[*1]
Dubose v Anton & Partners
2004 NY Slip Op 50357(U)
Decided on April 28, 2004
Appellate Term, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on April 28, 2004
APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

PRESENT:
HON. WILLIAM P. McCOOE, J.P.
HON. WILLIAM J. DAVIS
HON. MARTIN SCHOENFELD, Justices.
570335/03

LISA DUBOSE, Plaintiff-Respondent,

against

ANTON & PARTNERS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.


Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Civil Court, New York County, entered March 27, 2003 after a nonjury trial (George Postel, J.H.O.) awarding plaintiff damages in the principal sum of $35,323.14, plus interest, costs and disbursements, for a total judgment of $43,417.36.


PER CURIAM:

Judgment entered March 27, 2003 (George Postel, J.H.O.) affirmed, with $25 costs.

We have deemed the notice of appeal from the order dated March 5, 2003 amended to state that the appeal is taken from the judgment entered March 27, 2003 (CPLR 5520[c]).

With respect to the first cause of action for breach of the January 27, 2000 letter agreement, the record supports the finding of the trial court that plaintiff performed services for defendant advertising agency and that defendant failed to pay the balance of plaintiff's fees following termination of her services. While defendant contended that plaintiff's compensation was conditioned upon her performance of additional work on other projects, the court could [*2]reasonably find that plaintiff did render services to defendant on certain other identified projects, "subject to prior commitments," as expressly permitted by the parties' written agreement (paragraph 4).

The "separation letter" dated December 12, 2000 signed by defendant, acknowledging the debt to plaintiff on the first advertising account, did not constitute a compromise offer (CPLR 4547) and was properly admitted. The document was not generated in the course of settlement discussions between the parties nor did it evidence that plaintiff had interposed a claim which defendant was seeking to compromise.

As to the second cause of action, plaintiff met her burden of proving that on August 14, 2000 the parties agreed to a 50% split of any profit earned on the second advertising account. Although defendant asserted that there was no profit on that account, the court credited plaintiff's testimony regarding charges defendant improperly included in its calculation of production costs and credited plaintiff's own calculation of net profits realized. Defendant, which was in a better position to have documented the project costs, failed to rebut plaintiff's testimony with competent proof, particularly in connection with defendant's assertion that it expended $18,000 to retain its own art director on the project.

In summary, there is no basis to disturb the trial court's credibility-based determinations, as it cannot be said that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (Thoreson v Penthouse Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 495 [1992]).

We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.