People v Franklin (Quintin)
2003 NY Slip Op 51408(U)
Decided on October 30, 2003
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
Appellate Term, First Department


[*1]
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the Official Reports.

Digest-Index Classification:
Crimes—Jurors—Selection of Jury

Decided on October 30, 2003
APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

PRESENT:
HON. LUCINDO SUAREZ, P.J.
HON. WILLIAM P. McCOOE
HON. PHYLLIS GANGEL-JACOB, Justices.
570709/01

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,

against

QUINTIN FRANKLIN,


[*2]Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court, New York County, rendered June 14, 2001 after a nonjury trial (Gregory Carro, J.) convicting him of menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14[2]), four counts of menacing in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.15), harassment in the first degree (Penal Law § 240.25), resisting arrest (Penal Law § 120.50[3]), and stalking in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 120.45[1]), and imposing sentence.


PER CURIAM:

Judgment of conviction rendered June 14, 2001 (Gregory Carro, J.) affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant's challenge for cause to a prospective juror who was a "911" dispatcher. The venireperson's connection to law enforcement was not, in itself, a disqualifying relationship under CPL 270.20(1)(c) (see, People v Jones, 299 AD2d 283, lv denied 99 NY2d 655), and her unequivocal responses to inquiries as to whether she could critically evaluate police testimony indicated an ability to decide the case impartially (see, People v Williams, 63 NY2d 882, 884-885).
[*3]Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the anti-stalking statute (Penal Law § 120.45), to the extent preserved for review, is without merit (People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412).

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.