In the early morning hours of January 11, 2007, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree — the sole count of the accusatory instrument by which he was charged — and was sentenced to time served. He now moves to withdraw his plea of guilty and to vacate the judgment, contending that he was unaware that his driver license would be suspended as a result of the plea.

Although defendant maintains that this court may in its discretion permit him to withdraw his plea, the court lacks authority to consider such a motion. "At any time before the imposition of sentence, the court in its discretion may permit a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty . . . to withdraw such plea" (CPL 220.60 [3] [emphasis added]; see also People v Jian Jing Huang, 1 NY3d 532 [2003]). Sentence having been previously imposed in this case, a plea withdrawal application no longer properly lies. Instead, if defendant is entitled to redress, it must be by means of a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment — defendant's alternative basis for relief.

A motion to vacate the judgment is not discretionary, however. Rather, at any time after entry of a judgment,^[FN1] the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate the judgment only upon certain statutorily enumerated grounds (see CPL 440.10 [1]). Here, defendant moves to vacate the judgment on the ground that his conviction was obtained in violation of a constitutional right (see CPL 440.10 [1][h]) — specifically, his due process right to require that his guilty plea be accepted only if it has been offered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently (see People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 19 [1983]; see also Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238, 243 & n 5 [1969]). Defendant asserts that his plea was not knowing because he was unaware that as a result, his driver license would be suspended.

Under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 510 (2) (b) (v), a driver license must be suspended for a period of six months when, as here, the holder is convicted of any misdemeanor or felony [*2]defined in article 220 or 221 of the Penal Law.^[FN2] Accordingly, upon his conviction for criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree — a class B misdemeanor defined in Penal Law § 221.10 — defendant's driver license was suspended. He now contends that his lack of knowledge that his license would be suspended renders his plea involuntary.

"A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences. Although the court is not required to engage in any particular litany when allocuting the defendant, due process requires that the record must be clear that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant" (People v Catu, 4 NY3d 242, 244-245 [2005] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]).

In order for a guilty plea to be voluntary, the court must, at the time of plea, advise the defendant of all direct consequences of the plea (see People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 403 [1995]). A trial court, however, "has no obligation to explain to defendants who plead guilty the possibility that collateral consequences may attach to their criminal convictions" (Catu, 4 NY3d at 244). A direct consequence "is one which has a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant's punishment," whereas collateral consequences "are peculiar to the individual and generally result from the actions taken by agencies the court does not control" (Ford, 86 NY2d at 403).

The Court of Appeals has characterized the loss of a driver license — a result arising from action taken by the Department of Motor Vehicles — as illustrative of a collateral consequence (see Ford, 86 NY2d at 403; see also Moore v Hinton, 513 F2d 781 [5th Cir 1975]). Inasmuch as the suspension of defendant's license was thus collateral to his conviction, the court was under no obligation to advise him of it.

Nor did defense counsel's failure to advise defendant of the license suspension constitute ineffective assistance. While an affirmative misstatement by counsel as to a collateral consequence might entitle a defendant to vacatur of his or her guilty plea (see People v McDonald, 1 NY3d 109, 115 [2003] [misinformation provided by counsel as to possibility of deportation falls below objective standard of reasonableness]), a mere failure to advise will not suffice to establish a constitutional violation (see id. at 114; Ford, 86 NY2d at 404-405).

Finally, although the court was thus under no obligation to inform defendant that his driver license would be suspended, here the court did in fact so advise defendant at the conclusion of the proceedings, as the record plainly reflects. Defendant's unsubstantiated assertion that he did not hear what the court said — even absent his counsel's concession that counsel did, however, hear the court's statement — does not warrant CPL 440.10 relief.

This opinion shall constitute the decision and order of the court.