Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Justice Court, Village of Tarrytown, Westchester County (S. Jones, J.), rendered December 18, 2002, convicting her, after a jury trial, of hindering prosecution in the third degree (Penal Law § 205.55), and imposing sentence.

Judgment of conviction unanimously affirmed.

Defendant was charged with hindering prosecution in the third degree (Penal Law § 205.55) in that she did harbor and conceal Michael Sanders, who had committed the felony of grand larceny, in order to avoid his apprehension by the police.

Penal Law § 205.55 provides that a "person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the third degree when he renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed a felony." Thus, the People were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant rendered criminal assistance to Sanders, and (2) Sanders had committed a felony. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the statute does not require proof that the assisted person was ever arrested or convicted of the underlying felony (see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 588 [1997]). Therefore, contrary to defendant's contention, it is irrelevant that Sanders was ultimately convicted of a misdemeanor, not a felony.

Upon a review of the record, we find that the hearing court should have suppressed the statements contained in the People's CPL 710.30 notice since they were the result of custodial interrogation and, contrary to the determination of said court, the People did not establish that defendant was informed of her Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). hi addition, we find that the trial court should have either precluded the People from offering at trial evidence of defendant's deposition since the People failed to provide a CPL 710.30 notice for the statements contained in the deposition or, in the alternative, upon the showing of good cause, the court should have delayed the trial and held a hearing regarding the voluntariness of the [*2]statements (see e.g. People v Lopez, 84 NY2d 425 [1994]; People v Greer, 42 NY2d 170, 179 [1977]). Nevertheless, the facts alleged in the statements were established at trial through other properly admitted evidence. Consequently, said error is harmless (see e.g. People v Bowen, 309 AD2d 600 [1st Dept, Oct. 16, 2003]). Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict was affected by the aforementioned errors (see People v Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750, 758-759 [19881), and the evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]). Defendant's remaining contentions lack merit.
Decision Date: December 23, 2003