Appeal by occupant from a final judgment of the Civil Court, Queens County (A. Agate, J.), entered March 3, 2003, granting possession to petitioner.

Final judgment unanimously affirmed without costs.

As a general rule, "the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the conduct of the trial" (Ingebretsen v Manha, 218 AD2d 784 [1995]), and the admission of evidence, including "the method and duration of cross-examination to determine a witness' credibility," is within the sound exercise of that discretion (Feldsberg v
Nitschke, 49 NY2d 636, 643 [1980]). Moreover, while "a witness may be cross-examined with respect to specific immoral, vicious or criminal acts which have a bearing on the witness's credibility" (Badr v Hogan, 75 NY2d 629, 634 [1990]; see People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 244 [1969]), the credibility of a witness may not be impeached "through extrinsic evidence on matters collateral to the issues in the case" (People v Rendon, 301 AD2d 665, 666 [2003]; see also Parsons v 218 E. Main St. Corp., 1 AD3d 420 [2003]; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]). The fact that in prior proceedings, certain of the witnesses' contentions regarding the content of the parties' sublease and the right to restrict occupant's access to a portion of the disputed premises were determined adversely to the witness, is a matter collateral to the material trial issue (whether a portion of the occupied premises was subject to an oral license independent of the sublease) and did not evidence the necessary "moral turpitude" to be relevant to the witness' credibility (Badr v Hogan, 75 NY2d at 634). Thus, the court below did not abuse its discretion when it limited occupant's exploration of those matters on cross-examination. [*2]

Decision Date: June 23, 2004