On July 5, 2005, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea before me to the class "B" felony offense of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree. Pursuant to the plea bargain and with the People's consent, the Court agreed to defer sentencing and to release defendant into the custody of an inpatient drug treatment program through TASC for eighteen to twenty-four months. The Court promised that, if defendant successfully completed the drug program and met certain other conditions, she would be permitted to withdraw her felony plea and to plead guilty instead to a misdemeanor for which the sentence would be "time served." On the other hand, the Court warned defendant that, if she failed to complete the program, her felony conviction would stand and she would be sentenced to an indeterminate prison sentence of from four and one-half to nine years. After a full allocution, the Court accepted defendant's guilty plea, adjudicated her as a second felony offender, and adjourned the matter to Part C for release into the program and for compliance.

Defendant apparently was released into the custody of a residential treatment program in early August 2005, but left without permission shortly thereafter, leading the Court to issue a bench warrant on September 9, 2005. The defendant voluntarily returned on the warrant on September 13, 2005, and was given another chance to participate in the program. On October 7, 2005, defendant again left the program, and the Court issued another bench warrant for her arrest on October 18, 2005. On April 15, 2006, defendant was involuntarily returned on the warrant in the arraignment part of the Criminal Court, following a new arrest. The matter was thereupon returned to Part C of this Court. The People eventually rejected the notion of giving defendant any more treatment opportunities and the Court appointed new counsel when it became apparent that defendant wished to file a motion to withdraw her plea. See 7/7/06 Calendar Minutes at 2. On December 7, 2006, defendant formally moved, pursuant to CPL § 220.60(3), to withdraw her guilty plea. On January 4, 2007, the People filed their response, and the matter is now ripe for disposition.

To support her motion, defendant asserts that she is innocent and suggests that her guilty plea was coerced by virtue of her dealings with her first assigned attorney and the manner in which her second assigned attorney entered the case. In fact, these assertions lack merit. The [*2]Court repeatedly offered to adjourn the case to give defendant more time to consider her situation and meet with her second assigned attorney, but it was defendant herself who decided to proceed with the plea proceeding.

On July 5, 2005, after being told by defendant's first attorney that a disposition had been reached, the Court placed defendant under oath and began to conduct the plea allocution. See 7/5/05 Plea Minutes at 2-4. When defendant was asked whether she had an opportunity to discuss the case with her lawyer, she responded, "No." See id. The Court told her to take some time "to discuss it further," and advised her, "I need you to discuss anything that you need to discuss with him before I take the plea." Id. After a few moments, the Court asked whether she "had enough time" to talk to counsel; she replied, "All right, yes. Yes." See id. After an additional colloquy during which defendant suggested that she had not had enough time to talk to counsel and hesitated when asked about her satisfaction with his services, the Court concluded that the first assigned attorney should be relieved. See id. at 4-12. The Court then adjourned the case for two days to permit another attorney to talk to defendant. Id. at 12.

The Court assigned another attorney to the matter and, at defendant's own request, recalled the case that same day so that she could avail herself of the disposition that had been offered. See id. at 13. She not only told the Court that she had enough time to talk to the new lawyer, but also responded in the negative when asked, "Do you need more time to talk to him before we dispose of the case?" Id. She then responded affirmatively when the Court asked whether she had "enough time to talk about the case itself and any possible disposition." Id. When the Court asked whether she "want[ed] to dispose of this case today instead of coming back," defendant replied, "Yes." Id. Defendant was again placed under oath. She then not only stated that she was satisfied with her new attorney's services, but also swore that she had a full opportunity to discuss the case with him and any possible defenses. See id. at 14-15. She again told the Court that she did not want more time to talk about the case with him. See id. at 15. Following a complete allocution about all the rights that she was waiving by entering her guilty plea and after the Court provided a detailed description of the program conditions and sentencing promise (see id. at 15-19), defendant swore that she did, in fact, sell crack-cocaine in the Bronx on the day in question. See id. at 19. The defendant then waived her right to appeal. Following formal acceptance of the plea, defendant was arraigned on a predicate felony statement and adjudicated a second felony offender. The case was thereupon adjourned to Part C. See id. at 20-24.

Under CPL § 220.60(3), prior to the imposition of sentence, the court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. Such a decision is within the trial court's sound discretion. See People v. Alexander, 97 NY2d 482, 483-84 (2002); People v. Frederick, 45 NY2d 520, 525-26 (1978). Generally, a defendant must support his or her motion by factual allegations establishing the deprivation of some right. See Preiser, Practice Commentaries (McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 11A, C.P.L. § 220.60 at 179). A guilty plea will be upheld as valid [*3]where it was entered into knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. People v. Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 (1983).

Here, the plea minutes establish that defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into her plea. During the plea proceeding, the court painstakingly explained the plea agreement and then inquired whether defendant wished to plead guilty to Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree. See 7/5/05 Plea Minutes at 15-18. Defendant unequivocally responded "yes." See id. Defendant was given repeated opportunities to discuss the matter with her attorney and she expressly stated that she had discussed her case with her lawyer and was satisfied with the lawyer's representation. See id. at 13, 14-15. Having been placed under oath, defendant freely and voluntarily admitted her guilt and essentially swore that the factual allegations in the indictment were true. See id. at 19-20. When the court asked what drug she had sold, defendant admitted that she and her co-defendant had sold crack. See id. at 20. She also stated that she understood all of the rights that she would forfeit as a consequence of her guilty plea, including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, the right to have her guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to appeal. See id. at 18-22.

In sum, having actually observed defendant's demeanor and answers during the plea colloquy, the Court concludes, as it did during the proceeding itself, that defendant's plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. The Court specifically rejects defendant's claims of coercion, which are belied by her sworn allocution. See, e.g., People v. Robertson, 2 AD3d 756, 756 (2nd Dept. 2003), appeal denied, 2 NY3d 745 (2004); People v. Alicea, 191 AD2d 702, 702 (2nd Dept.), appeal denied, 81 NY2d 1069 (1993). The court similarly rejects her conclusory claims of innocence, also made in the face of sworn factual admissions to the contrary. See, e.g., People v. Dixon, 29 NY2d 55, 57 (1971). Accordingly, defendant's motion to withdraw her plea is denied in all respects.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated:January 19, 2007

Bronx, New York

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Joseph J. Dawson, A.S.C.J.