Lyons v Frost
2003 NY Slip Op 51369(U)
Decided on October 1, 2003
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
Appellate Term, Second Department


[*1]
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the Official Reports.

Digest-Index Classification:
Courts—Small Claims—-Jurisdiction

Decided on October 1, 2003
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM : 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT:DOYLE, P.J., RUDOLPH and SKELOS, JJ.
NO. 2002-1243 OR C

RICHARD LYONS d/b/a LYONS PAVING, INC., Respondent,

against

JAMES FROST, Appellant.


[*2]Appeal by defendant from a small claims judgment of the Justice Court, Town of Minisink, Orange County (G. Hadden, J.), entered February 28, 2002, awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $1,500.


Judgment unanimously reversed without costs and action dismissed.

Defendant and plaintiff-corporation Lyons Paving, Inc., entered into a contract in September 2000, by which plaintiff was to provide defendant with paving services. Work on the project began in October 2000, the corporation was dissolved in December 2000, and Richard Lyons further worked on the project in 2001. Defendant made payments, by checks payable to Richard Lyons, in October 2000 and January 2001. After the corporation was dissolved, Richard Lyons commenced this action to collect the remaining monies owed to the corporation. There is no indication that any acts by Richard Lyons, prior to the dissolution of the corporation, were done other than in his corporate capacity, or that his acts after the corporation was dissolved were not done to wind up corporate business. Inasmuch as a corporation cannot commence an action in the Small Claims Part of the Justice Court (see UJCA 1809 [1]), the court below lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action (see Editorial Photocolor Archives v Granger Collection, 61 NY2d 517, 523); We note to the extent that it can be argued that plaintiff commenced this action in his personal capacity, and therefore properly brought said action in the Small Claims Part, a review of the record reveals that the only debt being sued upon is a corporate debt, not an individual one, and, thus, plaintiff has no individual cause of action. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the action is dismissed.
[*3]
Decision Date: October 01, 2003