Defendant's motion to dismiss this criminal action in the interests of justice (see CPL 170.40) is denied.

Defendant, originally charged by felony complaint with criminal mischief in the third degree (see Penal Law § 145.05), presently stands accused by prosecutor's information of criminal mischief in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 145.00[1]) for allegedly intentionally damaging a car. According a statement Defendant made to police that is annexed to the prosecutor's information, the car involved is that of her doctor, who is married and with whom she had a three-month-long sexual relationship. Also according to her statement, she felt "cheated on" by him and, on the night of April 8, 2004, she drove by the doctor's home, saw his car, went up to it, smashed all four windows, and slashed all four tires. She also thereby admits to other conduct toward the doctor that is violative of the Penal Law and she acknowledges that her motive was "to get back at him."

In support of her motion to dismiss this action in the interests of justice, Defendant asserts, through counsel, that she suffered from depression, that the complaining doctor gave her various drugs for that condition, that her sexual affair with him traumatized her,

that the doctor used his knowledge of her sexual and medical problems to "embark" on a sexual affair with her, that he lied to her, inferentially about whether he lived with his wife, that he violated medical ethics, that she vandalized his car only after she learned that he was living with his wife, and that she acted out of pain. She notes that she has no prior criminal record, that she remains married to her husband, that she and her husband have a 14½ year old daughter, that she has her own cleaning company, that she is part owner of a car wash, and that she is also a part owner of a landscaping company. She further asserts that she has had "no subsequent problems" regarding the doctor, and urges that dismissal in the interests of justice will "increase" the safety and welfare of the community, and instill confidence in the criminal justice system, by "telling" the doctor that "he must not have sex with his patients."

While I do have discretion to dismiss a case in the interests of justice, that discretion is to be exercised sparingly, after careful consideration and analysis of relevant, statutorily enumerated factors (see People v. Rickert, 58 NY2d 122, 459 NYS2d 734 [1983]; People v. Calderon, 287 AD2d 729, 732 NYS2d 136 [2d Dept. 2001]; and see CPL 170.40). Whether the victim of the crime has behaved unprofessionally, perhaps even criminally, is not among them (cf. CPL 170.40[1][I]). Moreover, Defendant, by her own admission, intentionally damaged property (see CPL 170.40[1][a][b][c] for reasons personal to her when there are appropriate, civilized avenues for addressing the misconduct of the doctor about which she makes claim. Allowing Defendant to indulge in criminal conduct without consequence simply because her victim is a scoundrel invites threats to the public safety and imperils confidence in the criminal justice system (see CPL 170.40[1][g],[h]).

So Ordered.