This is an action for negligence and loss of services. Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff Joachim Allouche a/k/a Joachim Davidson is a minor, and plaintiff Andrea Davidson is his mother. The minor plaintiff was skateboarding on July 14, 2003 at approximately 4:30 P.M. at a roller rink on the Chelsea Piers at West 23rd Street and the Hudson River in Manhattan when he had an accident and was injured. Defendants own and operate a sports complex at that location, which includes the roller rink. The minor plaintiff was seven years old at the time of the accident. The minor plaintiff testified at his deposition that, before the day of the accident, he had fallen off his skateboard numerous times while skateboarding; that, at the time of the accident, he was wearing a helmet, kneepads, and elbow pads; and that, right after he fell on the day in question, a BMX bicycle ridden by a 17 or 18 year old boy rolled over the minor plaintiff's leg and broke it. In addition, he declared that a BMX bike has very thick wheels and goes very fast. He further stated that he only saw the one bicyclist at the rink that day, and in the four or five times that he had skateboarded at the rink previously (in June and July 2003), he had only seen a bicycle ridden there once. Plaintiff mother, who took the minor plaintiff to the rink for skateboarding lessons on the date of the accident and previously, had never before seen a bicyclist at the rink while skateboarders used it. The director of the roller rink testified at his deposition that bicyclists were permitted to use the rink at the same time as skateboarders.

A party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate his, her, or its entitlement thereto as a matter of law, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b) (see Rodrigues v N & S Building Contrs., Inc., 5 NY3d 427, 437 [2005]; Nazario v Fortunato & Fortunato, PLLC, 32 AD3d 692, 695 [1st Dept 2006]). To defeat summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must show that there [*2]is a material question(s) of fact that requires a trial (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

The doctrine of assumption of risk as a defense defeating negligence claims has been significantly limited and mostly replaced by the doctrine of culpable conduct, i.e. comparative negligence. However, the assumption of the risk defense lives on in the area of sports accidents. Participants in recreational sports activities assume the risks inherent in the sport in which the participants are engaged but not "unreasonably increased risks (citation omitted)." (Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484-485 [1997]; accord McGee v Board of Educ. of City of NY, 16 AD2d 99, 102 [1st Dept 1962].) Although falling off a skateboard is a risk inherent in skateboarding (cf. Engstrom v City of New York, 270 AD2d 35 [1st Dept 2000] [collisions between skaters on an ice skating rink is a risk inherent in the sport]), getting run over by a bicyclist after falling off a skateboard at a rink would not normally be. There is a question of fact as to whether defendants' permitting the older boy on the bike to be riding at their rink at the same time as the much younger infant plaintiff unreasonably increased the risks to him while skateboarding (see Karr v Brant Lake Camp, 261 AD2d 342, 343 [1st Dept 1999]).

Therefore, the motion has been denied. Pursuant to CPLR 8106 and 8202, defendants shall pay plaintiffs a total of $100 motion costs.

Dated: January 3, 2007

New York, New York

RICHARD F. BRAUN, J.S.C.