Defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Civil Court, New York County, dated October 15, 2003 (Karen S. Smith, J.) as denied their motion to dismiss the 8th, 9th 11th, 12th, 14th and 15th causes of action in the amended complaint.

PER CURIAM:

Order dated October 15, 2003 (Karen S. Smith, J.) modified to grant that branch of defendants' motion seeking to dismiss the 11th and 15th causes of action; as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

In March 2001, while on a business trip to Asia, plaintiff allegedly was lured by her supervisor, defendant Fredman, to a secluded location in Thailand where he subjected her to various forms of sexual harassment, conduct which, plaintiff claims, continued upon her return to the United States and ultimately caused her to leave the corporate defendant's employ. Plaintiff commenced this action in August 2001, seeking damages for sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In November 2002, more than a year after issue was joined, plaintiff amended her complaint to allege new and more specific causes of action relating to the travel abroad, the termination of her employment and alleged interference with her obtaining new employment. Defendants argued that these new claims were untimely under the one-year statute of limitations specified in CPLR 215(3). The court found sufficient allegations in the original complaint to support six of the new causes of action now at issue.

The relation-back rule provides that a "claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading" (CPLR 203[f]). We conclude that the original pleading provided sufficient notice of the series of occurrences in the proposed new causes alleging assault, battery, false imprisonment and prima facie tort (cf. Messinger v Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 279 AD2d 344 [2001]). However, the original pleading did not give notice of the remaining series of allegations relating to events occurring after termination of plaintiff's employment, and underlying her cause of action for interference with prospective business relations (see Darby & Darby v VSI Intl., 268 AD2d 270, 273 [2000]), [*2]affd 95 NY2d 308 [2000]). The claim for slander per se must be dismissed as untimely, since the original complaint gave insufficient notice to allow preparation of a defense as to statements allegedly made by Fredman to plaintiff's fellow employees and prospective employers (see Murray Hill Invs. v Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 305 AD2d 228 [2003]).

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Decision Date: October 05, 2005