| Lipman v Quinton |
| 2005 NY Slip Op 51590(U) [9 Misc 3d 131(A)] |
| Decided on September 30, 2005 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from an order of the Justice Court of the Town of Warwick, Orange County (Daniel F. Coleman, J.), entered on July 17, 2003. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and denied his demand for a trial by jury.
Order, insofar as appealed from, unanimously affirmed without costs.
Plaintiff Alan S. Lipman, a resident of the Town of Warwick, is an attorney who has been practicing law as a sole practitioner under the firm name "Fabricant & Lipman" since 1988, and conducts his practice in Goshen. Subsequent to the death of Herbert
[*2]
Fabricant in 1987, plaintiff continued to practice law with Mark Stern under the firm name "Fabricant Lipman and Stern," which was the name of the firm prior to Fabricant's death. Upon dissolution of that firm in 1988, plaintiff filed a Certificate of Conducting Business under an Assumed Name pursuant to General Business Law § 130 (1), and continued his private practice of law under the name "Fabricant & Lipman."
Contrary to defendant's contention, plaintiff's use of the firm name "Fabricant & Lipman" subsequent to the death of Herbert Fabricant is permitted under the Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-102 (b) (22 NYCRR 1200.7 [b]), which provides that a "firm may use as, or continue to include in its name the name or names of one or more deceased . . . members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession." Further, plaintiff was entitled to commence the action in his individual capacity and established the basis for personal jurisdiction of the Justice Court in the Town of Warwick by uncontroverted proof that he is a resident of the Town of Warwick (see UJCA 213 [1]). [*3]
In granting the alternative relief sought by defendant for leave to serve a late answer, under the particular circumstances presented herein, it was not an abuse of discretion by the court to deny the branch of defendant's motion belatedly seeking a jury trial as additional alternative relief.
Decision Date: September 30, 2005