The Defendant labels this motion one for Summary Judgment, and then indicates that the relief sought is dismissal, pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(2), alleging the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, when, in actuality, the Plaintiff's motion is one to dismiss due to the alleged lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(8). As The Bard has said: "What's in a name? That which we call a rose By any other name would smell as sweet."^[FN1]

Whatever its name, the Plaintiff does not deny that the Defendant is a corporation located in Suffolk County and that the Plaintiff is located in Queens County. Similarly, the Plaintiff does not suggest that the Defendant transacted any business in Nassau County, committed a tortious action in Nassau County, or owned used or possessed any real property in Nassau County. In fact, the Plaintiff acknowledges that "This action was inadvertently filed in Nassau County District Court." (Parrella Affirmation 2/23/07, ¶ 7)

The Plaintiff does not oppose the Defendant's motion, but cross- moves for an order transferring the action to the Suffolk County District Court, Third District, or, in the alternative, granting the Plaintiff leave to re-file the action in Suffolk County District Court without costs and disbursements. The Defendant opposes the cross-motion.

UDCA § 403 provides, in pertinent part, "Service of summons ... shall be made only within the county unless service beyond the county be authorized by this act or by such other provision of [*2]law, other than the CPLR, as expressly applies to courts of limited jurisdiction or to all courts of the state." Relative thereto, UDCA § 404(a), the District Court's equivalent of the long arm statute set forth in CPLR § 302, Siegel, Uniform District Court Act § 404, Practice Commentary (McKinney's 1989 Main Volume); 146-150 West Sunrise Highway Corp. v. Lee's Hobby Speedway of New Hyde Park, Inc., 54 Misc 2d 913, 283 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Dist.Ct. Nassau Co. 1967), provides:

(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. The court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-resident of the county, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state and a resident of the county, if, in person or through an agent, he:

1. transacts any business within a district of the court in the county; or

2. commits a tortious act within a district of the court in the county, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or

3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within a district of the court in the county.

The Plaintiff's undisputed failure to satisfy any of the aforesaid criteria deprives this court of personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, requiring dismissal of the action. Advanced Medical v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, 8 Misc 3d 1005(A), 801 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Dist.Ct. Nassau County 2005)

UDCA § 306 authorizes the transfer of an action between districts within the county, it does not authorize the transfer of venue to courts outside of Nassau County, to the Suffolk County District Court, Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. Wolf, 179 Misc 2d 815, 687 N.Y.S.2d 225 (App. Term 2nd Dept.1999); Personnel Career Services Inc. v. Pizza Huts of Dutchess County Inc., 149 Misc 2d 729, 573 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Term 1st Dept.1991), nor is there any statutory authority which would permit such a transfer. Medicorp v. Avis Corp., 122 Misc 2d 813, 473 N.Y.S.2d 908 (App. Term 1st Dept.1984).

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for an order transferring this action to the Suffolk County District Court, Third District is denied; and, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, without prejudice to its recommencement in Suffolk County. Medicorp v. Avis Corp., supra.

All other matters not decided herein are hereby denied

This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Dated: Hempstead, New York

March 29, 2007

___________________________

ANDREW M. ENGEL

J.D.C.