— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Calabrese, J.), rendered April 9, 2002, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of robbery in the second degree because the People failed to establish his identity as the robber or his intent to commit robbery. The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his intent to commit robbery is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Bynum, 70 NY2d 858 [1987]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's identity and intent to commit robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see People v Gaimari, 176 NY 84, 94 [1903]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant's contention that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of bolstering testimony of a police officer who described, on redirect examination, the complainant's demeanor when he identified the defendant on the street, and by the prosecutor's reference to this testimony on summation in violation of People v Trowbridge (305 NY 471 [1953]) is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05; People v West, 56 NY2d 662 [1982]; People v Alston, 163 AD2d 398 [1990]). In any event, this argument is without merit. The defense counsel opened the door to the issue of the complainant's prior out-of-court identification of the defendant by bringing up the matter on cross-examination of the police officer who was present, thereby allowing the prosecutor to ask questions on the subject on redirect examination (see People v Melendez, 55 NY2d 445, 451-452 [1982]; People v Ocean, 292 AD2d 545 [2002]; People v Taylor, 142 AD2d 410, 421 [1988], affd 75 NY2d 277 [1990]).

The defendant's remaining contentions regarding bolstering and prosecutorial misconduct are, for the most part, also unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]), and, in any event, without merit or do not warrant reversal.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in summarily denying, without a hearing, his motion pursuant to CPL 330.30 to set aside the verdict based on newly-discovered evidence, as the defendant failed to establish that the evidence could not have been discovered with due diligence, or that, if received, would have created a probability of a more favorable verdict (see People v Reddick, 293 AD2d 554 [2002]; People v Wells, 289 AD2d 599 [2001]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit. McGinity, J.P., Luciano, Schmidt and Rivera, JJ., concur.