Respondent moves this court to dismiss the petition for failure to adequately describe the premises sought. Petitioner asserts that the description is adequate. Alternatively, petitioner asserts that any such defect is amendable and does not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal.

The description of the premises as required by RPAPL 74 1(3) serves two purposes. The first is to alert the respondent as to the subject matter of the proceeding. The second is to adequately apprise the marshal or other executing official which premises are the subject of an eviction, in the event petitioner gets a judgment of possession. The instant description fails to meet these ends.

The petition here describes the premises in paragraph 3 as "Food Court - 7th level in the [*2]building located at 1275-1291 Broadway a/k/a Manhattan Mall, Borough of Manhattan." By contrast, the lease more specifically describes the premises leased to respondent as "Room VC-8 cross-hatched on Exhibit B." Exhibit B reveals no less than 24 designated spaces on level 7. It appears from the Demaso affidavit, attached to petitioner s papers, that the 7th floor houses offices as well.

Petitioner argues that as the signage above the premises sought sufficiently designates "India Valley," this alone distinguishes these premises from other premises on the 7th floor food court.

Firstly, paragraph 3 of the petition does not describe the premises as "India Valley, Food Court, 7th level." Indeed, "India Valley" is not noted in the description of the premises at all. Therefore, the signage and the description must be read in conjunction with the entirety of the petition and caption in order to ascertain which premises are the subject of the proceedings.

Secondly, there is no guarantee that the signage will remain in place or continue to say "India Valley." Petitioner argues that such signage is required under the lease. However, what if the failure to maintain the signage, perhaps a substantial obligation under the lease, was the very basis for a summary proceeding? In that case, the petition would have to contain a more specific description.

The signage is not relevant here. The subjective name assigned to a business is not an objective method of determining which premises are sought. Similarly, one s name on an apartment door is less reliable than the objective use of an apartment number. Even if the number were removed, the placement of adjacent numbered units would provide a way to determine which unit is sought. The court concludes that signage alone is insufficient to distinguish the premises which are the subject of this proceeding, where the commercial unit is situated among many similar units.

Petitioner argues that even if this is a defect, it is amendable and does not require dismissal of this action. Petitioner cites a case on point, Broadway Madison Assocs. v. Minter & Gray, 23 HCR 44B,NYLJ 1/23/95, 27:4(AT1 Parness; McCooe, Glen) HCR Serial No.00007337, which found that "any infirmity in the description was readily correctable by amendment and did not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect." Id. In that case, however, the court found that "the petition accurately described the premises as set forth in the lease between the parties." Such is not the case here. In the instant case, the lease sets forth a different description from that in the petition. The lease describes the premises specifically as space number VC-8. The description in the petition is a general one and could be referring to any one of more than 24 spaces on the 7th floor food court. [*3]

The same logic applied in City of New York v. Morel, 156 Misc 2d 305 (Civ Court, Kings Co., 1992) off d 161 Misc 2d 681 (App Term 2d Dept) applies to these commercial premises as well. In Morel, the court found that "an accurate description of the subject premises in the petition, in the case of dwellings containing more than one residential unit means the individual apartment unit designation." Id. at 307. Here, where the commercial premises sought are among dozens of premises matching the same description, some designation is necessary. An action and a warrant of eviction bearing the description of the premises contained in the petition at bar could have implications for some 23 other commercial units in the 7th floor food court.

RPAPL § 74 1(3) requires that the petition describe the premises sought. Where, as here, the description contained in this petition describes in excess of 24 other leased spaces as well as the premises sought in this action, the court does not consider such a defect "form over substance." Recently, courts have shown a preference for considering cases on their merits (Metz v. Duennas, 183 Misc 2d 751 at 757 [District Court, Nassau County, 2000]. See also 433 West Associates v. Murdoch, 276 AD2d 360 [App Div 1st Dept., 2000). Nevertheless, MSG Pomp Corporation v. Doe, 185 AD2d 798 (App Div 1st Dept., 1992), recognizes that "a summary proceeding is a special proceeding governed entirely by statute and it is well established that there must be strict compliance with the statutory requirements to give the court jurisdiction." Id at 799.

The proceeding is dismissed for petitioner s failure to adequately describe the premises sought, without prejudice. The remainder of the motion is moot in light of the foregoing.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

.

Dated: April 18, 2001_____________________