-profit civic or charitable organization to use the judge’s real property to provide temporary housing for victims of labor human trafficking, the judge “must disqualify in any matters involving current residents of the property” (Opinion 26-27).

          In all of these instances, the disqualification may be subject to remittal under Section 100.3(F).  As set forth in our opinions, remittal of disqualification is a multi-step process that requires full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification and the voluntary affirmative consent of the parties and, if represented, their counsel (see Opinion 21-22[A]; 22 NYCRR 100.3[F]).

          The same principles apply here, because this judge likewise has a clear ongoing business and financial relationship with the neighbor, even if no money changes hands between them.  Accordingly, we conclude this judge is disqualified, subject to remittal, in all cases involving the judge’s neighbor for as long as the judge maintains the business/financial relationship with the neighbor involving the agricultural real property tax exemption.  The judge’s obligation ends once the business/financial relationship completely terminates with the neighbor.