Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Delores J. Thomas, J.), entered August 24, 2005. The order, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, granted defendant's motion to open its default in answering the complaint.

Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed without costs and defendant's motion to open its default in answering denied.

"A party seeking to vacate a . . . default must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its delay in appearing and answering the complaint and a meritorious defense to the action" (Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 31 AD3d 743, 743 [2006]; see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Auto One Ins. Co., 28 AD3d 441, 441 [2006]). The question of "[w]hether there is a reasonable excuse for a default is a discretionary, sui generis determination to be made by the court based on all relevant factors, including the extent of the delay, whether there has been prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public [*2]policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" (Harcztark v Drive Variety, Inc., 21 AD3d 876, 876-877 [2005]).

Here, defendant denied ever receiving the summons and complaint. However, in its opposing papers, plaintiff submitted an affidavit of service setting forth that the summons and complaint were served on defendant's employee, Adrienne Picariello, at defendant's corporate place of business, which affidavit created a presumption of proper service (Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v Nobre, Inc., 29 AD3d 511, 511 [2006]; see also Galarza v Saddle Cove Assoc., LLC, 22 AD3d 523, 523 [2005]). While
sworn denials of personal service by the party alleged to be served may suffice to put at issue the factual assertions to the contrary in the affidavit of service (Bethpage Motel, Inc. v Greenstein, 2003 NY Slip Op 51310[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists]), defendant's denials of service, by counsel and an employee of defendant, other than Adrienne Picariello, who do not allege personal knowledge of the facts asserted in the affidavit, are insufficient to controvert the affidavit. Thus, as defendant's mere denials of receipt are "insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service created by the affidavit of service" (Commissioners of State Ins. Fund, 29 AD3d at 511), there is no reasonable excuse in this record for defendant's default in answering.

We further note that defendant failed to proffer a meritorious defense. The affidavit by its employee, which referred only to assignors' unspecified lack of cooperation and to equally unspecified "numerous factors and evidence," amounts to mere "unsubstantiated hypotheses and suppositions" (Penny v Pembrook Mgt., 280 AD2d 590, 591 [2001]) which are inadequate to establish a "fact or founded belief" that the underlying incident was staged to defraud defendant (Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]).

Accordingly, defendant's motion to open the default in answering is denied. We note that plaintiff's brief raised no issue as to the branch of the order which "vacated" plaintiff's motion for entry of a default judgment.

Pesce, P.J., Weston Patterson and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 03, 2007