Defendant is charged with Loitering for Prostitution (Penal Law §240.37[2]) under Docket No. 2006NY006745 and with Prostitution (Penal Law §230.00) under Docket No. 2006CN005521. The People move to consolidate the two informations for trial pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law §§100.45 and 200.20. Those sections permit a Court, in its discretion, to consolidate informations when the charged offenses are"joinable" pursuant to CPL §200.20 (2).

The People argue that the charged offenses are joinable under CPL §200.20 (2) (b) and (c) in that proof of each charge would be relevant and admissible upon the trial of the other charge and that the offenses are similar in law.

While the People assert that "the evidence with connection to defendant's commission of each of these offenses is relevant, material and admissible with respect to the other", their supporting argument is limited to the assertion that both cases "involve the same defendant and require that the People prove the same elements". Such an assertion does not provide evidentiary justification for joinder and is insufficient to overcome the general prohibition against proving one crime by introducing evidence of defendant's commission of another crime. See People v Molineux, 168 NY 264. Defendant is charged with two different crimes committed eight months apart. The People articulate no specific Molineux exceptions in their application. To allow the introduction of evidence of defendant's alleged act of prostitution to prove that she was loitering for prostitution at a different location eight months earlier would be an unreasonably expansive reading of the overlapping evidence concept contained in CPL §200.20 (2) (b).

The People further argue that the cases are joinable under CPL §200.20 (2) (c) since they are "similar in law" and the evidence and witnesses would be similar. A review of the informations, however, indicates that the evidence as to each crime would be substantially [*2]different and each crime involves different witnesses.

The People finally argue that "public policy concerns mandate consolidation" because consolidation "would eliminate the expense and burden of multiple prosecutions and would promote the goal of judicial economy". The People's citation to People v Lane (56 NY2d 1), however, directly undercuts this argument. The Lane decision directs trial courts to "generally weigh the public interest in avoiding duplicative, lengthy and expensive trials against defendant's interest in being protected from unfair advantage". (56 NY2d at 8). As noted above, these two trials would not be duplicative nor would either one be lengthy. A Loitering for Prostitution trial usually involves one witness and a Prostitution charge such as the one in this case usually involves, at most, two witnesses. Each fact pattern is relatively simple, each trial would be non-jury and each trial would take up only a small portion of the Court's day. Weighing these factors against "defendant's interest in being protected from unfair advantage" compels the conclusion that consolidation would be an inappropriate exercise of discretion and would invite appellate reversal. To order consolidation would be to grant the People a Pyrrhic victory.

The People's application for consolidation is denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated:___________________________

New York, New YorkJudge of the Criminal Court