Defendant moves this Court to dismiss the simplified traffic informations against him pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law §170.30 and §30.30(1)(d). The People oppose defendant's motion. Defendant is charged with one (1) count of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192.1, Driving While Impaired as a traffic infraction, and one (1) count of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law §1229( c)(3), Failure to Wear a Seatbelt.

A review of the Court file regarding the various adjournments reveals that the following adjournments were at the request of the People and are chargeable to the People:

a. the time from 9/27/06 to 10/10/06 (13 days).

b. the time from 10/10/06 to 10/31/06 (21 days).

c. the time from 10/31/06 to 11/30/06 (30 days). Said time period represents the People's adjournment request for trial. Although on November 9, 2006, the People filed a Certificate of Readiness for trial, on the next date, November 30, 2006, the People answered not ready for trial. The People provided no explanation on the record for their post-readiness delay and failed to explain same in their motion papers. Therefore, this Court finds the declaration of "Readiness" by the People on November 9, 2006, was illusory.

d. 11/30/06 to 1/17/07 (48 days.) Said time period represents the People's adjournment request for trial. Although on December 18, 2006, the People filed a Certificate of Readiness for trial, on the next date, January 17, 2007, the People answered "Not Ready". Again, the People failed to give any explanation on the record for their post-readiness delay. Neither have the People explained same in their motion papers. Consequently this Court finds that the declaration of "Readiness" by the People on December 18, 2006, was illusory.

The total time chargeable to the People is ONE HUNDRED AND TWELVE (112) days.

The People argue that there is no specific Statute of Limitations applicable to Vehicle and Traffic Law Violations other than C.P.L. §30.20, which provides that "after a criminal action is commenced the defendant is entitled to a speedy trial." Defendant argues that C.P.L. §30.30(1)(d) is applicable. C.P.L §30.30(1)(d) provides that with respect to violations, the People must be ready for trial within Thirty (30) days. Defendant supports his argument by citing the decision in the matter of the People v. Griffin, 134 Misc 2d 1068, 514 N.Y.S.2d 311 [*2](Dist. Ct. Nassau 1987.)

In said decision, Judge Wexner held that with respect to a charge of Driving While Impaired, speedy trial runs after thirty (30) days.

There are numerous Court decisions which analyze whether a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192.1 should be governed by either C.P.L. §30.30, or C.P.L. §30.20, with differing results. Notwithstanding the decision in Griffin, a number of Courts have subsequently held that a defendant has no "statutory" right to a speedy trial regarding a traffic infraction under either C.P.L. §30.30, or C.P.L. §30.20. However, it is indisputable that all defendants have a Constitutional right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution and the New York Constitution.

The Court of Appeals in People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975), established that when deciding whether a defendant has been deprived of his/her speedy trial rights, the Court must consider: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by the reason of the delay.

This Court will use the factors set forth by the Court in Taranovich in evaluating whether the defendants right to a speedy trial was violated herein. As previously indicated, the People are charged with One Hundred and Twelve Days. There was no information provided by the People regarding the reason for the delays. The charge before the Court is a traffic infraction. In this case there was no pretrial incarceration. Finally, the defendant indicated that the extensive delays have been prejudicial to his defense.

This Court holds that the speedy trial time period regarding a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192.1, Driving While Impaired, should not be greater than the time period governing a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192.2, Driving While Intoxicated (which is ninety (90) days.) A violation of V.T.L. §1192.1 is a lesser included charge of V.T.L. §1192.2, and as such is a less serious offense. A conviction for violating V.T.L. §1192.2 carries a maximum term of imprisonment of up to one (1) year, and a conviction for violating V.T.L. §1192.1 carries a maximum term of imprisonment of up to fifteen (15) days. Therefore, it would not be sensible for the speedy trial time period regarding the latter to exceed the time period regarding the former. In fact, such would be contrary to the very essence and structure of speedy trial statutes which provide longer time periods for more serious charges. The underlying reasoning of the speedy trial statutes obviously is that the People should be given more time to prepare for more serious charges. With respect to charges of V.T.L. §1192.1 and V.T.L. §1192.2, it is inconceivable that the People would need more time to prepare a V.T.L. §1192.1 case, than a V.T.L. §1192.2 case. In fact, the preparation time regarding a V.T.L. §1192.1 case should be less than, but at most equal to, a V.T.L. §1192.2 case. The subject matter, the witnesses, and the testimony are similar if not identical in both a V.T.L. §1192.1 and V.T.L. §1192.2 case. Consequently, there is no reason that the speedy trial time regarding a charge of V.T.L. §1192.1 should exceed the speedy trial time regarding a charge of V.T.L. §1192.2. [*3]

In light of the forgoing, this Court finds the delay by the People of One Hundred and Twelve (112) days violates defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Hence, Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of V.T.L. §1192.1 is granted.

This constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.

Dated: April 9, 2007

ENTER:

____________________________________

Norman St. George, District Court Judge

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