Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover no-fault first party benefits in the sum of $600.00, plus interest and attorney's fees, on or about January 17, 2006, allegedly necessitated by a motor vehicle accident which occurred on September 22, 2002. The Plaintiff's Endorsed Complaint sets forth, in sum and substance, that the Plaintiff timely submitted bills for the payment of no-fault benefits for services provided on September 24, 26, 27, 28, 2002 and October 1, 2002 and that these bills were neither paid nor properly denied in accordance with the no-fault regulations.

The Defendant has not served an Answer, but has brought this motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint. The Defendant's Notice of Motion indicates that the motion is brought "for an Order Pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) dismissing the complaint, pursuant to Articles 51 & 52 of the Insurance Laws on the grounds that the pleadings fail to state a cause of action against the Defendant, Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, ("MVAIC") and for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper." In addition thereto, the Affirmation in Support accompanying the Notice of Motion states, "This Affirmation is submitted in support of defendant's Motion to dismiss, which seeks an Order pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211, 214(2) and Articles 51 & 52 of the Insurance Law and 11 NYCRR Section 65.12, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint against MVAIC and for such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper."(emphasis in original) (Massaro Affirmation 9/25/06, ¶ 2)

Given the fact that neither party addressed the statute of limitations issue in their papers, they were given the opportunity to do so; and, by order dated March 12, 2007, [*2](Engel, J.) the parties were directed to appear on March 27, 2007 at 9:30 a.m., before Civil Part 3, to orally argue that issue. In accordance with that order, counsel for both parties appeared and were heard on the statute of limitations issue. Based thereon, and after full consideration of the papers submitted, the court renders the following decision.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed "because coverage is nonexistent with MVAIC as plaintiff's assignor (1) failed to prove that an accident or [sic] occurred, or alternatively, failed to prove that the alleged accident was reported to the police within 24 hours as required by statute, by submitting a police accident report." (Massaro Affirmation 9/25/06, ¶ 4) The Defendant further urges that, based thereon, the Plaintiff's assignor never qualified to receive MVAIC benefits and that the assignor is not a "covered person" within the ambit of Insurance Law Article 51 or Article 52.

According to the Defendant, "When a person is qualified, it is at that time, only, that MVAIC can be held responsible to pay or deny a claim for no-fault benefits to that applicant. MVAIC can only be considered a proper defendant when it is legally responsible for providing coverage to an injured party. The plaintiff fails to recognize that it is seeking redress from MVAIC when MVAIC lacks an obligation to provide coverage- the injured party is not qualified." (Massaro Affirmation 9/25/06, ¶ 12) The court notes that the Defendant's arguments, whether valid or not, do not address the sufficiency of the Plaintiff's Complaint, but attack the viability of the Plaintiff's action. "The question presented for review [however] is not whether plaintiff[] should ultimately prevail in this litigation, but rather, more narrowly, whether [its] complaint[] state[s] cognizable causes of action." Becker v. Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401, 413 NYS2d 895 (1978); see also: Benerofe v. Avnet, Inc., 236 AD2d 496, 654 NYS2d 619 (2nd Dept. 1997); Reliance Insurance Company v. Morris Associates, P.C., 200 AD2d 728, 607 NYS2d 106 (2nd Dept. 1994)

In determining the motion that is before the court, the pleadings must be liberally construed, Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 614 NYS2d 972 (1994); Natural Organics, Inc. v. Smith, __ AD2d, __ NYS2d __, 2007 WL 765955 (2nd Dept. 2007), accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, Kempf v. Magida, 37 AD3d 763, __ NYS2d __ (2nd Dept. 2007); Williams v. Williams, 36 AD3d 693, 828 NYS2d 189 (2nd Dept. 2007), and according the Plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference. Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., Inc., 40 NY2d 633, 389 NYS2d 314 (1976); Fasano v. Colon, 27 AD3d 691, 812 NYS2d 610 (2nd Dept. 2006) "Initially, the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from the four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail (citations omitted)." Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 401 NYS2d 182 (1997)

Unlike a motion for summary judgment, where the parties must lay bare their proof in evidentiary form, Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Associate Fur Manufacturers, Inc., 46 [*3]NY2d 1065, 416 NYS2d 790 (1979); Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 427 NYS2d 595 (1980), there is no such obligation upon a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7). Kempf v. Magida, supra .; Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., Inc., supra . The parties may, nevertheless, "submit any evidence that could properly be considered on a motion for summary judgment." CPLR § 3211(c); Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., Inc., supra . In such an event, when the court considers such evidentiary material, "unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, again dismissal should not eventuate (citations omitted)." Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, supra .; see also: Quesada v. Global Land, Inc., 35 AD3d 575, 826 NYS2d 667 (2nd Dept. 2006). More pointedly, "affidavits submitted by the defendant will seldom if ever warrant the relief he seeks unless ... the affidavits establish conclusively that plaintiff has no cause of action." Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., Inc., supra .; see also: Simmons v. Edelstein, 32 AD3d 464, 820 NYS2d 614 (2nd Dept. 2006)

Turning to the Complaint sub judice, there is no question that it states a cause of action for the recovery of no-fault first party benefits, on its face. To make out a prima facie case, the Plaintiff would be obligated to establish the proper submission of the bills in question and the Defendant's failure to either pay or properly deny same within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof. See: 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65-3.8(c); Presbyterian Hospital in the City of New York v. Maryland Casualty Company, 90 NY2d 274, 660 NYS2d 536 (1997); Nyack Hospital v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 11 AD3d 664, 784 NYS2d 136 (2nd Dept. 2004); Westchester Medical Center v. AIG, Inc., 36 AD3d 900, 829 NYS2d 180, (2nd Dept. 2007); New York Craniofacial Care, P.C. v. Allstate Insurance Company, 11 Misc 3d 1071(A), 816 NYS2d 698 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co., 2006). The Complaint herein sets forth each of these elements; and, the Defendant does not argue otherwise.

The Defendant, instead, hopes to rely upon the affidavit of one of its Claims Examiners and a report of an "independent contractor" (Fuentes Affidavit 9/22/06, ¶ 6) hired by the Defendant to investigate whether or not the Plaintiff's assignor reported the alleged accident to the police within twenty-four (24) hours of its occurrence, as required by Insurance Law § 5208(2)(A), to demonstrate that no cause of action actually exists against MVAIC. As will be discussed, the Defendant's reliance upon these documents is misplaced.

While, as indicated above, the parties may "submit any evidence that could properly be considered on a motion for summary judgment" CPLR § 3211(c); Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., Inc., supra ., neither the affidavit of Mr. Fuentes nor the unsworn report of the Defendant's hired investigator qualify as such evidence. Mr. Fuentes acknowledges that he has no personal knowledge of this matter, and, in fact, attests that his knowledge of this case is based solely upon the review of the file for a claimant named "Giselle Abreu." There is, however, no such applicant for benefits involved in this [*4]action. Moreover, overlooking what appears to be a draftsperson's "cut and paste" error in the preparation of Mr. Fuentes' affidavit, Mr. Fuentes presents nothing other than inadmissible hearsay testimony. His opinion, that the Plaintiff's assignor did not report her accident to the police within twenty-four (24) hours, is based upon his review of MVAIC's file in this matter, which allegedly does not contain a police report. Mr. Fuentes, however, neither provides a proper business record foundation for the submission of such records nor even attempts to submit same. Moreover, Insurance Law § 5208(2)(A) does not mandate that the claimant provide MVAIC with a copy of a police report. Similarly, the report of the Defendant's "independent contractor" is unsworn and is not properly submitted as the Defendant's business record. Standard Textile Company, Inc. v. National Equipment Rental, Ltd., 80 AD2d 911, 437 NYS2d 398 (2nd Dept. 1981) [papers received from another entity, even if retained in ordinary course of business insufficient to qualify as a business record]; Johnson v. Lutz, 253 NY 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930) [the investigation report contains hearsay statements of others]; Vozdik v. Frederick, 146 AD2d 898, 536 N.Y.lS.2d 599 (3rd Dept. 1989) [unsworn investigation report not in admissible form for summary judgment motion]

The above notwithstanding, even if the court were to overlook these defects, the papers submitted by the Defendant simply do not "demonstrate[], without significant dispute, that a material fact alleged by the complaint is not a fact at all," Quesada v. Global Land, Inc., supra ., and certainly do not "conclusively establish that no cause of action exists (citation omitted)." Annunziato v. City of New York, 33 AD3d 950, 824 NYS2d 115 (2nd Dept. 2006)

The Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff's assignor is not a "qualified person", pursuant to Insurance Law Article 52, by virtue of allegedly failing to report her accident to the police within twenty-four (24) hours, thereby rendering MVAIC immune to suit herein, confuses a "qualified person" and a "covered person" under Insurance Law Article 52 and is not as factually clear as the Defendant represents.

As here relevant, the purpose of Insurance Law Article 52, known as the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Act, is set forth in Insurance Law § 5201(b) as follows:

The legislature finds and declares that the motor vehicle financial security act in the vehicle and traffic law, ... fails to accomplish its full purpose of securing to innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents recompense for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon them in that the act makes no provision for the payment of loss on account of injury to or death of persons who, through no fault of their own, were involved in motor vehicle accidents caused by:

(2) unidentified motor vehicles which leave the scene of the accident.

In addition, this article is intended to provide no-fault benefits for qualified persons for basic economic loss arising out of the use and operation in this state of an uninsured [*5]motor vehicle, as provided herein and in the comprehensive motor vehicle insurance reparations act. The legislature determines that it is a matter of grave concern that those persons are not recompensed for their injury and financial loss inflicted upon them and that the public interest can best be served by closing such gaps in the motor vehicle financial security act and the comprehensive motor vehicle insurance reparations act through the continued operation of the motor vehicle accident indemnification corporation.

Canty v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 95 AD2d 509, 467 NYS2d 50 (2nd Dept. 1983); A.B. Medical Services PLLC v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 10 Misc 3d 145(A), 814 NYS2d 889 (App. Term 2nd and 11th Jud. Dists. 2006); Ocean Diagnostic Imaging v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 8 Misc 3d 137(A), 803 NYS2d 19 (App. Term 2nd and 11th Jud. Dists. 2005)

Contrary to the Defendant's argument, a "qualified person" entitled to coverage under Article 52 is defined by Insurance Law § 5202(b) as nothing more or less than:

(i) a resident of this state, other than an insured or the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle and his spouse when a passenger in such vehicle, or his legal representative, or (ii) a resident of another state, territory or federal district of the United States or province of the Dominion of Canada, or foreign country, in which recourse is afforded, to residents of this state, of substantially similar character to that provided for by this article, or his legal representative. It does not include any operator of or passenger on a snowmobile. In this subsection, "operator" means every person who operates or is in actual physical control of a snowmobile, whether or not it is under way.

Canty v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, supra .; McNair v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 11 NY2d 701, 225 NYS2d 767 (1962); Saunderson v. The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 54 AD2d 936, 388 NYS2d 318 (2nd Dept. 1976).

The Plaintiff's assignor, being a resident of the State of New York who was not an insured or the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle, struck by a vehicle that left the scene after striking the assignor, a pedestrian, is a "qualified person" pursuant to Insurance Law § 5202(b). "[This] threshold determination that an individual is a qualified person' does not, however, end the inquiry." Canty v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, supra . Before MVAIC becomes obligated to pay no-fault first party benefits pursuant to the Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, Insurance Law Article 51, to a "qualified person" that individual must also be a "covered person" by complying with the requirements of Insurance Law Article 52. A.B. Medical Services PLLC v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., supra .; Ocean Diagnostic Imaging v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., supra .; Insurance Law § 5221(b)(2) ["A qualified person who has complied with all the applicable requirements of [*6]this article shall be deemed to be a covered person and shall have only such rights as a covered person may have under article fifty-one of this chapter."]

Insurance Law § 5208 specifically provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The protection provided by the corporation on account of motor vehicle accidents caused by financially irresponsible motorists shall be available to:

(2)(A) Any qualified person having a cause of action because of death or bodily injury, arising out of a motor vehicle accident occurring within this state and reported within twenty-four hours after the occurrence to a police, peace or judicial officer in the vicinity or to the commissioner, and who files with the corporation within ninety days of the accrual of the cause of action, as a condition precedent to the right to apply for payment from the corporation, an affidavit stating that: (i) the person has the cause of action for damages arising out of the accident and setting forth the supporting facts, (ii) the cause of action is against a person whose identity is unascertainable, and (iii) the person is making a claim for those damages. Hempstead General Hospital v. MVAIC, 97 AD2d 544, 468 NYS2d 48 (2nd Dept. 1983)

The Plaintiff, however, need not plead or prove its assignor's compliance with these requirements as part of its prima facie case.

Insurance Law § 5221futher provides, in pertinent part:

(b)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the corporation [MVAIC] shall also provide for the payment of first party benefits to a qualified person for basic economic loss arising out of the use or operation in this state of an uninsured motor vehicle.

(3) The corporation shall have only those rights and obligation which are applicable to an insurer subject to article fifty-one of this chapter.

(c) The corporation shall continue to comply with the plan of operation approved by the superintendent, which provides for the economical, prompt and fair payment of first party benefits to qualified persons in substantially the same manner as is required of insurers and self-insurers by article fifty-one of this chapter and regulations of the superintendent.

As with any other claimant for no-fault first party benefits, pursuant to Article 51 and the Insurance Department Regulations implementing the Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Ch. III, Subch. B, Pt. 65, to establish a prima facie case the Plaintiff need only demonstrate "that [it] submitted claims, setting forth the fact and the amount of the loss sustained, and the payment of no -fault benefits was overdue (citations omitted)." A.B. Medical Serivces PLLC v. Motor Vehicle Accident [*7]Indemnification Corp., 6 Misc 3d 131(A), 800 NYS2d 341 (App. Term 2nd and 11th Jud. Dists. 2005)

Payments will be overdue when the carrier has failed to either pay a claim or issue a timely valid denial. 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65-3.8(c); New York Craniofacial Care, P.C. v. Allstate Insurance Company, supra .; Nyack Hospital v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 11 AD3d 664, 784 NYS2d 136 (2nd Dept. 2004); Presbyterian Hospital in the City of New York v. Maryland Casualty Company, supra . Contrary to the Defendant's argument herein, MVAIC's time to pay or deny a claim begins to run upon receipt of the claim and not after MVAIC has "qualified" the claimant. New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation;, supra .; A.B. Medical Serivces PLLC v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., supra .

There is no dispute herein that the Defendant did not pay. The only "denial" tendered was a letter from the Defendant erroneously indicating that the assignor is not a "qualified person" and that the accident in question was not reported to the police within twenty-four (24) hours. This "denial" was not issued on the "prescribed claim forms that must be used by all insurers, [which] shall not be altered unless approved by the superintendent" 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65-3.(c), rendering it incomplete and invalid on its face. Nyack Hospital v. Metropolitan Casualty & Liability Insurance Company, 16 AD3d 564, 791 NYS2d 658 (2nd Dept. 2005) lv. den. 5 NY3d 713, 806 NYS2d 163 (2005); Nyack Hospital v. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, supra .; Spineamaricare Medical, P.C. v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Company, 12 Misc 3d 138(A), 824 NYS2d 766 (App. Term 9th and 10th Jud. Dists. 2006).

Nevertheless, the Defendant's argument remains concerning the Plaintiff's assignor's compliance with Insurance Law § 5208(a)(2)(A), establishing her as a "covered person" entitled to recover no-fault first party benefits from the Defendant. The Defendant's "lack of coverage" defense is not waived by its failure to issue a proper denial. Central General Hospital v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 90 NY2d 195, 659 NYS2d 246 (1997); Hospital for Joint Diseases v. Allstate Insurance Company, 21 AD2d 348, 800 NYS2d 190 (2nd Dept. 2005) It should be emphasized however, that this lack of coverage defense is just that, a defense, to be raised by the Defendant; it is not a pleading requirement for the Plaintiff; and it is the Defendant's burden, not the Plaintiff's, to "establish that the [Plaintiff] failed to comply with the notification provision" of Insurance Law § 5208(a)(2)(A). Matter of Country Wide Insurance Co., 201 AD2d 368, 607 NYS2d 648 (1st Dept. 1994) This the Defendant has not done.

The Defendant acknowledges that the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Intention to Make A Claim within ninety (90) days of the date of the accident, which indicates that the accident was reported to the 102nd Precinct of the New York City Police Department on the date of the accident. As previously indicated, in an effort to rebut this representation, the Defendant submits the report of its hired investigator which is based upon nothing [*8]more than a conversation this investigator had with a Cadet at the 102nd Precinct. The court notes that this report indicates that it is a "Supplemental" report; but, the original report is not submitted to the court. The investigator's report further indicates that the Cadet with whom he spoke was confused, completing two (2) separate reports, because more than one individual was apparently involved, when only one report was required. The investigator further indicates that based upon his conversation with the Cadet and a printout of a complaint report, which was provided to MVAIC ^[FN1] but not to this court, the Plaintiff's assignor reported the accident at the station house some time on the second day following the accident. The investigator's report is silent as to whether or not the accident was reported at the scene, in addition to the report made at the station house.

This "proof" tendered by the Defendant raises more questions than it answers. Even if the court were to overlook that the investigator's report is not in evidentiary form and replete with double and triple hearsay entries, it does not conclusively demonstrate that "the accident was not reported within twenty-four hours after the occurrence ... or that it was made as soon as was reasonably possible." Insurance Law § 5208(a)(2)(B) The Defendant's papers alone having raised significant questions regarding the reporting of this accident to the police, which cannot be resolved without a determination of credibility, a hearing on this issue will ultimately be necessary. Matter of Country Wide Insurance Co., supra .; Canty v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, supra .; Francis v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 41 AD2d 556, 340 NYS2d 2 (2nd Dept. 1973); Caceres v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 37 AD3d 215, 829 NYS2d 487 (1st Dept. 2007); Chick v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 74 AD2d 558, 424 NYS2d 280 (2nd Dept. 1980)

Mindful that this court has not chosen to treat the Defendant's motion as one for summary judgment under CPLR §§ 3211(c) and 3212, the Plaintiff has not been forced to come forth with proof regarding the reporting of this accident, which proof may well exist.

"Although absent further evidence, the dispute may be finally resolved on the more embracive and exploratory motion for summary judgment, disposition by summary dismissal under CPLR 3211 (subd. (a), par. 7) [which is what the Defendant requests] is premature." Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., Inc., supra . Accordingly, that branch of the Defendant's motion which seeks to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), is denied.

The parties do not dispute that the Defendant's obligation to pay no-fault first party benefits was "created or imposed by statute, but for which [it] would not exist. Hence the [*9]three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214[2]) applies." Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 89 NY2d 214, 652 NYS2d 584 (1996); See also: Stracar Medical Services, P.C. v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 10 Misc 3d 1056(A), 809 NYS2d 484 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co. 2005)

As previously indicated, MVIAC's obligation to pay or deny begins upon its receipt of the claims in question; and, payments are overdue if not paid or properly denied within thirty (30) days of their receipt. CPLR § 5106(a); 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65-3.8(c); Presbyterian Hospital in the City of New York v. Maryland Casualty Company, supra .; Nyack Hospital v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, supra .; Westchester Medical Center v. AIG, Inc., supra . This is the accrual date for the Plaintiff's cause of action. Micha v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Company, 94 AD2d 835, 463 NYS2d 110 (3 Dept. 1983); Benson v. Boston Old Colony Insurance Company, 134 AD2d 214, 521 NYS2d 14 (1st Dept.1987); Alleviation Supplies Inc. v. Enterprise Rent A Car, 12 Misc 3d 787, 819 NYS2d 404 (Civ.Ct. Richmond Co. 2006)

While the Plaintiff alleges that it sent two (2) bills dated October 29, 2002 to the Defendant, which comprise the claim herein, neither party knows when, if at all, these bills were received by the Defendant. Although not required to do so at this time, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated "proof of actual mailing or proof of a standard office practice or procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed", Amaze Medical Supply Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Company, 3 Misc 3d 133(A), 787 NYS2d 675 (App. Term 2nd and 11th Jud. Dists. 2004); Residential Holding Corp. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, 286 AD2d 679, 729 NYS2d 776 (2nd Dept. 2001), which would have raised a presumption of their receipt. Similarly, there is no proper denial, or any other indication from the Defendant, indicating when these bills were received, which would have substituted for proof of mailing. Prestige Medical & Surgical Supply Inc. v. Clarendon National Insurance Company, 13 Misc 3d 127(A), 824 NYS2d 758 (App. Term 2nd and 11th Jud. Dists. 2006); Magnezit Medical Care, P.C. v. New York Central Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 12 Misc 3d 144(A), 824 NYS2d 763 (App. Term 2nd and 11th Jud. Dists. 2006).

Although the issue of the statute of limitations was raised and the parties were given the opportunity to appear before the court and address this specific issue, neither party has provided the court with the necessary information to determine when, if at all, the Plaintiff's cause of action accrued. It is possible that the Plaintiff mailed the subject bills on or about October 29, 2002 and that they were received by the Defendant shortly thereafter; it is also possible that the bills were mailed on or about October 29, 2002 but never received by the Defendant; and, it is possible that these bills were actually never mailed at all. The Defendant, who made this motion seeking dismissal, has not provided the court with any information which would permit the court to divine which of these scenarios occurred, when the cause of action accrued and whether or not the Plaintiff's action was timely commenced. Accordingly, that branch of the Defendant's motion to dismiss this action based upon the [*10]running of the statute of limitations is denied; and, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the Defendant shall serve an Answer upon the Plaintiff within thirty (30) days of service of a copy of this order with Notice of Entry.

This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Dated: Hempstead, New York

April 20, 2007

___________________________

ANDREW M. ENGEL

J.D.C.