Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Criminal Court, Kings County (W. Miller, J.), rendered February 6, 2004, convicting him of driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]) and imposing sentence.

Judgment of conviction unanimously affirmed.

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3). On appeal, defendant, for the first time, argues that the plea allocution was legally insufficient.

Defendant, upon allocution, admitted to driving while intoxicated in that he drank one beer and took a prescription pill for pain. Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that defendant admitted that either the one beer he drank was sufficient to render him intoxicated or that the prescription medication interacted with the beer so as to render him intoxicated (cf. People v Grinberg, 4 Misc 3d 670 [2004]). Inasmuch as defendant entered a plea of guilty to driving while in an intoxicated condition, it is irrelevant whether he was influenced or affected by alcoholic beverages alone or by a combination of alcoholic beverages and other substances (see Otero v Town of Southampton, 194 F Supp 2d 167, 179 [US Dist Ct, ED NY 2002], affd 59 Fed Appx 409 [2d Cir 2003]). In addition, we note that defendant did not say anything that would have either cast a significant doubt upon his guilt of the crime or called into question the voluntariness of the plea (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]; People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666 [1988]). The record contains an affirmative showing that the plea was voluntarily and understandably entered (Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238 [1969]; see also People v MacLeay, 233 AD2d 529 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 987 [1997]). In view of the foregoing, the plea satisfied the standard of representing "a voluntary and intelligent choice [*2]among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant" (North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25, 31 [1970]; see also People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 19 [1983]).

The People, at the time of the plea, moved to amend the accusatory instrument to charge driving while intoxicated in lieu of driving while impaired. In this regard, we note that the factual portion of the accusatory instrument indicating that defendant exhibited signs of intoxication, to wit, watery eyes, odor of alcoholic beverage on his breath, disheveled appearance, an unsteady gait and that he admitted drinking one beer and taking prescription drugs, was sufficient to establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and defendant's commission thereof.
Decision Date: July 20, 2005