| Tarrant Apparel Group v Camuto Consulting Group, Inc. |
| 2007 NY Slip Op 04582 [40 AD3d 556] |
| May 31, 2007 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| Tarrant Apparel Group, Respondent, v Camuto Consulting Group, Inc., et al., Defendants, and With You, Inc., et al., Appellants. |
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Kent, Beatty & Gordon, LLP, New York (Jack A. Gordon of counsel), for respondent.
Performance rendered directly to plaintiff would indicate that plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary (see e.g. Internationale Nederlanden [U.S.] Capital Corp. v Bankers Trust Co., 261 AD2d 117, 123 [1999]). Drawing all inferences in plaintiff's favor, as one must on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), Simpson's obligation under section 6.6 of the Master License Agreement to "be actively involved in promoting the . . . Sub-Licensed Products" and to "publicly wear or use the . . . Sub-Licensed Products" is arguably performance that is rendered directly to plaintiff, the sublicensee. Neither New York Pepsi-Cola Distribs. Assn. v Pepsico, Inc. (240 AD2d 315 [1997]) nor Artwear, Inc. v Hughes (202 AD2d 76 [1994]) involved an obligation by the licensor akin to section 6.6 of the Master License Agreement. Appellants' argument that section 6.6 does not apply because plaintiff failed to satisfy a condition precedent is without merit; the condition precedent applies to section 7.1 as amended, not section 6.6.
In light of our disposition of this appeal, we need not reach plaintiff's argument under [*2]CPLR 3211 (d) that appellants' motion was properly denied because of the need for further discovery. Concur—Tom, J.P., Marlow, Nardelli, Gonzalez and Kavanagh, JJ.