People v Krakowski (2006 NY Slip Op 52578(U))

People v Krakowski (Georgia)

2006 NY Slip Op 52578(U) [14 Misc 3d 139(A)]

Decided on October 6, 2006

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Georgia Krakowski, Appellant.

Appeal from three judgments of the City Court of Long Beach, Nassau County (Roy Tepper, J.), rendered October 2, 2003. The judgments convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and two charges of failing to stop at a stop sign.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find it was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05) and two charges of failing to stop at a stop sign (City of Long Beach Municipal Code § 15-8) beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]). Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses (see People v Gaimari, 176 NY 84 [1903]). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86 [1974]).

Contrary to defendant's contentions, the jury charge was proper. The lower court properly referenced the facts in the context of explaining the applicable legal principles and was evenhanded and fair in doing so (see CPL 300.10 [2]; People v Williamson, 40 NY2d 1073 [*2][1976]; People v Hollis, 106 AD2d 462 [1984]). Defendant's remaining contention, that the court should have dismissed the accusatory instruments in the interest of justice, is unpreserved for appellate review since defendant never moved to dismiss the accusatory instruments on said ground (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, there is no compelling factor, consideration or circumstance demonstrating that defendant's conviction clearly resulted in an injustice (see CPL 170.40 [1]; People v Peak Carting, Inc., 11 Misc 3d 4 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]; People v Kelly,
10 Misc 3d 136[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 52131[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]). Accordingly, the judgments of conviction should be affirmed.