| People v Paige (Joseph) |
| 2006 NY Slip Op 52284(U) [13 Misc 3d 143(A)] |
| Decided on November 29, 2006 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
The People appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert E. Torres, J.) dated August 5, 2005, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds.
PER CURIAM:
Order (Robert E. Torres, J.) dated August 5, 2005, reversed, on the law, motion denied, and accusatory instrument reinstated.
The misdemeanor prosecution was commenced for purposes of CPL 30.30 on May 9, 2005, the date of the filing of the accusatory instrument (see CPL 1.20(17); CPL 100.05; People v Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434 [1998]). In concluding otherwise and holding that the criminal action was commenced on February 1, 2005, the date of defendant's arrest, the motion court focused improperly upon the circumstances that defendant was a patient in a State psychiatric center and could have been readily produced for arraignment. Although delays engendered by the People's lack of diligence in producing a defendant for arraignment may support a dismissal based upon a violation of a defendant's due process rights, such pre-commencement delays are not relevant in the calculation of statutory speedy trial time under CPL 30.30 (see People v Parris, 148 Misc 2d 347, 348 [1990]), aff'd 79 NY2d 69 [1992]). In the absence of any motion to dismiss on due process grounds, and since the total time chargeable to the prosecution was within the statutory limit required by CPL 30.30, defendant's motion to dismiss should have been denied.
To the extent that the court, sua sponte, found that defendant's due process rights were violated by the three-month delay, the record does not support a finding that the delay was due to the People's lack of good faith (see People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241, 253-255 [1978]). Nor was the delay "a deliberate attempt by the prosecution to hamper [defendant] in the preparation of his defense" (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 446 [1975]) or shown to have been motivated by a desire to gain an unfair tactical advantage (see People v Jones, 267 AD2d 250 [1999] lv denied 94 NY2d 949 [2000]).
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Decision Date: November 29, 2006