Monarch Condominium v Raskin
2007 NY Slip Op 01378 [37 AD3d 288]
February 15, 2007
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, April 11, 2007


Monarch Condominium, by the Board of Managers, Appellant,
v
Jonathan Raskin et al., Respondents.

[*1] Cascone, Cole & Collyer, New York (Michael S. Cole of counsel), for appellant. Peter Axelrod & Associates, P.C., New York (Osman Dennis of counsel), for respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter B. Tolub, J.), entered August 3, 2006, which denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff condominium's motion for a preliminary injunction compelling defendants to cease the use of their apartment as a psychiatry office and requiring the unit's restoration to residential purposes was properly denied since plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm if the sought relief is denied (see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988]). Contrary to plaintiff's contention, it is required to demonstrate irreparable harm. This is not a situation where a preliminary injunction may, by reason of specific statutory dispensation, be obtained without such a showing (cf. Village of Chestnut Ridge v Roffino, 306 AD2d 522, 524 [2003]). Plaintiff's request for relief was also properly denied because it "clearly did not seek to maintain the status quo, but rather sought the ultimate relief in [the] action" (Putter v City of New York, 27 AD3d 250, 253 [2006]). Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Williams, Buckley, Catterson and McGuire, JJ.