Appeal from an order of the Justice Court of the Town of Philipstown, Putnam County (Stephen G. Tomann, J.), dated June 9, 2005. The order granted defendant's motion to dismiss the action and denied plaintiff's cross motion for sanctions.

Order affirmed with $10 costs.

Substantial justice was done between the parties in the present small claims action for breach of contract (UJCA 1804, 1807). The court below properly granted defendant's motion dismissing the action (see Glendora v Langelotti, Misc 3d [A], 2006 NY Slip Op 52281[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]). Even the most liberal reading of plaintiff's allegations, accepting them as true, and affording plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, fails to demonstrate the existence of a cause of action based on breach of contract (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Plaintiff merely alleges that defendant stated that she would sign sponsorship papers and later refused to do so. However, every change of mind is not a breach of contract; there is no allegation of any consideration for such a promise and no allegation of any terms of the alleged agreement. It is axiomatic that an agreement must be definite in its material terms to be enforceable as a contract, and this alleged agreement does not come close to meeting this test (see Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v Le Chase Constr. Servs. LLC, 31 AD3d 983 [2006]). There cannot be said to have been a meeting of the minds on the terms of any agreement at any point (see Miranco Contr. Co. v Perel, 29 AD3d 873 [2006]).

As to plaintiff's cross motion for sanctions against defendant, we note that Rules of the Chief Administrator (22 NYCRR) § 130-1.1 does not apply in the Justice Court or [*2]
in the Small Claims Part of any court, and sanctions are therefore unavailable. In any event, no grounds were shown warranting the imposition of sanctions.

Rudolph, P.J., McCabe and Lippman, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: December 27, 2006