[*1]
Rosenberg v Kolker
2004 NY Slip Op 51015(U)
Decided on September 2, 2004
Appellate Term, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on September 2, 2004
APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT

PRESENT:
HON. LUCINDO SUAREZ, P.J.
HON. WILLIAM P. McCOOE
HON. PHYLLIS GANGEL-JACOB, Justices.
570493/03

MICHAEL ROSENBERG, Plaintiff-Appellant,

against

MARYANNE KOLKER AND CHARLES KOLKER, Defendants-Respondents.


Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court, New York County, dated September 16, 2002 (Joan M. Kenney, J.) which granted defendants' cross motion to dismiss the complaint as barred by the Statute of Limitations, and denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.


PER CURIAM:

Order dated September 16, 2002 (Joan M. Kenney, J.) modified by denying defendants' cross motion to dismiss the complaint and by reinstating the complaint; as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff's action to recover on two promissory notes executed by defendants, each of which matured on August 6, 1992, was commenced in April of 2002. As late as May 8, 1997 and June 12, 1997, defendants made partial payments to plaintiff by checks bearing the notations "on account loan" and "on account." In view of these payments within the limitations period, and considering the ready acknowledgment of defendant Charles Kolker that he does not recall "the details and circumstances" of his delivery of the checks or whether any separate writing accompanied such delivery, there are at least questions of fact as to whether defendants' partial [*2]payments extended the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations. "Whether a purported acknowledgment is sufficient to restart the running of a period of limitations depends on the circumstances of the individual case" (Fade v Pugliani/Fade, 8 AD3d 612 [2004], quoting Estate of Vengroski v Garden Inn, 114 AD2d 927, 928 [1985]) and the slender record so far developed on defendants' CPLR 3211(a)(5) dismissal motion was insufficient to conclusively resolve that issue.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.