| People v Begemov (Ribi) |
| 2003 NY Slip Op 51533(U) |
| Decided on October 28, 2003 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the Official Reports. |
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Criminal Court, Kings County (D. Chun, J.), rendered June 18, 2002, convicting him, after a bench trial, of unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 [1]) and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [a]) and imposing sentence.
Judgment of conviction unanimously affirmed.
In or about December 2001, defendant was charged, inter alia, with unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 [1]) and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [a]). At trial, defendant's Department of Motor Vehicles Driver's Abstract, an Affidavit of Regularity/Proof of Mailing, and Orders of Suspension were admitted into evidence. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 214 creates a statutory exception to the hearsay rule in which said documents are admissible and create a presumption of mailing (and knowledge) which may be rebutted by defendant (see People v Meyer, 177 Misc 2d 537; People v Kollore, 151 Misc 2d 384), regardless of their ability to be independently admitted pursuant to any evidentiary hearsay exception (Meyer, 177 Misc 2d at 538). Herein, defendant's Abstract lists seven suspensions, three of which were listed on the 1998 Orders of Suspensions and the 2002 Affidavit of Regularity/ Proof of Mailing. Consequently, these documents created a presumption that defendant was notified of said suspensions at the Queens address he provided to the police officers at the time the summonses were issued and, thus, knew of said suspensions at the time of his arrest.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]). Defendant's remaining [*2]contentions lack merit.
Decision Date: October 28, 2003