This action examines the interplay between a recent enactment of the Federal Transportation Equity Act and Vehicle and Traffic Law §388 where a Plaintiff attempts to add an owner /lessor as a party Defendant, days after the effective date of the Federal statute. Defendants, GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORP., and VAUL TRUST, sued herein as "GMAC LEASING CORP., GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORP., and VAULT TRUST CORP.", move by Notice of Motion (motion sequence number 001) for an Order, dismissing the Plaintiff, CHEVONNA JOHNSON's Amended Complaint, in this personal injury action, as against those parties. The Action arises out of a motor vehicle accident, in which Plaintiff claims she was injured as a result of the actions of Co-Defendant SUSAN KLING, who operated the motor vehicle in question and LEO KLING, who leased the vehicle.

Originally, Plaintiff commenced her negligence action, on July 20, 2005, against Defendants SUSAN KLING and LEO KLING for personal injuries, allegedly arising out of a December 6, 2002 accident. Less than one month later, on August 19, 2005, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, adding GMAC/VAUL as Defendants, on a "vicarious liability" theory, since such Defendants were the alleged owners/lessors of the vehicle operated by the other Defendants. New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 permits an injured party to sue an owner/lessor for personal injury/property damage on such a legal theory.

Interestingly, in the interim, between the original and amended Complaints, Congress enacted 49 USC § 30106, also known as the Transportation Equity Act, Graves Amendment. In pertinent part, 49 USC § 30106 (a) provides that the owner or lessor, engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles will not be held liable under any State law, for injuries resulting from the use or operation of the leased vehicle, where there are no allegations of negligence against such owner/lessor. In other words, the Congress has essentially prohibited the States from imposing vicarious liability on owners/lessors, where that is the sole basis for bringing them into a civil litigation. see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388.

Based on the above, Defendants GMAC/VAUL, have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint against those parties, under CPLR § 3211 (a)(7), asserting that, based on the newly enacted Federal Law, Plaintiff is barred from suing such Defendants.

Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the "relation- back" doctrine [*2][*3]applies to the facts of this case; and, based thereon, Plaintiff commenced the action prior to the effective date of the federal law. According to Defendants, the "relation back" doctrine applies in this matter because 1) the original and amended claims arise out of the same occurrence; 2) the new party is united in interest with the original Defendants and, therefore, can be charged with notice of commencement of the action; and 3) the new Defendants knew or should have known that, but for excusable mistake on the part of Plaintiff, the action would have been brought against that Defendant as well. See, Austin v Interfaith Medical Center, 264 AD2d 61, 443 NYS2d 730 (2d Dep't 1999). Plaintiff's counsel asserts, in the alternative, based on a case with strikingly similar facts, that the negligence action against the lessor is clearly derivative of the Plaintiff's claim against the driver, which was commenced prior to the enactment of the federal statute. see, Leuchner v Cavanaugh Vaul Trust, Misc 2d; 820 NYS2d 786 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co., 2006). In Leuchner, as in the case at Bar, the injured party commenced the negligence action against the driver and the person she believed to be the owner in 2004. Thereafter, when the Plaintiff learned that the automobile was owned by a leasing company, she sought, on August 29, 2005, to amend her complaint to add the lessor as a Co-Defendant. Although the court did not apply the "relation-back" doctrine per se, since it is limited by its terms to cases involving the statute of limitations, the decision applies similar reasoning in allowing the amendment, on the grounds set forth above, that the claim against the lessor was derived from the original claim against the driver and lessee. see, Leuchner, supra .

The Appellate Division, Second Department, has recently held that the "relation back" doctrine only applies to save a Plaintiff's claims, where the Defendant asserts that the claim sought to be added is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Jones v Bill, 34 A.D. 3d 74, 825 NYS2d 508 (2d Dep't 2006) . There is no such assertion in the case at Bar. In the same decision, the Court affirmed the Supreme's Court's dismissal of a motor vehicle accident complaint, as against a leasing company, where the original action against the driver had been commenced prior to the enactment of 49 USC § 30106 and the addition of the leasing company was made after the effective date of the same Federal law. In so holding, the Appellate Court clearly rejects the reasoning of the Court in Leuchner, supra either under the "relation back" theory or the assertion that the claim against the lessor is derivative of that against the driver/lessee.

Based on the Court's decision in Jones, supra , this Court is constrained to grant the motion of Defendants GMAC/VAUL, sued herein as GMAC LEASING CORP., GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORP., and VAULT TRUST CORP. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint against those parties is dismissed pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action.

This constitutes the DECISION and ORDER of the Court.



Dated: February 7, 2007 Riverhead, New York

Emily Pines J. S. C.