On July 8, 2003, the plaintiff Joseph Rizzi allegedly was injured when he tripped and fell on the sidewalk in front of property owned by defendant Y.S.G.F. Realty, Inc. In January, 2004, the plaintiff commenced this action and issue was joined by service of an answer. The plaintiff's deposition revealed that he suffered memory difficulties and could not recall the accident. There were no witnesses to the accident. After the completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The defendant met its burden of establishing prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by demonstrating that the plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of the accident (see, Manning v. 6638 18th Avenue Realty Corp., 28 AD3d 434 [2d Dept. 2006];Oettinger v. Amerada Hess Corp., 15 AD3d 638 [2d Dept. 2005]). Although proximate cause can be established in the absence of direct evidence of causation and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, "[m]ere speculation as to the cause of the fall, where there can be many causes, is fatal to a cause of action" (Garvin v. Rosenberg, 204 AD2d 388 [2d Dept.; see, Oettinger v. Amerada Hess Corp., 15 AD3d 638 [2d Dept. 2005]; Hartman v. Mountain Valley Brew Pub, 301 AD2d 570 [2d Dept. 2003]). "Since it is just as likely that the accident could have been caused by some other factor, such as a misstep or loss of balance, any determination by the trier of fact as to the cause of the accident would be based on pure speculation" (Teplitskaya v. 3096 Owners Corp., 289 AD2d 477 [2d Dept. 2001].)

In opposition, the plaintiff submitted an expert affidavit setting forth violations of the New York State and New York City Building Codes. However, no reasonable inferences as to causation could be drawn from the expert's opinion that the ramp outside the premises violated provisions of the New York State and New York City Building Codes, creating an unsafe condition, in the absence of any evidence connecting the alleged violations to the plaintiff's fall (see, Reed v. Piran Realty Corp., 30 AD3d 319 [1st Dept. 2006]; Manning v. 6638 18th Avenue Realty Corp., 28 AD3d 434 [2d Dept. 2006]; Hartman v. Valley Brew Pub Inc., 301 AD2d 570 [2d Dept. 2003]). The expert's opinion, based on pure speculation, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Birman v. Birman, 8 AD3d 219 [2d Dept. 2004]; Grob v. Kings Realty [*2]Ass., LLC, 4 AD3d 394 [2d Dept. 2004]).

Finally, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Noseworthy doctrine (Noseworthy v. City of New York, 298 NY 76, 80-81 [1948]) is not applicable to this case since the parties were on an equal footing as to their access to knowledge of the events which caused the accident (see, Kuravskaya v. Samjo Realty Corp., 281 AD2d 518 [2d Dept. 2001]; Walsh v. Murphy, 267 AD2d 172 [1st Dept. 1999]; Gayle v. City of New York, 256 AD2d 541, 542 [2d Dept. 1998]; Lynn v. Lynn, 216 AD2d 194 [1st Dept. 1995]).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted; and it is further,

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

E N T E R,

Dated: March 30, 2007

J.S.C.