Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Martin J. Massell, J.), dated October 20, 2005. The order, insofar as appealed from, upon granting plaintiff's motion for reargument and/or renewal, adhered to a prior decision denying plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment, nunc pro tunc, against defendants Hempstead Electric Services, Inc. and Richard Seidel, and dismissing the complaint as to all defendants.

Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed without costs, complaint reinstated as against all defendants, plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment against defendants Hempstead Electric Services, Inc. and Richard Seidel granted and matter remanded to the court below for all further proceedings.

Plaintiff instituted this action against defendant Hempstead Electric Services, Inc. for goods sold and delivered, and an account stated. Plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants were based upon personal guaranties. Defendants Hempstead Electric Services, Inc. and Richard Seidel defaulted in answering. Approximately one year and three weeks after said defendants' default, plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3215 for entry of a default judgment. By order dated June 6, 2005, the court denied plaintiff's motion and dismissed the complaint as to all [*2]defendants due to plaintiffs' failure to take proceedings for entry of judgment within one year after the default (CPLR 3215 [c]). Plaintiff then moved for reargument and/or renewal. Upon granting plaintiff's motion for reargument and/or renewal, the court adhered to its original decision.

CPLR 3215 (c) provides in pertinent part, "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned . . . upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed." In order to demonstrate "sufficient cause," a plaintiff is required to present a valid excuse for the delay in proceeding with the action and demonstrate that the action has merit (see 7 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 3215.15). Here, not only did plaintiff's attorney proffer an excuse of law office failure that was reasonable under the facts of the case, the length of delay was de minimis, and there was no evidence of willfulness or prejudice to defendants (see CPLR 2005; see also Flora v Ingilis, 233 AD2d 418 [1996]). In addition, the verified complaint, together with plaintiff's statement reflecting defendant Hempstead Electric Services, Inc.'s purchases, as well as the personal guaranty signed by the individual defendants were sufficient to demonstrate merit to the causes of action.

As to defendant Conn, plaintiff's moving papers reflect that said defendant served and filed a verified answer dated February 26, 2004 and that said parties subsequently engaged in discovery through March 10, 2005. Thus, as to said defendant there were proceedings sufficient to avoid dismissal (see 7 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 3215.14).

In view of the foregoing, the order, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, the complaint reinstated as against all defendants and plaintiff's motion for entry of a
default judgment against defendants Hempstead Electric Services, Inc. and Richard Seidel is granted.

Rudolph, P.J., McCabe and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 15, 2006